ssl/ssl_lib.c

/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 * 
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 * 
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 * 
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
 *
 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
 * license.
 *
 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
 *
 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
 *
 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
 * to make use of the Contribution.
 *
 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
 * OTHERWISE. */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <assert.h>

#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>

#include "ssl_locl.h"

SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
	/* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
	(int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
	ssl_undefined_function,
	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
	(int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
	(int (*)(SSL *,  const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
	0,	/* finish_mac_length */
	(int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
	NULL,	/* client_finished_label */
	0,	/* client_finished_label_len */
	NULL,	/* server_finished_label */
	0,	/* server_finished_label_len */
	(int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
		 size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
		 int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function,
	};

int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
	{

	if (s->method == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_clear, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
		return(0);
		}

	if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
		{
		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
		s->session=NULL;
		}

	s->error=0;
	s->hit=0;
	s->shutdown=0;

#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
       * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
	/* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
	 * the old cipher.  It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
	if (s->renegotiate) return(1);
#else
	if (s->renegotiate)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_clear, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
		return 0;
		}
#endif

	s->type=0;

	s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);

	s->version=s->method->version;
	s->client_version=s->version;
	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
	s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
#if 0
	s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
#endif

	if (s->init_buf != NULL)
		{
		BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
		s->init_buf=NULL;
		}

	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);

	s->first_packet=0;

#if 1
	/* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
	 * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
	if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
		{
		s->method->ssl_free(s);
		s->method=s->ctx->method;
		if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
			return(0);
		}
	else
#endif
		s->method->ssl_clear(s);
	return(1);
	}

/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
	{
	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;

	ctx->method=meth;

	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(
		ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,
		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ?
			"SSLv2" :
			SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
		ctx->cert);

	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
		return(0);
		}
	return(1);
	}

SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	SSL *s;

	if (ctx == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
		return(NULL);
		}
	if (ctx->method == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
		return(NULL);
		}

	s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
	if (s == NULL) goto err;
	memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL));

	s->options=ctx->options;
	s->mode=ctx->mode;
	s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;

	if (ctx->cert != NULL)
		{
		/* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
		 * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new
		 * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be
		 * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX
		 * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly
		 * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
		 * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert).
		 * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having
		 * duplicated it once. */

		s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
		if (s->cert == NULL)
			goto err;
		}
	else
		s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */

	s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
	s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
	s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
	s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
#if 0
	s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
#endif
	s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
	assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
	memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
	s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
	s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;

	s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
	if (!s->param)
		goto err;
	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
#if 0
	s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
	s->trust = ctx->trust;
#endif
	s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
	s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;

	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
	s->ctx=ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
	s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
	s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
	s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
	s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
	s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
	s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
	s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
	s->initial_ctx=ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
		{
		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
			BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
					ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
		if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
			goto err;
		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
					ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
		}
	if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
		{
		s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
			BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
					ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
		if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
			goto err;
		s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 
					ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
		}
#endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
	s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
# endif

	if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
		{
		s->alpn_client_proto_list =
			OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
		if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
			goto err;
		memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list,
		       s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
		s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
		}
#endif

	s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;

	s->method=ctx->method;

	if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
		goto err;

	s->references=1;
	s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;

	SSL_clear(s);

	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
	s->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
	if (ctx->psk_identity_hint)
		{
		s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
		if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
			goto err;
		}
	s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
	s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
#endif

	return(s);
err:
	if (s != NULL)
		{
		if (s->cert != NULL)
			ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
		if (s->ctx != NULL)
			SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
		OPENSSL_free(s);
		}
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
	return(NULL);
	}

int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
				   unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
    {
    if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx)
	{
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
	return 0;
	}
    ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
    memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);

    return 1;
    }

int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
			       unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
    {
    if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
	{
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_session_id_context, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
	return 0;
	}
    ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
    memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);

    return 1;
    }

int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
	{
	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
	ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
	return 1;
	}

int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
	{
	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
	ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
	return 1;
	}

int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
				unsigned int id_len)
	{
	/* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
	 * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
	 * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
	 * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
	 * use by this SSL. */
	SSL_SESSION r, *p;

	if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
		return 0;

	r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
	r.session_id_length = id_len;
	memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
	/* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
	 * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
	 * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
	 * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
	if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
			(id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
		{
		memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
			SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
		r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
		}

	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
	p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
	CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
	return (p != NULL);
	}

int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
	{
	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
	}

int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
	{
	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
	}

int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
	{
	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
	}

int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
	{
	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
	}

int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
	{
	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
	}

int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
	{
	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
	}

void ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(
	struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list)
	{
	sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list->ciphers);
	OPENSSL_free(cipher_list->in_group_flags);
	OPENSSL_free(cipher_list);
	}

struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st*
ssl_cipher_preference_list_dup(
	struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *cipher_list)
	{
	struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* ret = NULL;
	size_t n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list->ciphers);

	ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st));
	if (!ret)
		goto err;
	ret->ciphers = NULL;
	ret->in_group_flags = NULL;
	ret->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list->ciphers);
	if (!ret->ciphers)
		goto err;
	ret->in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(n);
	if (!ret->in_group_flags)
		goto err;
	memcpy(ret->in_group_flags, cipher_list->in_group_flags, n);
	return ret;

err:
	if (ret->ciphers)
		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ret->ciphers);
	if (ret)
		OPENSSL_free(ret);
	return NULL;
	}

struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st*
ssl_cipher_preference_list_from_ciphers(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers)
	{
	struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st* ret = NULL;
	size_t n = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers);

	ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st));
	if (!ret)
		goto err;
	ret->ciphers = NULL;
	ret->in_group_flags = NULL;
	ret->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(ciphers);
	if (!ret->ciphers)
		goto err;
	ret->in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(n);
	if (!ret->in_group_flags)
		goto err;
	memset(ret->in_group_flags, 0, n);
	return ret;

err:
	if (ret->ciphers)
		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ret->ciphers);
	if (ret)
		OPENSSL_free(ret);
	return NULL;
	}

X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	return ctx->param;
	}

X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl)
	{
	return ssl->param;
	}

void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s)
	{
	ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert);
	}

void SSL_free(SSL *s)
	{
	int i;

	if(s == NULL)
	    return;

	i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
	REF_PRINT("SSL",s);
#endif
	if (i > 0) return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
	if (i < 0)
		{
		fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
		abort(); /* ok */
		}
#endif

	if (s->param)
		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);

	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);

	if (s->bbio != NULL)
		{
		/* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
		if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
			{
			s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
			}
		BIO_free(s->bbio);
		s->bbio=NULL;
		}
	if (s->rbio != NULL)
		BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
	if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
		BIO_free_all(s->wbio);

	if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);

	/* add extra stuff */
	if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
		ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(s->cipher_list);
	if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);

	/* Make the next call work :-) */
	if (s->session != NULL)
		{
		ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
		}

	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);

	if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
	/* Free up if allocated */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
	if (s->tlsext_hostname)
		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
	if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
	if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
		sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
						X509_EXTENSION_free);
        /* TODO(fork): OCSP support */
#if 0
	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
		sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
#endif
	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
	if (s->alpn_client_proto_list)
		OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list);
	if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
		EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private);
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
	if (s->psk_identity_hint)
		OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint);
#endif

	if (s->client_CA != NULL)
		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);

	if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);

	if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);

#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
	if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
		OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
#endif

        if (s->srtp_profiles)
            sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
	if (s->tlsa_record && s->tlsa_record!=(void *)-1)
		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsa_record);
#endif

	OPENSSL_free(s);
	}

void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
	{
	/* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
	 */
	if (s->bbio != NULL)
		{
		if (s->wbio == s->bbio)
			{
			s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio;
			s->bbio->next_bio=NULL;
			}
		}
	if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
		BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
	if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
		BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
	s->rbio=rbio;
	s->wbio=wbio;
	}

BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
	{ return(s->rbio); }

BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
	{ return(s->wbio); }

int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
	{
	return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
	}

int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
	{
	int ret= -1;
	BIO *b,*r;

	b=SSL_get_rbio(s);
	r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
	if (r != NULL)
		BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
	return(ret);
	}

int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
	{
	int ret= -1;
	BIO *b,*r;

	b=SSL_get_wbio(s);
	r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
	if (r != NULL)
		BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
	return(ret);
	}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd)
	{
	int ret=0;
	BIO *bio=NULL;

	bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd());

	if (bio == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_fd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
		goto err;
		}
	BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
	SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio);
	ret=1;
err:
	return(ret);
	}

int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd)
	{
	int ret=0;
	BIO *bio=NULL;

	if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_FD)
		|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd))
		{
		bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd());

		if (bio == NULL)
			{
                        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_wfd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
                        goto err;
                        }
		BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
		SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio);
		}
	else
		SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s));
	ret=1;
err:
	return(ret);
	}

int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd)
	{
	int ret=0;
	BIO *bio=NULL;

	if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_FD)
		|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd))
		{
		bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_fd());

		if (bio == NULL)
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_rfd, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
		SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s));
		}
	else
		SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s));
	ret=1;
err:
	return(ret);
	}
#endif


/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
	{
	size_t ret = 0;
	
	if (s->s3 != NULL)
		{
		ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
		if (count > ret)
			count = ret;
		memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
		}
	return ret;
	}

/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
	{
	size_t ret = 0;
	
	if (s->s3 != NULL)
		{
		ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
		if (count > ret)
			count = ret;
		memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
		}
	return ret;
	}


int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
	{
	return(s->verify_mode);
	}

int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
	{
	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
	}

int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
	{
	return(s->verify_callback);
	}

int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	return(ctx->verify_mode);
	}

int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
	}

int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
	{
	return(ctx->default_verify_callback);
	}

void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode,
		    int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
	{
	s->verify_mode=mode;
	if (callback != NULL)
		s->verify_callback=callback;
	}

void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
	{
	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
	}

void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes)
	{
	s->read_ahead=yes;
	}

int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
	{
	return(s->read_ahead);
	}

int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
	{
	/* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
	 * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)),
	 * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report
	 * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data.
	 * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value,
	 * so we'd better not return -1.)
	 */
	return(s->method->ssl_pending(s));
	}

X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
	{
	X509 *r;
	
	if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
		r=NULL;
	else
		r=s->session->peer;

	if (r == NULL) return(r);

	CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);

	return(r);
	}

STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
	{
	STACK_OF(X509) *r;
	
	if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
		r=NULL;
	else
		r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;

	/* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own
	 * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */
	
	return(r);
	}

/* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
 * modify.  We need to be able to read f without being hassled */
void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f)
	{
	CERT *tmp;

	/* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
	SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f));

	/* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or
	 * vice-versa */
	if (t->method != f->method)
		{
		t->method->ssl_free(t);	/* cleanup current */
		t->method=f->method;	/* change method */
		t->method->ssl_new(t);	/* setup new */
		}

	tmp=t->cert;
	if (f->cert != NULL)
		{
		CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
		t->cert=f->cert;
		}
	else
		t->cert=NULL;
	if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp);
	SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length);
	}

/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	if (	(ctx == NULL) ||
		(ctx->cert == NULL) ||
		(ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL))
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
		return(0);
		}
	if 	(ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
		return(0);
		}
	return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
	}

/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
	{
	if (ssl == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
		return(0);
		}
	if (ssl->cert == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
		return 0;
		}
	if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
		return(0);
		}
	if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_check_private_key, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
		return(0);
		}
	return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
		ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
	}

int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
		/* Not properly initialized yet */
		SSL_set_accept_state(s);

	return(s->method->ssl_accept(s));
	}

int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
		/* Not properly initialized yet */
		SSL_set_connect_state(s);

	return(s->method->ssl_connect(s));
	}

long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
	{
	return(s->method->get_timeout());
	}

int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
	{
	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_read, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
		return -1;
		}

	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
		{
		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
		return(0);
		}
	return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num));
	}

int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
	{
	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_peek, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
		return -1;
		}

	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
		{
		return(0);
		}
	return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num));
	}

int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num)
	{
	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_write, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
		return -1;
		}

	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)
		{
		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_write, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
		return(-1);
		}
	return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num));
	}

int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
	{
	/* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
	 * expect.  Return values are 0 for no success (yet),
	 * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough,
	 * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown).
	 */

	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_shutdown, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
		return -1;
		}

	if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
		return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
	else
		return(1);
	}

int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->renegotiate == 0)
		s->renegotiate=1;

	s->new_session=1;

	return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
	}

int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->renegotiate == 0)
		s->renegotiate=1;

	s->new_session=0;

	return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
	}

int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
	{
	/* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
	 * false again once a handshake has finished */
	return (s->renegotiate != 0);
	}

long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
	{
	long l;

	switch (cmd)
		{
	case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
		return(s->read_ahead);
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
		l=s->read_ahead;
		s->read_ahead=larg;
		return(l);

	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
		s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
		return 1;

	case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
		return(s->options|=larg);
	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
		return(s->options&=~larg);
	case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
		return(s->mode|=larg);
	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
		return(s->mode &=~larg);
	case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
		return(s->max_cert_list);
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
		l=s->max_cert_list;
		s->max_cert_list=larg;
		return(l);
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
		if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
			return 0;
#endif

		if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
			{
			s->d1->mtu = larg;
			return larg;
			}
		return 0;
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
			return 0;
		s->max_send_fragment = larg;
		return 1;
	case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
		if (s->s3)
			return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
		else return 0;
	case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
		return(s->cert->cert_flags|=larg);
	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
		return(s->cert->cert_flags &=~larg);

	case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST:
		if (parg)
			{
			if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL)
				return 0;
			*(unsigned char **)parg = s->cert->ciphers_raw;
			return (int)s->cert->ciphers_rawlen;
			}
		else
			return ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
	default:
		return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
		}
	}

long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
	{
	switch(cmd)
		{
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
		s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
		return 1;
		
	default:
		return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
		}
	}

LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	return ctx->sessions;
	}

long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
	{
	long l;

	switch (cmd)
		{
	case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
		return(ctx->read_ahead);
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
		l=ctx->read_ahead;
		ctx->read_ahead=larg;
		return(l);
		
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
		ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
		return 1;

	case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
		return(ctx->max_cert_list);
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
		l=ctx->max_cert_list;
		ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
		return(l);

	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
		l=ctx->session_cache_size;
		ctx->session_cache_size=larg;
		return(l);
	case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
		return(ctx->session_cache_size);
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
		l=ctx->session_cache_mode;
		ctx->session_cache_mode=larg;
		return(l);
	case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
		return(ctx->session_cache_mode);

	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
		return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_accept);
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_hit);
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_miss);
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
		return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
	case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
		return(ctx->options|=larg);
	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
		return(ctx->options&=~larg);
	case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
		return(ctx->mode|=larg);
	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
		return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
			return 0;
		ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
		return 1;
	case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
		return(ctx->cert->cert_flags|=larg);
	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
		return(ctx->cert->cert_flags &=~larg);
	default:
		return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
		}
	}

long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
	{
	switch(cmd)
		{
	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
		ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
		return 1;

	default:
		return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
		}
	}

int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
	{
	long l;
	const SSL_CIPHER *a = in_a;
	const SSL_CIPHER *b = in_b;
	const long a_id = a->id;
	const long b_id = b->id;

	l = a_id - b_id;
	if (l == 0L)
		return(0);
	else
		return((l > 0)?1:-1);
	}

int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER **ap, const SSL_CIPHER **bp)
	{
	long l;
	const long a_id = (*ap)->id;
	const long b_id = (*bp)->id;

	l = a_id - b_id;
	if (l == 0)
		return(0);
	else
		return((l > 0)?1:-1);
	}

/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
 * preference */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
	{
	if (s == NULL)
		return NULL;

	if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
		{
		return(s->cipher_list->ciphers);
		}

	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
		{
		if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL)
			return s->ctx->cipher_list_tls11->ciphers;
		}

	if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
		(s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
		{
		return(s->ctx->cipher_list->ciphers);
		}

	return(NULL);
	}

/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
 * algorithm id */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
	{
	if (s != NULL)
		{
		if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
			{
			return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
			}
		else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
			(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
			{
			return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
			}
		}
	return(NULL);
	}

/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n)
	{
	SSL_CIPHER *c;
	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;

	if (s == NULL) return(NULL);
	sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
		return(NULL);
	c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n);
	if (c == NULL) return(NULL);
	return(c->name);
	}

/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
	{
	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
	
	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
		&ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str, ctx->cert);
	/* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
	 * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
	 * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
	 * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
	 * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
	 * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
	 * updated. */
	if (sk == NULL)
		return 0;
	else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
		return 0;
		}
	return 1;
	}

int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
	{
	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
	
	sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list_tls11, NULL, str, ctx->cert);
	if (sk == NULL)
		return 0;
	else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list_tls11, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
		return 0;
		}
	return 1;
	}

/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
	{
	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
	
	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
		&s->cipher_list_by_id,str, s->cert);
	/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
	if (sk == NULL)
		return 0;
	else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_set_cipher_list, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
		return 0;
		}
	return 1;
	}

/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
	{
	char *p;
	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
	SSL_CIPHER *c;
	int i;

	if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) ||
		(len < 2))
		return(NULL);

	p=buf;
	sk=s->session->ciphers;

	if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
		return NULL;

	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
		{
		int n;

		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
		n=strlen(c->name);
		if (n+1 > len)
			{
			if (p != buf)
				--p;
			*p='\0';
			return buf;
			}
		strcpy(p,c->name);
		p+=n;
		*(p++)=':';
		len-=n+1;
		}
	p[-1]='\0';
	return(buf);
	}

int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
			     int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
	{
	int i,j=0;
	SSL_CIPHER *c;
	CERT *ct = s->cert;
	unsigned char *q;
	int no_scsv = s->renegotiate;
	/* Set disabled masks for this session */
	ssl_set_client_disabled(s);

	if (sk == NULL) return(0);
	q=p;

	if (put_cb == NULL)
		put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;

	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
		{
		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
		/* Skip disabled ciphers */
		if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl ||
			c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k ||
			c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
			continue;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
		if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV)
			{
			if (no_scsv)
				continue;
			else
				no_scsv = 1;
			}
#endif
		j = put_cb(c, p);
		p += j;
		}
	/* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
	 * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
	 */
	if (p != q)
		{
		if (!no_scsv)
			{
			static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
				{
				0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
				};
			j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
			p += j;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
			fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
#endif
			}
		if (s->fallback_scsv)
			{
			static SSL_CIPHER fallback_scsv =
				{
				0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
				};
			j = put_cb(&fallback_scsv, p);
			p += j;
			}
		}

	return(p-q);
	}

STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
					       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
	{
	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
	int i,n;
	if (s->s3)
		s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;

	n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
	if ((num%n) != 0)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
		return(NULL);
		}
	if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
		sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
	else
		{
		sk= *skp;
		sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
		}

	if (s->cert->ciphers_raw)
		OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ciphers_raw);
	s->cert->ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num);
	if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		goto err;
		}
	s->cert->ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num;

	for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
		{
		/* Check for SCSV */
		if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
			(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
			{
			/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
			if (s->renegotiate)
				{
				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 
				goto err;
				}
			s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
			p += n;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
			fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
#endif
			continue;
			}

		/* Check for FALLBACK_SCSV */
		if (s->s3 && n == 2 &&
			(p[0] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
			(p[1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)) &&
			s->version < ssl_get_max_version(s))
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
			goto err;
			}

		c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
		p+=n;
		if (c != NULL)
			{
			if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c))
				{
				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
				goto err;
				}
			}
		}

	if (skp != NULL)
		*skp=sk;
	return(sk);
err:
	if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
	return(NULL);
	}


#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
 * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
 */

const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
	{
	if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
		return NULL;

	return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
		s->session->tlsext_hostname :
		s->tlsext_hostname;
	}

int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
		return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
	return -1;
	}

/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
 * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
 * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
 *
 * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
 * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
 * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
 *
 * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
 *
 * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
 * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
 * or have a default application level protocol.
 *
 * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
 * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
 * API that this fallback case was enacted.
 *
 * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
 * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
 * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
 * a client should use.
 *
 * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
 * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
 *
 * It returns either
 * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
 * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
 */
int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
	{
	unsigned int i, j;
	const unsigned char *result;
	int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;

	/* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
	for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
		{
		for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
			{
			if (server[i] == client[j] &&
			    memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
				{
				/* We found a match */
				result = &server[i];
				status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
				goto found;
				}
			j += client[j];
			j++;
			}
		i += server[i];
		i++;
		}

	/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
	result = client;
	status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;

	found:
	*out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
	*outlen = result[0];
	return status;
	}

# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
 * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
 * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
 *
 * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
 * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
 * provided by the callback.
 */
void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
	{
	*data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
	if (!*data) {
		*len = 0;
	} else {
		*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
	}
}

/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
 * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
 * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format.  The list is returned
 * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
 * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
 * it.
 *
 * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
 * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
	{
	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
	}

/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
 * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
 * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
 * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
 * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
 * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
 *
 * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
 * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
 */
void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
	{
	ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
	ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
	}
# endif

int SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned short ext_type,
			       custom_cli_ext_first_cb_fn fn1, 
			       custom_cli_ext_second_cb_fn fn2, void* arg)
	{
	size_t i;
	custom_cli_ext_record* record;

	/* Check for duplicates */
	for (i=0; i < ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
		if (ext_type == ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i].ext_type)
			return 0;

	ctx->custom_cli_ext_records = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->custom_cli_ext_records,
						      (ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count + 1) * 
						      sizeof(custom_cli_ext_record));
	if (!ctx->custom_cli_ext_records) {
		ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count = 0;
		return 0;
	}
	ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count++;
	record = &ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count - 1];
	record->ext_type = ext_type;
	record->fn1 = fn1;
	record->fn2 = fn2;
	record->arg = arg;
	return 1;
	}

int SSL_CTX_set_custom_srv_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned short ext_type,
			       custom_srv_ext_first_cb_fn fn1, 
			       custom_srv_ext_second_cb_fn fn2, void* arg)
	{
	size_t i;
	custom_srv_ext_record* record;

	/* Check for duplicates */	
	for (i=0; i < ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
		if (ext_type == ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i].ext_type)
			return 0;

	ctx->custom_srv_ext_records = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->custom_srv_ext_records,
						      (ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count + 1) * 
						      sizeof(custom_srv_ext_record));
	if (!ctx->custom_srv_ext_records) {
		ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count = 0;
		return 0;
	}
	ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count++;
	record = &ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count - 1];
	record->ext_type = ext_type;
	record->fn1 = fn1;
	record->fn2 = fn2;
	record->arg = arg;
	return 1;
	}

/* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|.
 * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
 * length-prefixed strings).
 *
 * Returns 0 on success. */
int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char* protos,
			    unsigned protos_len)
	{
	if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
		OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);

	ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
	if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
		return 1;
	memcpy(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
	ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;

	return 0;
	}

/* SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|.
 * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
 * length-prefixed strings).
 *
 * Returns 0 on success. */
int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char* protos,
			unsigned protos_len)
	{
	if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
		OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);

	ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
	if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
		return 1;
	memcpy(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
	ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;

	return 0;
	}

/* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is called
 * during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the
 * client's list of offered protocols. */
void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX* ctx,
				int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
					   const unsigned char **out,
					   unsigned char *outlen,
					   const unsigned char *in,
					   unsigned int inlen,
					   void *arg),
				void *arg)
	{
	ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
	ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
	}

/* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|.
 * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name (not
 * including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't respond with
 * a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */
void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
			    unsigned *len)
	{
	*data = NULL;
	if (ssl->s3)
		*data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
	if (*data == NULL)
		*len = 0;
	else
		*len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
	}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */

int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
	const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
	int use_context)
	{
	if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
		return -1;

	return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
							   llen, p, plen,
							   use_context);
	}

static uint32_t ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
	{
	uint32_t hash = ((uint32_t) a->session_id[0]) ||
			((uint32_t) a->session_id[1] << 8) ||
			((uint32_t) a->session_id[2] << 16) ||
			((uint32_t) a->session_id[3] << 24);

	return hash;
	}

/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
 * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
 * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
 * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
 * with a matching session ID. */
static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
	{
	if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
		return(1);
	if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
		return(1);
	return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
	}

SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
	{
	SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;

	if (meth == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
		return(NULL);
		}

#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
	if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION))	
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
		return NULL;
		}
#endif

	if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
		goto err;
		}
	ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
	if (ret == NULL)
		goto err;

	memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX));

	ret->method=meth;

	ret->cert_store=NULL;
	ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
	ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
	ret->session_cache_head=NULL;
	ret->session_cache_tail=NULL;

	/* We take the system default */
	ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout();

	ret->new_session_cb=0;
	ret->remove_session_cb=0;
	ret->get_session_cb=0;
	ret->generate_session_id=0;

	memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));

	ret->references=1;
	ret->quiet_shutdown=0;

/*	ret->cipher=NULL;*/
/*	ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
	ret->master_key=NULL;
	ret->key_arg=NULL;
	ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */

	ret->info_callback=NULL;

	ret->app_verify_callback=0;
	ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;

	ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
	ret->read_ahead=0;
	ret->msg_callback=0;
	ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
	ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
#if 0
	ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
#endif
	ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
	ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
	if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
		goto err;

	ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
	ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
	ret->client_cert_cb=0;
	ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
	ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;

	ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp);
	if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
	ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
	if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;

	ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
		&ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert);
	if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
	    || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list->ciphers) <= 0)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
		goto err2;
		}

	ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
	if (!ret->param)
		goto err;

	ret->rsa_md5 = EVP_md5();
	ret->md5 = EVP_md5();
	ret->sha1 = EVP_sha1();

	if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
		goto err;

	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);

	ret->extra_certs=NULL;
	/* No compression for DTLS */
	if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
		ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();

	ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
	ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
	ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
	/* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
	if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
		|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
		|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
		ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;

	ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
	ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;

# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
	ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
	ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
	ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
	ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
	ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
#endif
	ret->custom_cli_ext_records = NULL;
	ret->custom_cli_ext_records_count = 0;
	ret->custom_srv_ext_records = NULL;
	ret->custom_srv_ext_records_count = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
	ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
	ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
	if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
		goto err;
	ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
	ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
	ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
	ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
	if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
		goto err;
		}
	ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
	ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
	ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
	ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
#define eng_strx(x)	#x
#define eng_str(x)	eng_strx(x)
	/* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
	{
	ENGINE *eng;
	eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
	if (!eng)
		{
		ERR_clear_error();
		ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
		eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
		}
	if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
		ERR_clear_error();
	}
#endif
#endif
	/* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
	 * deployed might change this.
	 */
	ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;

	return(ret);
err:
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err2:
	if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret);
	return(NULL);
	}

#if 0
static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
    { OPENSSL_free(comp); }
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
static void
ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
	{
	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
	for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next)
		{
		next = ent->next;
		OPENSSL_free(ent);
		}
	OPENSSL_free(list);
	}
#endif

void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
	{
	int i;

	if (a == NULL) return;

	i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
	REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a);
#endif
	if (i > 0) return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
	if (i < 0)
		{
		fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
		abort(); /* ok */
		}
#endif

	if (a->param)
		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);

	/*
	 * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
	 * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
	 * after the sessions were flushed.
	 * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
	 * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
	 * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
	 * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
	 */
	if (a->sessions != NULL)
		SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);

	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);

	if (a->sessions != NULL)
		lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);

	if (a->cert_store != NULL)
		X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
	if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
		ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(a->cipher_list);
	if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
	if (a->cipher_list_tls11 != NULL)
		ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(a->cipher_list_tls11);
	if (a->cert != NULL)
		ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
	if (a->client_CA != NULL)
		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
	if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
		sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */
	if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
		sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free);
#else
	a->comp_methods = NULL;
#endif

        if (a->srtp_profiles)
                sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
	if (a->psk_identity_hint)
		OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
	OPENSSL_free(a->custom_cli_ext_records);
	OPENSSL_free(a->custom_srv_ext_records);
#endif

	/* TODO(fork): remove. */
#if 0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
	if (a->client_cert_engine)
		ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
#endif
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
	if (a->wbuf_freelist)
		ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
	if (a->rbuf_freelist)
		ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	if (a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
		OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
	if (a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
		OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
	if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL)
		OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list);
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
	if (a->tlsext_channel_id_private)
		EVP_PKEY_free(a->tlsext_channel_id_private);
#endif

	OPENSSL_free(a);
	}

void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
	{
	ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb;
	}

void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u)
	{
	ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
	}

void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
	{
	ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
	ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
	}

void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
	{
	ctx->verify_mode=mode;
	ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
	}

void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
	{
	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
	}

void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
	{
	ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg);
	}

void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
	{
	ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg);
	}

void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
	{
	CERT_PKEY *cpk;
	int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign;
	int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
	int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
	unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
	int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	X509 *x = NULL;
	EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
	int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
#endif
	if (c == NULL) return;

	kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
	rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
		(rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl));
#else
	rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
	dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
	dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
		(dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl));
#else
	dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0;
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp || c->ecdh_tmp_cb || c->ecdh_tmp_auto);
#endif
	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
	rsa_enc= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
	rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
	rsa_sign= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
	dsa_sign= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
	dh_rsa=  cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
	dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
	dh_dsa=  cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
	dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	have_ecc_cert= cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
#endif
	mask_k=0;
	mask_a=0;
	emask_k=0;
	emask_a=0;

	

#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
	printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
	        rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
		rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
#endif
	
	cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
	if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
		mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
		mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
	}
	cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
	if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
		mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
		mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
	}

	if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
		mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
	if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
		emask_k|=SSL_kRSA;

#if 0
	/* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
	if (	(dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) &&
		(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
		mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
	if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
		(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
		emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
#endif

	if (dh_tmp_export)
		emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;

	if (dh_tmp)
		mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;

	if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
	if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr;

	if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
	if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd;

	if (emask_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
		mask_a |= SSL_aDH;

	if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
		{
		mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
		emask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
		}

	if (dsa_sign)
		{
		mask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
		emask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
		}

	mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
	emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;

	/* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
	 * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension.
	 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	if (have_ecc_cert)
		{
		cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC];
		x = cpk->x509;
		/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
		X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
		ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
		    (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
		ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
		    (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
		if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
			ecdsa_ok = 0;
		ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
		ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
		    EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
		EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
		if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
			{
			signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
			OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
			}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
		if (ecdh_ok)
			{

			if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
				{
				mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
				mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
				if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
					{
					emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
					emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
					}
				}

			if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
				{
				mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
				mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
				if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
					{
					emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
					emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
					}
				}
			}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
		if (ecdsa_ok)
			{
			mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
			emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
			}
#endif
		}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	if (have_ecdh_tmp)
		{
		mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
		emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
		}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
	mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
	mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
	emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
	emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
#endif

	c->mask_k=mask_k;
	c->mask_a=mask_a;
	c->export_mask_k=emask_k;
	c->export_mask_a=emask_a;
	c->valid=1;
	}

/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC

int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
	{
	unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
	int keysize = 0;
	int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
	const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;

	alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
	alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;

	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
		{
		/* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
		pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
		if (pkey == NULL) return 0;
		keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
		if (keysize > 163) return 0;
		}

	/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
	X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
	if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
		{
		signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
		OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
		}
	if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
		{
		/* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
		if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
			return 0;
			}
		if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
			{
			/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
			if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
				{
				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
				return 0;
				}
			}
		if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
			{
			/* signature alg must be RSA */

			if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
				{
				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
				return 0;
				}
			}
		}
	if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
		{
		/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
		if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
			return 0;
			}
		}

	return 1;  /* all checks are ok */
	}

#endif

static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s)
	{
	int idx;
	idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
	if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509)
		idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
	if (idx == -1)
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_server_cert_index, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	return idx;
	}

CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
	{
	CERT *c;
	int i;

	c = s->cert;
	ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);

#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
	/* Broken protocol test: return last used certificate: which may
	 * mismatch the one expected.
	 */
	if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
		return c->key;
#endif

	i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);

	/* This may or may not be an error. */
	if (i < 0)
		return NULL;

	/* May be NULL. */
	return &c->pkeys[i];
	}

EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd)
	{
	unsigned long alg_a;
	CERT *c;
	int idx = -1;

	alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
	c=s->cert;

#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
	/* Broken protocol test: use last key: which may
	 * mismatch the one expected.
	 */
	if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
		idx = c->key - c->pkeys;
	else
#endif

	if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
		(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
		idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
	else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
		{
		if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
			idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
		else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
			idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
		}
	else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
	         (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
		idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
	if (idx == -1)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_sign_pkey, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
		return(NULL);
		}
	if (pmd)
		*pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
	return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
	}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
unsigned char *ssl_get_authz_data(SSL *s, size_t *authz_length)
	{
	CERT *c;
	int i;

	c = s->cert;
	i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);

	if (i == -1)
		return NULL;

	*authz_length = 0;
	if (c->pkeys[i].authz == NULL)
		return(NULL);
	*authz_length = c->pkeys[i].authz_length;

	return c->pkeys[i].authz;
	}

int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo,
				   size_t *serverinfo_length)
	{
	CERT *c = NULL;
	int i = 0;
	*serverinfo_length = 0;

	c = s->cert;
	i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);

	if (i == -1)
		return 0;
	if (c->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL)
		return 0;

	*serverinfo = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo;
	*serverinfo_length = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
	return 1;
	}
#endif

void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
	{
	int i;

	/* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it,
	 * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
	if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;

	i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
	if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
		&& ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
		    || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session))
		&& (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
		{
		CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
		if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
			SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
		}

	/* auto flush every 255 connections */
	if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
		((i & mode) == mode))
		{
		if (  (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
			?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
			:s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
			{
			SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
			}
		}
	}

const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	return ctx->method;
	}

const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
	{
	return(s->method);
	}

int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
	{
	int conn= -1;
	int ret=1;

	if (s->method != meth)
		{
		if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
			conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);

		if (s->method->version == meth->version)
			s->method=meth;
		else
			{
			s->method->ssl_free(s);
			s->method=meth;
			ret=s->method->ssl_new(s);
			}

		if (conn == 1)
			s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect;
		else if (conn == 0)
			s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept;
		}
	return(ret);
	}

int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i)
	{
	int reason;
	unsigned long l;
	BIO *bio;

	if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE);

	/* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake
	 * etc, where we do encode the error */
	if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0)
		{
		if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
			return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
		else
			return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
		}

	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_session(s))
		return(SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION);

	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_certificate(s))
		return(SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE);

	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
		{
		bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
		if (BIO_should_read(bio))
			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
		else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
			/* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try
			 * to write to the rbio, and an application program where
			 * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it
			 * should wait for.
			 * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly
			 * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of
			 * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same,
			 * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer
			 * to keep it. */
			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
		else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
			{
			reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
			if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
			else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
			else
				return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
			}
		}

	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s))
		{
		bio=SSL_get_wbio(s);
		if (BIO_should_write(bio))
			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
		else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
			/* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */
			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
		else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
			{
			reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
			if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
			else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
			else
				return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
			}
		}
	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s))
		{
		return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
		}
	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s))
		{
		return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP);
		}

	if (i == 0)
		{
		if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
			{
			/* assume it is the socket being closed */
			return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
			}
		else
			{
			if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
				(s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
				return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
			}
		}
	return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
	}

int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
	{
	int ret=1;

	if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_do_handshake, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
		return(-1);
		}

	s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);

	if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
		{
		ret=s->handshake_func(s);
		}
	return(ret);
	}

/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
 * one of these calls will reset it */
void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
	{
	s->server=1;
	s->shutdown=0;
	s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
	s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
	/* clear the current cipher */
	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
	}

void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
	{
	s->server=0;
	s->shutdown=0;
	s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
	s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
	/* clear the current cipher */
	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
	}

int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
	{
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
	return(0);
	}

int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
	{
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_void_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
	return(0);
	}

int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
	{
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_undefined_const_function, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
	return(0);
	}

SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
	{
	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_bad_method, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
	return(NULL);
	}

const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
		return("TLSv1.2");
	else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
		return("TLSv1.1");
	else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
		return("TLSv1");
	else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
		return("SSLv3");
	else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
		return("SSLv2");
	else
		return("unknown");
	}

void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
		{
		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
		OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
		s->enc_read_ctx=NULL;
		}
	if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
		{
		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
		OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
		s->enc_write_ctx=NULL;
		}
	if (s->aead_read_ctx != NULL)
		{
		EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_read_ctx->ctx);
		OPENSSL_free(s->aead_read_ctx);
		s->aead_read_ctx = NULL;
		}
	if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL)
		{
		EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_write_ctx->ctx);
		OPENSSL_free(s->aead_write_ctx);
		s->aead_write_ctx = NULL;
		}
	}

X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->cert != NULL)
		return(s->cert->key->x509);
	else
		return(NULL);
	}

EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->cert != NULL)
		return(s->cert->key->privatekey);
	else
		return(NULL);
	}

X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	if (ctx->cert != NULL)
		return ctx->cert->key->x509;
	else
		return NULL;
	}

EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	if (ctx->cert != NULL)
		return ctx->cert->key->privatekey;
	else
		return NULL ;
	}

const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
	{
	if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
		return(s->session->cipher);
	return(NULL);
	}
const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
	{
	return NULL;
	}
const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
	{
	return NULL;
	}

int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push)
	{
	BIO *bbio;

	if (s->bbio == NULL)
		{
		bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
		if (bbio == NULL) return(0);
		s->bbio=bbio;
		}
	else
		{
		bbio=s->bbio;
		if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
			s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
		}
	(void)BIO_reset(bbio);
/*	if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
	if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1))
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_init_wbio_buffer, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
		return(0);
		}
	if (push)
		{
		if (s->wbio != bbio)
			s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio);
		}
	else
		{
		if (s->wbio == bbio)
			s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio);
		}
	return(1);
	}

void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->bbio == NULL) return;

	if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
		{
		/* remove buffering */
		s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
		assert(s->wbio != NULL);
#endif
	}
	BIO_free(s->bbio);
	s->bbio=NULL;
	}
	
void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode)
	{
	ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode;
	}

int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	return(ctx->quiet_shutdown);
	}

void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
	{
	s->quiet_shutdown=mode;
	}

int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
	{
	return(s->quiet_shutdown);
	}

void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
	{
	s->shutdown=mode;
	}

int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
	{
	return(s->shutdown);
	}

int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
	{
	return(s->version);
	}

SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
	{
	return(ssl->ctx);
	}

SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
	{
	if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
		return ssl->ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
	if (ctx == NULL)
		ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
#endif
	if (ssl->cert != NULL)
		ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
	ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
	if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
		SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
	ssl->ctx = ctx;

	ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
	assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
	memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));

	return(ssl->ctx);
	}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
	}

int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
		const char *CApath)
	{
	return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath));
	}
#endif

void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
	{
	ssl->info_callback=cb;
	}

/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
   function pointer.  */
void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
	{
	return ssl->info_callback;
	}

int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
	{
	return(ssl->state);
	}

void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
	{
	ssl->state = state;
	}

void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
	{
	ssl->verify_result=arg;
	}

long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
	{
	return(ssl->verify_result);
	}

int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
			 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
	{
	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
				new_func, dup_func, free_func);
	}

int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
	{
	return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
	}

void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx)
	{
	return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
	}

int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
			     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
	{
	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
				new_func, dup_func, free_func);
	}

int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
	{
	return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
	}

void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx)
	{
	return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
	}

int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
	{
	return(1);
	}

X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
	{
	return(ctx->cert_store);
	}

void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store)
	{
	if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
		X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
	ctx->cert_store=store;
	}

int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
	{
	return(s->rwstate);
	}

/*!
 * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
 * \param ctx the SSL context.
 * \param cb the callback
 */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
							  int is_export,
							  int keylength))
    {
    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
    }

void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
						  int is_export,
						  int keylength))
    {
    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
    }
#endif

#ifdef DOXYGEN
/*!
 * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
 * \param ssl the SSL session.
 * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
 * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
 * of the required key in bits.
 * \return the temporary RSA key.
 * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
 */

RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength)
    {}
#endif

/*!
 * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
 * \param ctx the SSL context.
 * \param dh the callback
 */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
                                                        int keylength))
	{
	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
	}

void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
                                                int keylength))
	{
	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
	}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
                                                                int keylength))
	{
	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
	}

void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
                                                        int keylength))
	{
	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
	}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
	{
	if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
		return 0;
		}
	if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
		OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
	if (identity_hint != NULL)
		{
		ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
		if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
			return 0;
		}
	else
		ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
	return 1;
	}

int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
	{
	if (s == NULL)
		return 0;

	if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_use_psk_identity_hint, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
		return 0;
		}

	/* Clear hint in SSL and associated SSL_SESSION (if any). */
	if (s->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint);
		s->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
		}
	if (s->session != NULL && s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
		s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
		}

	if (identity_hint != NULL)
		{
		/* The hint is stored in SSL and SSL_SESSION with the one in
		 * SSL_SESSION taking precedence. Thus, if SSL_SESSION is avaiable,
		 * we store the hint there, otherwise we store it in SSL. */
		if (s->session != NULL)
			{
			s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
			if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
				return 0;
			}
		else
			{
			s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
			if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
				return 0;
			}
		}
	return 1;
	}

const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
	{
	if (s == NULL)
		return NULL;
	/* The hint is stored in SSL and SSL_SESSION with the one in SSL_SESSION
	 * taking precedence. */
	if (s->session != NULL)
		return(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
	return(s->psk_identity_hint);
	}

const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
	{
	if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
		return NULL;
	return(s->session->psk_identity);
	}

void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
	{
	s->psk_client_callback = cb;
	}

void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
	{
	ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
	}

void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
	{
	s->psk_server_callback = cb;
	}

void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
	{
	ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
	}
#endif

void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
	{
	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
	}
void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
	{
	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
	}

int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
	{
	return (!s->server &&                 /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
		!s->hit &&                        /* full-handshake */
		s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
		s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 &&   /* cutthrough only applies to write() */
		(SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) &&  /* cutthrough enabled */
		ssl3_can_cutthrough(s) &&                                   /* cutthrough allowed */
		s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 &&                 /* not a renegotiation handshake */
		(s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A ||                 /* ready to write app-data*/
			s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A));
	}

void SSL_get_structure_sizes(size_t* ssl_size, size_t* ssl_ctx_size,
                             size_t* ssl_session_size)
{
	*ssl_size = sizeof(SSL);
	*ssl_ctx_size = sizeof(SSL_CTX);
	*ssl_session_size = sizeof(SSL_SESSION);
}

int ssl3_can_cutthrough(const SSL *s)
	{
	const SSL_CIPHER *c;

	/* require a strong enough cipher */
	if (SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) < 128)
		return 0;

	/* require ALPN or NPN extension */
	if (!s->s3->alpn_selected
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
		&& !s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen
#endif
	)
		{
		return 0;
		}

	/* require a forward-secret cipher */
	c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
	if (!c || (c->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kEDH &&
			c->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kEECDH))
		{
		return 0;
		}

	return 1;
	}

/* ssl_get_max_version returns the maximum SSL/TLS version number supported by
 * |s|, or zero if all versions are disabled. */
int ssl_get_max_version(const SSL *s)
	{
	/* Only one version supported for DTLS. */
	if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
		return DTLS1_VERSION;

	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
		return TLS1_2_VERSION;
	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
		return TLS1_1_VERSION;
	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
		return TLS1_VERSION;
	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
		return SSL3_VERSION;
	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
		return SSL2_VERSION;
	return 0;
	}

/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
 * vairable, freeing  EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
 * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
 * Returns newly allocated ctx;
 */

EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) 
{
	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
	*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
	if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
	return *hash;
}
void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) 
{

	if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
	*hash=NULL;
}

void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
	{
	s->debug = debug;
	}

int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
	{
	return s->hit;
	}

int SSL_is_server(SSL *s)
	{
	return s->server;
	}