ssl/t1_lib.c

/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 * 
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 * 
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 * 
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <assert.h>

#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>

#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
				SSL_SESSION **psess);
static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
#endif

SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
	tls1_enc,
	tls1_mac,
	tls1_setup_key_block,
	tls1_generate_master_secret,
	tls1_change_cipher_state,
	tls1_final_finish_mac,
	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	tls1_alert_code,
	tls1_export_keying_material,
	0,
	SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
	ssl3_handshake_write
	};

SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
	tls1_enc,
	tls1_mac,
	tls1_setup_key_block,
	tls1_generate_master_secret,
	tls1_change_cipher_state,
	tls1_final_finish_mac,
	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	tls1_alert_code,
	tls1_export_keying_material,
	SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
	SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
	ssl3_handshake_write
	};

SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
	tls1_enc,
	tls1_mac,
	tls1_setup_key_block,
	tls1_generate_master_secret,
	tls1_change_cipher_state,
	tls1_final_finish_mac,
	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	tls1_alert_code,
	tls1_export_keying_material,
	SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
		|SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
	SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
	ssl3_handshake_write
	};

long tls1_default_timeout(void)
	{
	/* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
	 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
	return(60*60*2);
	}

int tls1_new(SSL *s)
	{
	if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
	s->method->ssl_clear(s);
	return(1);
	}

void tls1_free(SSL *s)
	{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
	if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
		}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
	ssl3_free(s);
	}

void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
	{
	ssl3_clear(s);
	s->version = s->method->version;
	}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC

static int nid_list[] =
	{
		NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
		NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
		NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
		NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
		NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
		NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
		NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
		NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
		NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
		NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
		NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
		NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
		NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
		NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
		NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
		NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
		NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
		NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
		NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
		NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
		NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
		NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
		NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
		NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
		NID_secp521r1,  /* secp521r1 (25) */	
		NID_brainpoolP256r1,  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */	
		NID_brainpoolP384r1,  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */	
		NID_brainpoolP512r1  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */	
	};


static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = 
	{
	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
	};

static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
	{
		0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
		0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
		0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */	
		0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */	
		0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
		0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
		0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */	
		0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
		0,9,  /* sect283k1 (9) */
		0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
		0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */	
		0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
		0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
		0,8,  /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
		0,6,  /* sect233k1 (6) */
		0,7,  /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
		0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
		0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
		0,4,  /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
		0,5,  /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
		0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
		0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
		0,1,  /* sect163k1 (1) */
		0,2,  /* sect163r1 (2) */
		0,3,  /* sect163r2 (3) */
		0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
		0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
		0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
	};

static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
	{
		0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
		0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
	};

int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
	{
	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
	if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
				sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
		return 0;
	return nid_list[curve_id-1];
	}

int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
	{
	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
	switch (nid)
		{
	case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
		return 1;
	case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
		return 2;
	case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
		return 3;
	case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
		return 4;
	case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
		return 5;
	case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
		return 6;
	case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
		return 7;
	case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
		return 8;
	case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
		return 9;
	case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
		return 10;
	case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
		return 11;
	case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
		return 12;
	case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
		return 13;
	case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
		return 14;
	case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
		return 15;
	case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
		return 16;
	case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
		return 17;
	case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
		return 18;
	case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
		return 19;
	case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
		return 20;
	case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
		return 21;
	case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
		return 22;
	case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
		return 23;
	case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
		return 24;
	case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */	
		return 25;
	case NID_brainpoolP256r1:  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
		return 26;
	case NID_brainpoolP384r1:  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
		return 27;
	case NID_brainpoolP512r1:  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
		return 28;
	default:
		return 0;
		}
	}
/* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
 * preferred list
 */
static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
					const unsigned char **pcurves,
					size_t *pcurveslen)
	{
	if (sess)
		{
		*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
		*pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
		return;
		}
	/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
	switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
		{
	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
		*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
		*pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
		break;

	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
		*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
		*pcurveslen = 2;
		break;

	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
		*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
		*pcurveslen = 2;
		break;
	default:
		*pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
		*pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
		}
	if (!*pcurves)
		{
		*pcurves = eccurves_default;
		*pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
		}
	}
/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
	{
	const unsigned char *curves;
	size_t curveslen, i;
	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
	if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
		return 0;
	/* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
	if (suiteb_flags)
		{
		unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
		if (p[1])
			return 0;
		if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
			{
			if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
				return 0;
			}
		else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
			{
			if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
				return 0;
			}
		else	/* Should never happen */
			return 0;
		}
	tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
	for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
		{
		if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
			return 1;
		}
	return 0;
	}

/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
 * an EC tmp key.
 */

int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
	{
	const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
	size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
	int k;
	/* Can't do anything on client side */
	if (s->server == 0)
		return -1;
	if (nmatch == -2)
		{
		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
			{
			/* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we 
			 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
			 * checks.
			 */
			unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
			if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
				return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
			if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
				return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
			/* Should never happen */
			return NID_undef;
			}
		/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
		nmatch = 0;
		}
	tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
				&supp, &supplen);
	tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
				&pref, &preflen);
	preflen /= 2;
	supplen /= 2;
	k = 0;
	for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
		{
		const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
		for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
			{
			if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
				{
				if (nmatch == k)
					{
					int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
					return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
					}
				k++;
				}
			}
		}
	if (nmatch == -1)
		return k;
	return 0;
	}

int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
			int *curves, size_t ncurves)
	{
	unsigned char *clist, *p;
	size_t i;
	/* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
	 * while curve ids < 32 
	 */
	unsigned long dup_list = 0;
	clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
	if (!clist)
		return 0;
	for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
		{
		unsigned long idmask;
		int id;
		id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
		idmask = 1L << id;
		if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
			{
			OPENSSL_free(clist);
			return 0;
			}
		dup_list |= idmask;
		s2n(id, p);
		}
	if (*pext)
		OPENSSL_free(*pext);
	*pext = clist;
	*pextlen = ncurves * 2;
	return 1;
	}

/* TODO(fork): remove */
#if 0
#define MAX_CURVELIST	28

typedef struct
	{
	size_t nidcnt;
	int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
	} nid_cb_st;

static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
	{
	nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
	size_t i;
	int nid;
	char etmp[20];
	if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
		return 0;
	if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
		return 0;
	memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
	etmp[len] = 0;
	nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
	if (nid == NID_undef)
		nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
	if (nid == NID_undef)
		nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
	if (nid == NID_undef)
		return 0;
	for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
		if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
			return 0;
	narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
	return 1;
	}
/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 
				const char *str)
	{
	nid_cb_st ncb;
	ncb.nidcnt = 0;
	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
		return 0;
	if (pext == NULL)
		return 1;
	return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
	}
#endif

/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
				EC_KEY *ec)
	{
	int is_prime = 1, id;
	const EC_GROUP *grp;
	if (!ec)
		return 0;

        /* TODO(fork): remove. All curves are prime now. */
	grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
	if (!grp)
		return 0;
#if 0
	/* Determine if it is a prime field */
        meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
	if (!meth)
		return 0;
        if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
		is_prime = 1;
	else
		is_prime = 0;
#endif

	/* Determine curve ID */
	id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
	id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
	/* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
	if (id)
		{
		curve_id[0] = 0;
		curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
		}
	else
		{
		curve_id[0] = 0xff;
		if (is_prime)
			curve_id[1] = 0x01;
		else
			curve_id[1] = 0x02;
		}
	if (comp_id)
		{
        	if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
			return 0;
		if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
			{
			if (is_prime)
				*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
			else
				*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
			}
		else
			*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
		}
	return 1;
	}
/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
			unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
	{
	const unsigned char *p;
	size_t plen, i;
	int j;
	/* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
	 * is supported (see RFC4492).
	 */
	if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
		{
		p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
		plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
		for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
			{
			if (*comp_id == *p)
				break;
			}
		if (i == plen)
			return 0;
		}
	if (!curve_id)
		return 1;
	/* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
	for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
		{
		tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
		for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
			{
			if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
				break;
			}
		if (i == plen)
			return 0;
		/* For clients can only check sent curve list */
		if (!s->server)
			return 1;
		}
	return 1;
	}

static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
					size_t *pformatslen)
	{
	/* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
	 * use default */
	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
		{
		*pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
		*pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
		}
	else
		{
		*pformats = ecformats_default;
		/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
			*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
		else
			*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
		}
	}

/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
 */
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
	{
	unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
	int rv;
	pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
	if (!pkey)
		return 0;
	/* If not EC nothing to do */
	if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
		{
		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
		return 1;
		}
	rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
	if (!rv)
		return 0;
	/* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
	 * supported curves extension.
	 */
	rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
	if (!rv)
		return 0;
	/* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
	 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
	 */
	if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
		{
		int check_md;
		size_t i;
		CERT *c = s->cert;
		if (curve_id[0])
			return 0;
		/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
		if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
			check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
		else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
			check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
		else
			return 0; /* Should never happen */
		for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
			if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
				break;
		if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
			return 0;
		if (set_ee_md == 2)
			{
			if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
			else
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
			}
		}
	return rv;
	}
/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
	{
	unsigned char curve_id[2];
	EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
	/* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
	if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
		return 1;
#endif
	/* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
	 * no other curves permitted.
	 */
	if (tls1_suiteb(s))
		{
		/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
		if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
			curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
		else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
			curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
		else
			return 0;
		curve_id[0] = 0;
		/* Check this curve is acceptable */
		if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
			return 0;
		/* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
		if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
			return 1;
		/* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
		else 
			{
			unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
			if (!ec)
				return 0;
			if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
				return 0;
			if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
				return 1;
			return 0;
			}
			
		}
	if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
		{
		/* Need a shared curve */
		if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
			return 1;
		else return 0;
		}
	if (!ec)
		{
		if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
			return 1;
		else
			return 0;
		}
	if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
		return 0;
/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
#if 0
	return 1;
#else
	return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
#endif
	}

#else

static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
	{
	return 1;
	}

#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
 */

#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
#else
#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
#endif

#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
#else
#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
#endif

#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
#else
#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
#endif

#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
		tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
		tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
		tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)

static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
#endif
};
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
	tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
	tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
};
#endif
size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
	{
	/* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
	 * preferences.
	 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
		{
	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
		return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);

	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
		return 2;

	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
		return 2;
		}
#endif
	/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
	if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
		{
		*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
		return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
		}
	else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
		{
		*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
		return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
		}
	else
		{
		*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
		return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
		}
	}
/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
 */
int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
				const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
	{
	const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
	size_t sent_sigslen, i;
	int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
	/* Should never happen */
	if (sigalg == -1)
		return -1;
	/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
	if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
		return 0;
		}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
		{
		unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
		/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
		if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
			return 0;
		if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
			return 0;
			}
		/* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
			{
			if (curve_id[0])
				return 0;
			if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
				{
				if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
					{
					OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
					return 0;
					}
				}
			else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
				{
				if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
					{
					OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
					return 0;
					}
				}
			else
				return 0;
			}
		}
	else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
		return 0;
#endif

	/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
	sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
	for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
		{
		if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
			break;
		}
	/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
	if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
		return 0;
		}
	*pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
	if (*pmd == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
		return 0;
		}
	/* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
	 * wish.
	 */
	if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
		s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
	return 1;
	}
/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
 * session and not global settings.
 * 
 */
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
	{
	CERT *c = s->cert;
	const unsigned char *sigalgs;
	size_t i, sigalgslen;
	int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
	c->mask_a = 0;
	c->mask_k = 0;
	/* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
	if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
		c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
	else
		c->mask_ssl = 0;
	/* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
	 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
	 * TLS 1.2.
	 */
	sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
	for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
		{
		switch(sigalgs[1])
			{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
			have_rsa = 1;
			break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
		case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
			have_dsa = 1;
			break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
		case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
			have_ecdsa = 1;
			break;
#endif
			}
		}
	/* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
	 * signature algorithms.
	 */
	if (!have_rsa)
		{
		c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
		c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
		}
	if (!have_dsa)
		{
		c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
		c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
		}
	if (!have_ecdsa)
		{
		c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
		c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
		}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
	/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
	if (!s->psk_client_callback)
		{
		c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
		c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
		}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
	c->valid = 1;
	}

/* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
	{
	unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
	unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);

	if (a > b)
		return 1;
	else if (a < b)
		return -1;
	return 0;
}

unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
	{
	int extdatalen=0;
	unsigned char *ret = p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
	int using_ecc = 0;
	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
		{
		int i;
		unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);

		for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
			{
			SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);

			alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
			alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
			if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
				|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
				{
				using_ecc = 1;
				break;
				}
			}
		}
#endif

	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
	if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
					&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
		return p;

	ret+=2;

	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */

 	if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
		{ 
		/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
		unsigned long size_str;
		long lenmax; 

		/* check for enough space.
		   4 for the servername type and entension length
		   2 for servernamelist length
		   1 for the hostname type
		   2 for hostname length
		   + hostname length 
		*/
		   
		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 
		    || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 
			return NULL;
			
		/* extension type and length */
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 
		s2n(size_str+5,ret);
		
		/* length of servername list */
		s2n(size_str+3,ret);
	
		/* hostname type, length and hostname */
		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
		s2n(size_str,ret);
		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
		ret+=size_str;
		}

        /* Add RI if renegotiating */
        if (s->renegotiate)
          {
          int el;
          
          if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
              {
              OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              return NULL;
              }

          if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
          
          s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
          s2n(el,ret);

          if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
              {
              OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              return NULL;
              }

          ret += el;
        }


#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	if (using_ecc)
		{
		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
		long lenmax; 
		const unsigned char *plist;
		size_t plistlen;

		tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);

		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
		if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
		if (plistlen > 255)
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			return NULL;
			}
		
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
		s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
		*(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
		memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
		ret+=plistlen;

		/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
		plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
		tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);

		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 
		if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
		if (plistlen > 65532)
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			return NULL;
			}
		
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
		s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);

		/* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
		 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
		 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
		 * resolves this to two bytes.
		 */
		s2n(plistlen, ret);
		memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
		ret+=plistlen;
		}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */

	if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
		{
		int ticklen;
		if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
			ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
		else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
			 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
			{
			ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
			s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
			if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
				return NULL;
			memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
			       s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
			       ticklen);
			s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
			}
		else
			ticklen = 0;
		if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
		    s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
			goto skip_ext;
		/* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
 		 * rest for ticket
  		 */
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 
		s2n(ticklen,ret);
		if (ticklen)
			{
			memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
			ret += ticklen;
			}
		}
		skip_ext:

	if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
		{
		size_t salglen;
		const unsigned char *salg;
		salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
			return NULL; 
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
		s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
		s2n(salglen, ret);
		memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
		ret += salglen;
		}

#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
		{
		size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
		
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
			return NULL;
		if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
			return NULL;

		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 
		s2n(col + 2, ret);
		s2n(col, ret);
		memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
		ret += col;
		}
#endif

        /* TODO(fork): we probably want OCSP stapling, but it currently pulls in a lot of code. */
#if 0
	if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
		{
		int i;
		long extlen, idlen, itmp;
		OCSP_RESPID *id;

		idlen = 0;
		for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
			{
			id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
			itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
			if (itmp <= 0)
				return NULL;
			idlen += itmp + 2;
			}

		if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
			{
			extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
			if (extlen < 0)
				return NULL;
			}
		else
			extlen = 0;
			
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
		if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
			return NULL;
		s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
		*(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
		s2n(idlen, ret);
		for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
			{
			/* save position of id len */
			unsigned char *q = ret;
			id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
			/* skip over id len */
			ret += 2;
			itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
			/* write id len */
			s2n(itmp, q);
			}
		s2n(extlen, ret);
		if (extlen > 0)
			i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
		}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
	/* Add Heartbeat extension */
	s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
	s2n(1,ret);
	/* Set mode:
	 * 1: peer may send requests
	 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
	 */
	if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
		*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
	else
		*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
	if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
		{
		/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
		 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
			return NULL;
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
		s2n(0,ret);
		}
#endif

	if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
		{
		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
			return NULL;
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
		s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
		s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
		memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
		       s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
		ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
		}

	if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
		{
		/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
		 * support for Channel ID. */
		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
			return NULL;
		if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new)
			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
		else
			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
		s2n(0,ret);
		}

        if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
                {
                int el;

                ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
                
                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;

                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
                s2n(el,ret);

                if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			return NULL;
			}
                ret += el;
                }

	/* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
	/* 2 bytes for extension type */
	/* 2 bytes for extension length */
	/* 1 byte for the list length */
	/* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
	if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
		{
                const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
                const unsigned char list_len = 1;

		if (limit < ret + 6)
			return NULL;

		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
                /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
		s2n(ext_len, ret);
		*(ret++) = list_len;
		*(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
		}

	/* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
	if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
		{
		size_t i;
		custom_cli_ext_record* record;

		for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
			{
			const unsigned char* out = NULL;
			unsigned short outlen = 0;

			record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
			/* NULL callback sends empty extension */ 
			/* -1 from callback omits extension */
			if (record->fn1)
				{
				int cb_retval = 0;
				cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
							&out, &outlen,
							record->arg);
				if (cb_retval == 0)
					return NULL; /* error */
				if (cb_retval == -1)
					continue; /* skip this extension */
				}
			if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
				return NULL;
			s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
			s2n(outlen, ret);
			memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
			ret += outlen;
			}
		}

#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
	/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
	 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
	 *
	 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
	 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
	 */
	{
	int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
	/* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
	 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
	 * not. */
	if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
		hlen -= 5;
	if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
		{
		hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
		if (hlen >= 4)
			hlen -= 4;
		else
			hlen = 0;

		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
		s2n(hlen, ret);
		memset(ret, 0, hlen);
		ret += hlen;
		}
#endif

	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
		return p;

	s2n(extdatalen,p);
	return ret;
	}

unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
	{
	int extdatalen=0;
	unsigned char *ret = p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
	int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
	int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
	using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
#endif
	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
		return p;
	
	ret+=2;
	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */

	if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
		{ 
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 

		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
		s2n(0,ret);
		}

	if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
        {
          int el;
          
          if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
              {
              OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              return NULL;
              }

          if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
          
          s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
          s2n(el,ret);

          if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
              {
              OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              return NULL;
              }

          ret += el;
        }

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	if (using_ecc)
		{
		const unsigned char *plist;
		size_t plistlen;
		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
		long lenmax; 

		tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);

		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
		if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
		if (plistlen > 255)
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			return NULL;
			}
		
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
		s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
		memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
		ret+=plistlen;

		}
	/* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */

	if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
		&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 
		{ 
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
		s2n(0,ret);
		}

	if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
		{ 
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
		s2n(0,ret);
		}

#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
		{
		size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
		
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
			return NULL;
		if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
			return NULL;

		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 
		s2n(sol + 2, ret);
		s2n(sol, ret);
		memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
		ret += sol;
		}
#endif

        if(s->srtp_profile)
                {
                int el;

                ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
                
                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;

                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
                s2n(el,ret);

                if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			return NULL;
			}
                ret+=el;
                }

	if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 
		&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
		{ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
			0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
			0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
			0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 
			0x03,   0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 
			0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 
			0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
			if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
			memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
			ret+=36;

		}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
	/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
	if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
		{
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
		s2n(1,ret);
		/* Set mode:
		 * 1: peer may send requests
		 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
		 */
		if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
			*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
		else
			*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;

		}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
	next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
	if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
		{
		const unsigned char *npa;
		unsigned int npalen;
		int r;

		r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
		if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
			{
			if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
			s2n(npalen,ret);
			memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
			ret += npalen;
			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
			}
		}
#endif

	/* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
	 * to it. */
	if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
		{
		size_t authz_length;
		/* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
		 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
		 * has any authz data attached to it. */
		const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
		const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
		size_t i;
		unsigned authz_count = 0;

		/* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
		 * 	uint8_t authz_type
		 * 	uint16_t length
		 * 	uint8_t data[length]
		 *
		 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
		for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
			{
			unsigned short length;
			unsigned char type;

			type = *(authz++);
			if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
				   type,
				   s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
				authz_count++;

			n2s(authz, length);
			/* n2s increments authz by 2 */
			i += 2;
			authz += length;
			i += length;
			}

		if (authz_count)
			{
			/* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
			 * 2 bytes for extension type
			 * 2 bytes for extension length
			 * 1 byte for the list length
			 * n bytes for the list */
			const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;

			if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
			s2n(ext_len, ret);
			*(ret++) = authz_count;
			s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
			}

		authz = orig_authz;
		for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
			{
			unsigned short length;
			unsigned char type;

			authz_count++;
			type = *(authz++);
			if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
				   type,
				   s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
				*(ret++) = type;
			n2s(authz, length);
			/* n2s increments authz by 2 */
			i += 2;
			authz += length;
			i += length;
			}
		}

	/* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
	if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
		{
		size_t i;

		for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
			{
			size_t j;
			custom_srv_ext_record *record;

			for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
				{
				record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
				if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
					{
					const unsigned char *out = NULL;
					unsigned short outlen = 0;
					int cb_retval = 0;

					/* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
					if (!record->fn2)
						break;
					cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
						    		&out, &outlen,
						    		record->arg);
					if (cb_retval == 0)
						return NULL; /* error */
					if (cb_retval == -1)
						break; /* skip this extension */
					if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
						return NULL;
					s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
					s2n(outlen, ret);
					memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
					ret += outlen;
					break;
					}
				}
			}
		}

	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
		{
		const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
		unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;

		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
			return NULL;
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
		s2n(3 + len,ret);
		s2n(1 + len,ret);
		*ret++ = len;
		memcpy(ret, selected, len);
		ret += len;
		}

	/* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
	 * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
	if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
		{
		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
			return NULL;
		if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
		else
			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
		s2n(0,ret);
		}

	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
		return p;

	s2n(extdatalen,p);
	return ret;
	}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
 *   SNI,
 *   elliptic_curves
 *   ec_point_formats
 *
 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
 */
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
	unsigned short type, size;
	static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
		0x00, 0x0a,  /* elliptic_curves extension */
		0x00, 0x08,  /* 8 bytes */
		0x00, 0x06,  /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
		0x00, 0x17,  /* P-256 */
		0x00, 0x18,  /* P-384 */
		0x00, 0x19,  /* P-521 */

		0x00, 0x0b,  /* ec_point_formats */
		0x00, 0x02,  /* 2 bytes */
		0x01,        /* 1 point format */
		0x00,        /* uncompressed */
	};

	/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
	static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
		0x00, 0x0d,  /* signature_algorithms */
		0x00, 0x0c,  /* 12 bytes */
		0x00, 0x0a,  /* 10 bytes */
		0x05, 0x01,  /* SHA-384/RSA */
		0x04, 0x01,  /* SHA-256/RSA */
		0x02, 0x01,  /* SHA-1/RSA */
		0x04, 0x03,  /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
		0x02, 0x03,  /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
	};

	if (data >= (d+n-2))
		return;
	data += 2;

	if (data > (d+n-4))
		return;
	n2s(data,type);
	n2s(data,size);

	if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
		return;

	if (data+size > d+n)
		return;
	data += size;

	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
		{
		const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
		const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);

		if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
			return;
		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
			return;
		if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
			return;
		}
	else
		{
		const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);

		if (data + len != d+n)
			return;
		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
			return;
		}

	s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */

/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
 * ClientHello.
 *   data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
 *   data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
 *   al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
 *       return.
 *
 *   returns: 0 on success. */
static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
					 unsigned data_len, int *al)
	{
	unsigned i;
	unsigned proto_len;
	const unsigned char *selected;
	unsigned char selected_len;
	int r;

	if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
		return 0;

	if (data_len < 2)
		goto parse_error;

	/* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
	 * length-prefixed strings. */
	i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
	    ((unsigned) data[1]);
	data_len -= 2;
	data += 2;
	if (data_len != i)
		goto parse_error;

	if (data_len < 2)
		goto parse_error;

	for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
		{
		proto_len = data[i];
		i++;

		if (proto_len == 0)
			goto parse_error;

		if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
			goto parse_error;

		i += proto_len;
		}

	r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
				   s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
	if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
		if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
			OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
		s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
		if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
			{
			*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
			return -1;
			}
		memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
		s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
	}
	return 0;

parse_error:
	*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
	return -1;
	}

static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 
	{	
	unsigned short type;
	unsigned short size;
	unsigned short len;
	unsigned char *data = *p;
	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
	size_t i;

	s->servername_done = 0;
	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif

	/* Clear observed custom extensions */
	s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
	if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
		s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
		}		

	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
		}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
		ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */

	/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
	if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
		s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
		}
	/* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
	if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
		s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
		}
	/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
		{
		s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
		s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
		}

	if (data >= (d+n-2))
		goto ri_check;
	n2s(data,len);

	if (data > (d+n-len)) 
		goto ri_check;

	while (data <= (d+n-4))
		{
		n2s(data,type);
		n2s(data,size);

		if (data+size > (d+n))
	   		goto ri_check;
#if 0
		fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
#endif
		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
						s->tlsext_debug_arg);
/* The servername extension is treated as follows:

   - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
   - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
     in which case an fatal alert is generated.
   - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
   - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
     to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 
   - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 
     it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 
     Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
     set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
     case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
     a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
     presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
     the value of the Host: field. 
   - Applications must  use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
     if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
     i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 
   - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 

*/      

		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
			{
			unsigned char *sdata;
			int servname_type;
			int dsize; 
		
			if (size < 2) 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			n2s(data,dsize);  
			size -= 2;
			if (dsize > size  ) 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				} 

			sdata = data;
			while (dsize > 3) 
				{
	 			servname_type = *(sdata++); 
				n2s(sdata,len);
				dsize -= 3;

				if (len > dsize) 
					{
					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				if (s->servername_done == 0)
				switch (servname_type)
					{
				case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
					if (!s->hit)
						{
						if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
							{
							*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
							return 0;
							}
						if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
							{
							*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
							return 0;
							}
						if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
							{
							*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
							return 0;
							}
						memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
						s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
						if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
							OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
							s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
							*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
							return 0;
						}
						s->servername_done = 1; 

						}
					else 
						s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
							&& strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 
							&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
					
					break;

				default:
					break;
					}
				 
				dsize -= len;
				}
			if (dsize != 0) 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}

			}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;
			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);

			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 
				ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			if (!s->hit)
				{
				if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
					{
					OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
					s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
					}
				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
				if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
					{
					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
				}
#if 0
			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
			for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
				fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
			}
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;
			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
			ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));

			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
				ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			if (!s->hit)
				{
				if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
					{
					*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
				if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
					{
					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
				}
#if 0
			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
			for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
				fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
			}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;

			if (size < 2)
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}

			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
			else
				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			}
#endif
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
			{
			if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
			    !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			}
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
			{
			if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
				return 0;
			renegotiate_seen = 1;
			}
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
			{
			int dsize;
			if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			n2s(data,dsize);
			size -= 2;
			if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			/* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
			 * error.
			 */
			if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
				{
				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
				*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
				return 0;
				}
			}

                /* TODO(fork): we probably want OCSP stapling support, but this pulls in a lot of code. */
#if 0
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
			{
		
			if (size < 5) 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}

			s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
			size--;
			if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
				{
				const unsigned char *sdata;
				int dsize;
				/* Read in responder_id_list */
				n2s(data,dsize);
				size -= 2;
				if (dsize > size  ) 
					{
					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				while (dsize > 0)
					{
					OCSP_RESPID *id;
					int idsize;
					if (dsize < 4)
						{
						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					n2s(data, idsize);
					dsize -= 2 + idsize;
					size -= 2 + idsize;
					if (dsize < 0)
						{
						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					sdata = data;
					data += idsize;
					id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
								&sdata, idsize);
					if (!id)
						{
						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					if (data != sdata)
						{
						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
						&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
						sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
						{
						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
						*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
							s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
						{
						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
						*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					}

				/* Read in request_extensions */
				if (size < 2)
					{
					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				n2s(data,dsize);
				size -= 2;
				if (dsize != size)
					{
					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				sdata = data;
				if (dsize > 0)
					{
					if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
						{
						sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
									   X509_EXTENSION_free);
						}

					s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
						d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
							&sdata, dsize);
					if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
						|| (data + dsize != sdata))
						{
						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					}
				}
				/* We don't know what to do with any other type
 			 	* so ignore it.
 			 	*/
				else
					s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
			}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
			{
			switch(data[0])
				{
				case 0x01:	/* Client allows us to send HB requests */
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
							break;
				case 0x02:	/* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
							break;
				default:	*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
							return 0;
				}
			}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
			 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
			{
			/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
			 * renegotiation.
			 *
			 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
			 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
			 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
			 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
			 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
			 * anything like that, but this might change).

			 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
			 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
			 * 0.  (We are talking about a check that will happen
			 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
			 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
			}
#endif

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
			 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
			{
			if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
				return 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
			/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
			}

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id &&
			 s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new &&
			 s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
			{
			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
			}


		/* session ticket processed earlier */
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
                        {
			if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
							      al))
				return 0;
                        }

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;
			unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;

			if (size == 0)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}

			server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);

			if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}

			/* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
			 * information as the original session so we ignore this
			 * in the case of a session resumption. */
			if (!s->hit)
				{
				if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
					OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
				s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
					OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
				if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
					{
					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}

				s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
					server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
				memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
				       sdata,
				       server_authz_dataformatlist_length);

				/* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
				qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
				      server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
				      1 /* element size */,
				      byte_compare);

				for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
					{
					if (i > 0 &&
					    s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
					      s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
						{
						*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					}
				}
			}

		/* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is 
		 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a 
		 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
		 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
		 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
		 */
		else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
			{
			custom_srv_ext_record *record;

			for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
				{
				record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
				if (type == record->ext_type)
					{
					size_t j;

					/* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
					for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
						{
						if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
							{
							*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
							return 0;
							}
						}

					/* NULL callback still notes the extension */ 
					if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
						return 0;
						
					/* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
					s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
					s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
							s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
							s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
					if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
						{
						s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
						*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
							s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
					}						
				}
			}

		data+=size;
		}

	*p = data;

	ri_check:

	/* Need RI if renegotiating */

	if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
		!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
		{
		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
	 	OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
		return 0;
		}
	/* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
	if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
		ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);

	return 1;
	}

int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n) 
	{
	int al = -1;
	if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) 
		{
		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
		return 0;
		}

	if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) 
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
		return 0;
		}
	return 1;
}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
 * the length of the block. */
static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
	{
	unsigned int off = 0;

	while (off < len)
		{
		if (d[off] == 0)
			return 0;
		off += d[off];
		off++;
		}

	return off == len;
	}
#endif

static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
	{
	unsigned short length;
	unsigned short type;
	unsigned short size;
	unsigned char *data = *p;
	int tlsext_servername = 0;
	int renegotiate_seen = 0;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif

	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
		}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif

	if (data >= (d+n-2))
		goto ri_check;

	n2s(data,length);
	if (data+length != d+n)
		{
		*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		return 0;
		}

	while(data <= (d+n-4))
		{
		n2s(data,type);
		n2s(data,size);

		if (data+size > (d+n))
	   		goto ri_check;

		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
						s->tlsext_debug_arg);

		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
			{
			if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
				return 0;
				}
			tlsext_servername = 1;   
			}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;
			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);

			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
			if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
			if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
			memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
#if 0
			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
			for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
				fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
			}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
			{
			if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
			    !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
				|| (size > 0))
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
				return 0;
				}
			s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
			}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;

			if (size < 2)
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			
			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
				s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
			else
				s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);

			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			}
#endif
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
			{
			/* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
			 * a status request message.
			 */ 
			if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
				return 0;
				}
			/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
			s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
			}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
			{
			unsigned char *selected;
			unsigned char selected_len;

			/* We must have requested it. */
			if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
				return 0;
				}
			/* The data must be valid */
			if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
			if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
			s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
			}
#endif

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
			{
			unsigned len;

			/* We must have requested it. */
			if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
				return 0;
				}
			if (size < 4)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			/* The extension data consists of:
			 *   uint16 list_length
			 *   uint8 proto_length;
			 *   uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
			len = data[0];
			len <<= 8;
			len |= data[1];
			if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			len = data[2];
			if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
			s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
			if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
			s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
			}

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id)
			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new)
			{
			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
			}

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
			{
			if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
				return 0;
			renegotiate_seen = 1;
			}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
			{
			switch(data[0])
				{
				case 0x01:	/* Server allows us to send HB requests */
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
							break;
				case 0x02:	/* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
							break;
				default:	*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
							return 0;
				}
			}
#endif
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
                        {
                        if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
							      al))
                                return 0;
                        }

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
			{
			/* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
			 * an authz hello extension if the client
			 * didn't request a proof. */
			unsigned char *sdata = data;
			unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;

			if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
				return 0;
				}

			if (!size)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}

			server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
			if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}

			/* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
			 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
			if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
				sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
				return 0;
				}

			s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
			}

		/* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but 
		 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
		 * callback */
		else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
			{
			size_t i;
			custom_cli_ext_record* record;

			for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
				{
				record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
				if (record->ext_type == type)
					{
					if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
						return 0;
					break;
					}
				}			
			}
 
		data += size;
		}

	if (data != d+n)
		{
		*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		return 0;
		}

	if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
		{
 		if (s->tlsext_hostname)
			{
			if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
				{
				s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);	
				if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
					{
					*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
					return 0;
					}
				}
			else 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			}
		}

	*p = data;

	ri_check:

	/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
	 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
	 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
	 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
	 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
	 * absence on initial connect only.
	 */
	if (!renegotiate_seen
		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
		{
		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
		return 0;
		}

	return 1;
	}


int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
	{

#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	{
		int r = 1;
	
		if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
			{
			r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
			if (!r)
				return -1;
			}

		if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
			{
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);

			if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
			else
				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
				{
				OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
				return -1;
				}
			s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
			}

		if (r == 2)
			/* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
			s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
	}
#endif

	return 1;
	}

int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
	{
	return 1;
	}

static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
	{
	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	/* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 
	 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
	 */
	/* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 
	 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
	 */
#endif

	if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 
		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);

#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	{
		/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
		 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
		 * so this has to happen here in
		 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */

		int r = 1;
	
		if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
			{
			r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
			if (!r)
				{
				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				goto err;
				}
			}

		if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
			OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
		s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;

		if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
			{
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
				{
				/* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
				 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */

				if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
					s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
				else
					s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
				if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
					{
					ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
					al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
					goto err;
					}
				s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
				}
			}

		if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
			{
			/* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
			 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
			 * abort the handshake.
			 */
			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
			}
	}

 err:
#endif
	switch (ret)
		{
		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
			return -1;

		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
			return 1; 
					
		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
			s->servername_done=0;
			default:
		return 1;
		}
	}

int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
	{
	int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
	int al;

	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
 	 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
	 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
 	 */
	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
		{
		int r;
		CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
		certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
		/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
		if (certpkey == NULL)
			{
			s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
			return 1;
			}
		/* Set current certificate to one we will use so
		 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
		 */
		s->cert->key = certpkey;
		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
		switch (r)
			{
			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
				break;
			/* status request response should be sent */
			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
				else
					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
				break;
			/* something bad happened */
			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				goto err;
			}
		}
	else
		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;

 err:
	switch (ret)
		{
		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
			return -1;

		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
			return 1; 

		default:
			return 1;
		}
	}

int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
	{
	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	/* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
	 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
	 * it must contain uncompressed.
	 */
	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
	if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
	    (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
	    ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
		{
		/* we are using an ECC cipher */
		size_t i;
		unsigned char *list;
		int found_uncompressed = 0;
		list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
		for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
			{
			if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
				{
				found_uncompressed = 1;
				break;
				}
			}
		if (!found_uncompressed)
			{
			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
			return -1;
			}
		}
	ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */

	if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 
		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);

#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
		{
		/* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
		 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */

		if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
			{
			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
			}
		
		/* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
		 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
		if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
		    s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
			{
			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
			al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
			}
		}
#endif

	/* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
 	 * tell the callback
 	 */
	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
			&& s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
		{
		int r;
		/* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
 		 * there is no response.
 		 */
		if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
			{
			OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
			s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
			}
		s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
		if (r == 0)
			{
			al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
			}
		if (r < 0)
			{
			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
			}
		}

	switch (ret)
		{
		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
			return -1;

		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
			return 1; 
					
		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
			s->servername_done=0;
			default:
		return 1;
		}
	}

int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n) 
	{
	int al = -1;
	if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
		return 1;
	if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) 
		{
		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
		return 0;
		}

	if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
		return 0;
		}
	return 1;
}

/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
 *
 *   session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
 *       read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
 *       extension, if any.
 *   len: the length of the session ID.
 *   limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
 *   ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
 *       point to the resulting session.
 *
 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
 *
 * Returns:
 *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
 *    0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
 *    1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
 *       session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
 *    2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
 *       couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
 *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
 *
 * Side effects:
 *   Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
 *   a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
 *   (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
 *   a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
 *   s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
 *   Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
 */
int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
			const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
	{
	/* Point after session ID in client hello */
	const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
	unsigned short i;

	*ret = NULL;
	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;

	/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
	 * to permit stateful resumption.
	 */
	if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
		return 0;
	if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
		return 0;
	if (p >= limit)
		return -1;
	/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
		{
		i = *(p++);
		p+= i;
		if (p >= limit)
			return -1;
		}
	/* Skip past cipher list */
	n2s(p, i);
	p+= i;
	if (p >= limit)
		return -1;
	/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
	i = *(p++);
	p += i;
	if (p > limit)
		return -1;
	/* Now at start of extensions */
	if ((p + 2) >= limit)
		return 0;
	n2s(p, i);
	while ((p + 4) <= limit)
		{
		unsigned short type, size;
		n2s(p, type);
		n2s(p, size);
		if (p + size > limit)
			return 0;
		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
			{
			int r;
			if (size == 0)
				{
				/* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
				 * currently have one. */
				s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
				return 1;
				}
			if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
				{
				/* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
				 * decrypted rather than generating the session
				 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
				 * handshake based on external mechanism to
				 * calculate the master secret later. */
				return 2;
				}
			r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
			switch (r)
				{
				case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
					s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
					return 2;
				case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
					return r;
				case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
					s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
					return 3;
				default: /* fatal error */
					return -1;
				}
			}
		p += size;
		}
	return 0;
	}

/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
 *
 *   etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
 *   eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
 *   sess_id: points at the session ID.
 *   sesslen: the length of the session ID.
 *   psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
 *       point to the resulting session.
 *
 * Returns:
 *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
 *    2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
 *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
 *    4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
 */
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
				SSL_SESSION **psess)
	{
	SSL_SESSION *sess;
	unsigned char *sdec;
	const unsigned char *p;
	int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
	unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	HMAC_CTX hctx;
	EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
	SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
	/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
	if (eticklen < 48)
		return 2;
	/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
	if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
		{
		unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
		int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
							&ctx, &hctx, 0);
		if (rv < 0)
			return -1;
		if (rv == 0)
			return 2;
		if (rv == 2)
			renew_ticket = 1;
		}
	else
		{
		/* Check key name matches */
		if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
			return 2;
		HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
		EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
				tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
		}
	/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
	 * integrity checks on ticket.
	 */
	mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
	if (mlen < 0)
		{
		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
		return -1;
		}
	eticklen -= mlen;
	/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
	HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
		return 2;
	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
	p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
	eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
	sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
	if (!sdec)
		{
		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
		return -1;
		}
	EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
	if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
		return 2;
	slen += mlen;
	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
	p = sdec;

	sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
	if (sess)
		{
		/* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
		 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
		 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
		 * as required by standard.
		 */
		if (sesslen)
			memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
		sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
		*psess = sess;
		if (renew_ticket)
			return 4;
		else
			return 3;
		}
        ERR_clear_error();
	/* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
	 * ticket. */
	return 2;
	}

/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */

typedef struct 
	{
	int nid;
	int id;
	} tls12_lookup;

static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
	{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
	{NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
	{NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
	{NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
	{NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
	{NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
};

static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
	{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
	{EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
	{EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
};

static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
	{
	size_t i;
	for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
		{
		if (table[i].nid == nid)
			return table[i].id;
		}
	return -1;
	}

static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
	{
	size_t i;
	for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
		{
		if ((table[i].id) == id)
			return table[i].nid;
		}
	return NID_undef;
	}

int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
	{
	int sig_id, md_id;
	if (!md)
		return 0;
	md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
				sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
	if (md_id == -1)
		return 0;
	sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
	if (sig_id == -1)
		return 0;
	p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
	p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
	return 1;
	}

int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
	{
	return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
				sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
	}

const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
	{
	switch(hash_alg)
		{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
		case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
		if (FIPS_mode())
			return NULL;
#endif
		return EVP_md5();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
		case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
		return EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
		case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
		return EVP_sha224();

		case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
		return EVP_sha256();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
		case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
		return EVP_sha384();

		case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
		return EVP_sha512();
#endif
		default:
		return NULL;

		}
	}

static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
	{
	switch(sig_alg)
		{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
		return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
	case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
		return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
	case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
		return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
		}
	return -1;
	}

/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
			int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
	{
	int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
	if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
		return;
	if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
		{
		hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
					sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
		if (phash_nid)
			*phash_nid = hash_nid;
		}
	if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
		{
		sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
					sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
		if (psign_nid)
			*psign_nid = sign_nid;
		}
	if (psignhash_nid)
		{
		if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
			OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
							hash_nid, sign_nid);
		else
			*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
		}
	}
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
				const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
				const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
	{
	const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
	size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
	for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
		{
		/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
		if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
			continue;
		if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
			continue;
		for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
			{
			if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
				{
				nmatch++;
				if (shsig)
					{
					shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
					shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
					tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
						&shsig->sign_nid,
						&shsig->signandhash_nid,
						ptmp);
					shsig++;
					}
				break;
				}
			}
		}
	return nmatch;
	}

/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
	{
	const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
	size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
	size_t nmatch;
	TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
	CERT *c = s->cert;
	unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
	/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
	if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
		{
		conf = c->client_sigalgs;
		conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
		}
	else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
		{
		conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
		conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
		}
	else
		conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
	if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
		{
		pref = conf;
		preflen = conflen;
		allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
		allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
		}
	else
		{
		allow = conf;
		allowlen = conflen;
		pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
		preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
		}
	nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
	if (!nmatch)
		return 1;
	salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
	if (!salgs)
		return 0;
	nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
	c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
	c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
	return 1;
	}
		

/* Set preferred digest for each key type */

int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
	{
	int idx;
	size_t i;
	const EVP_MD *md;
	CERT *c = s->cert;
	TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
	/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
	if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
		return 1;
	/* Should never happen */
	if (!c)
		return 0;

	c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
	if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
		return 0;
	c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
	memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);

	tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);

#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
	if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
		{
		/* Use first set signature preference to force message
		 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
		 */
		const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
		if (s->server)
			sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
		else
			sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
		if (sigs)
			{
			idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
			md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
			c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
			c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
			if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
				{
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
				}
			}
		}
#endif

	for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
			i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
		{
		idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
		if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
			{
			md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
			c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
			c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
			if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
				{
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
				}
			}

		}
	/* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
	 * use the certificate for signing.
	 */
	if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
		{
		/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
		 * not supported it stays as NULL.
	 	 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
			{
			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
			}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
		}
	return 1;
	}


int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
			int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
			unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
	{
	const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
	if (psig == NULL)
		return 0;
	if (idx >= 0)
		{
		idx <<= 1;
		if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
			return 0;
		psig += idx;
		if (rhash)
			*rhash = psig[0];
		if (rsig)
			*rsig = psig[1];
		tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
		}
	return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
	}

int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
			int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
			unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
	{
	TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
	if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
		return 0;
	shsigalgs += idx;
	if (phash)
		*phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
	if (psign)
		*psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
	if (psignhash)
		*psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
	if (rsig)
		*rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
	if (rhash)
		*rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
	return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
	}
	

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
int
tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
	{
	unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
	unsigned short hbtype;
	unsigned int payload;
	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */

	/* Read type and payload length first */
	hbtype = *p++;
	n2s(p, payload);
	pl = p;

	if (s->msg_callback)
		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
			s, s->msg_callback_arg);

	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
		{
		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
		int r;

		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
		 * payload, plus padding
		 */
		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
		bp = buffer;
		
		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
		*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
		s2n(payload, bp);
		memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
		bp += payload;
		/* Random padding */
		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);

		r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);

		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
				buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
				s, s->msg_callback_arg);

		OPENSSL_free(buffer);

		if (r < 0)
			return r;
		}
	else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
		{
		unsigned int seq;
		
		/* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
		 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
		 * sequence number */
		n2s(pl, seq);
		
		if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
			{
			s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
			s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
			}
		}

	return 0;
	}

int
tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
	{
	unsigned char *buf, *p;
	int ret;
	unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */

	/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
	if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
	    s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
		return -1;
		}

	/* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
		return -1;
		}
		
	/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
	if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
		{
		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
		return -1;
		}
		
	/* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
	 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
	 */
	assert(payload + padding <= 16381);

	/* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
	 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
	 * some random stuff.
	 *  - Message Type, 1 byte
	 *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
	 *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
	 *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
	 *  - Padding
	 */
	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
	p = buf;
	/* Message Type */
	*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
	/* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
	s2n(payload, p);
	/* Sequence number */
	s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
	/* 16 random bytes */
	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
	p += 16;
	/* Random padding */
	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);

	ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
	if (ret >= 0)
		{
		if (s->msg_callback)
			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
				buf, 3 + payload + padding,
				s, s->msg_callback_arg);

		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
		}
		
	OPENSSL_free(buf);

	return ret;
	}
#endif

#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
/* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given
 * SSL connection and writes it to |md|. */
int
tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s)
	{
	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
	unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	unsigned temp_digest_len;
	int i;
	static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";

	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
			return 0;

	EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));

	if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
		{
		static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
		EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic,
				 sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
		if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
			return 0;
		EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
				 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
		}

	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
	for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++)
		{
		if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL)
			continue;
		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
		EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
		}
	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);

	return 1;
	}
#endif

/* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
 * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */
int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s)
	{
	int digest_len;
	/* This function should never be called for a resumed session because
	 * the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original,
	 * full handshake. */
	if (s->hit)
		return -1;
	/* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
	 * negotiated. */
	if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
		return -1;

	digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest(
		s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
		sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
	if (digest_len < 0)
		return -1;

	s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;

	return 1;
	}

/* TODO(fork): remove */
#if 0
#define MAX_SIGALGLEN	(TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)

typedef struct
	{
	size_t sigalgcnt;
	int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
	} sig_cb_st;

static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
	{
	sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
	size_t i;
	char etmp[20], *p;
	int sig_alg, hash_alg;
	if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
		return 0;
	if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
		return 0;
	memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
	etmp[len] = 0;
	p = strchr(etmp, '+');
	if (!p)
		return 0;
	*p = 0;
	p++;
	if (!*p)
		return 0;

	if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
	else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
	else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
	else return 0;

	hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
	if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
		hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
	if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
		return 0;

	for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
		{
		if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
			&& sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
			return 0;
		}
	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
	return 1;
	}

/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
	{
	sig_cb_st sig;
	sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
		return 0;
	if (c == NULL)
		return 1;
	return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
	}
#endif

int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
	{
	unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
	int rhash, rsign;
	size_t i;
	if (salglen & 1)
		return 0;
	sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
	if (sigalgs == NULL)
		return 0;
	for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
		{
		rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
					sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
		rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
				sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));

		if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
			goto err;
		*sptr++ = rhash;
		*sptr++ = rsign;
		}

	if (client)
		{
		if (c->client_sigalgs)
			OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
		c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
		c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
		}
	else
		{
		if (c->conf_sigalgs)
			OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
		c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
		c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
		}

	return 1;

	err:
	OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
	return 0;
	}

static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
	{
	int sig_nid;
	size_t i;
	if (default_nid == -1)
		return 1;
	sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
	if (default_nid)
		return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
	for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
		if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
			return 1;
	return 0;
	}
/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
	{
	X509_NAME *nm;
	int i;
	nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
		{
		if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
			return 1;
		}
	return 0;
	}

/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to 
 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
 */

/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */

#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
	(CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
/* Strict mode flags */
#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
	 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
	 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)

int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
									int idx)
	{
	int i;
	int rv = 0;
	int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
	CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
	CERT *c = s->cert;
	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
	/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
	if (idx != -1)
		{
		/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
		if (idx == -2)
			{
			cpk = c->key;
			idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
			}
		else
			cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
		x = cpk->x509;
		pk = cpk->privatekey;
		chain = cpk->chain;
		strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
		/* If no cert or key, forget it */
		if (!x || !pk)
			goto end;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
		/* Allow any certificate to pass test */
		if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
			{
			rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
			cpk->valid_flags = rv;
			return rv;
			}
#endif
		}
	else
		{
		if (!x || !pk)
			goto end;
		idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
		if (idx == -1)
			goto end;
		cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
		if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
			check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
		else
			check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
		strict_mode = 1;
		}

	if (suiteb_flags)
		{
		int ok;
		if (check_flags)
			check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
		ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
		if (ok != X509_V_OK)
			{
			if (check_flags)
				rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
			else
				goto end;
			}
		}

	/* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
	 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
	 * and strict mode.
	 */
	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
		{
		int default_nid;
		unsigned char rsign = 0;
		if (c->peer_sigalgs)
			default_nid = 0;
		/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
		else
			{
			switch(idx)
				{	
			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
			case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
				default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
				break;

			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
			case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
				default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
				break;

			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
				default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
				break;

			default:
				default_nid = -1;
				break;
				}
			}
		/* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
		 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
		 * sha1.
		 */
		if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
			{
			size_t j;
			const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
			for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
				{
				if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
					break;
				}
			if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
				{
				if (check_flags)
					goto skip_sigs;
				else
					goto end;
				}
			}
		/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
		if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
			{
			if (!check_flags) goto end;
			}
		else
			rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
			{
			if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
							default_nid))
				{
				if (check_flags)
					{
					rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
					break;
					}
				else
					goto end;
				}
			}
		}
	/* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
	else if(check_flags)
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
	skip_sigs:
	/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
	if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
	else if (!check_flags)
		goto end;
	if (!s->server)
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
	/* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
	else if (strict_mode)
		{
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
			{
			X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
			if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
				{
				if (check_flags)
					{
					rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
					break;
					}
				else
					goto end;
				}
			}
		}
	if (!s->server && strict_mode)
		{
		STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
		int check_type = 0;
		switch (pk->type)
			{
		case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
			check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
			break;
		case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
			check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
			break;
		case EVP_PKEY_EC:
			check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
			break;
		case EVP_PKEY_DH:
		case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
				{
				int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
				if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
					check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
				if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
					check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
				}
			}
		if (check_type)
			{
			const unsigned char *ctypes;
			int ctypelen;
			if (c->ctypes)
				{
				ctypes = c->ctypes;
				ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
				}
			else
				{
				ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
				ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
				}
			for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
				{
				if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
					{
					rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
					break;
					}
				}
			if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
				goto end;
			}
		else
			rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;


		ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;

		if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
			rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;

		if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
			{
			if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
				rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
			}
		if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
			{
			for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
				{
				X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
				if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
					{
					rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
					break;
					}
				}
			}
		if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
			goto end;
		}
	else
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;

	if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;

	end:

	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
		{
		if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
			rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
		else if (cpk->digest)
			rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
		}
	else
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;

	/* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
	 * if the chain is invalid.
	 */
	if (!check_flags)
		{
		if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
			cpk->valid_flags = rv;
		else
			{
			/* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
			cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
			return 0;
			}
		}
	return rv;
	}

/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
	{
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
	}
/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
	{
	return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
	}

#endif