blob: 628485db37ba7c60a595600c290189d989c3acb9 [file] [log] [blame]
Alexander Popovafaef012018-08-17 01:16:58 +03001// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2/*
3 * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value
4 * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature
5 * ported from grsecurity/PaX.
6 *
7 * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
8 *
9 * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
10 * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
11 */
12
13#include <linux/stackleak.h>
14
15asmlinkage void stackleak_erase(void)
16{
17 /* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
18 unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
19 unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
20 unsigned int poison_count = 0;
21 const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
22
23 /* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
24 if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
25 kstack_ptr = boundary;
26
27 /* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
28 while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
29 if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)
30 poison_count++;
31 else
32 poison_count = 0;
33
34 kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
35 }
36
37 /*
38 * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
39 * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y).
40 */
41 if (kstack_ptr == boundary)
42 kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
43
44 /*
45 * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from
46 * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that
47 * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison.
48 */
49 if (on_thread_stack())
50 boundary = current_stack_pointer;
51 else
52 boundary = current_top_of_stack();
53
54 while (kstack_ptr < boundary) {
55 *(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON;
56 kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
57 }
58
59 /* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
60 current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64;
61}
62
Alexander Popov10e9ae92018-08-17 01:16:59 +030063void __used stackleak_track_stack(void)
64{
65 /*
66 * N.B. stackleak_erase() fills the kernel stack with the poison value,
67 * which has the register width. That code assumes that the value
68 * of 'lowest_stack' is aligned on the register width boundary.
69 *
70 * That is true for x86 and x86_64 because of the kernel stack
71 * alignment on these platforms (for details, see 'cc_stack_align' in
72 * arch/x86/Makefile). Take care of that when you port STACKLEAK to
73 * new platforms.
74 */
75 unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
76
77 /*
78 * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
79 * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
80 * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that.
81 */
82 BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH);
83
84 if (sp < current->lowest_stack &&
85 sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
86 sizeof(unsigned long)) {
87 current->lowest_stack = sp;
88 }
89}
90EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack);