Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris.
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (28 commits)
AUDIT: make audit_is_compat depend on CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC
audit: renumber AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE into the 1300 range
audit: do not cast audit_rule_data pointers pointlesly
AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespaces
audit: define audit_is_compat in kernel internal header
kernel: Use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) in audit.c
sched: declare pid_alive as inline
audit: use uapi/linux/audit.h for AUDIT_ARCH declarations
syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments
audit: remove stray newline from audit_log_execve_info() audit_panic() call
audit: remove stray newlines from audit_log_lost messages
audit: include subject in login records
audit: remove superfluous new- prefix in AUDIT_LOGIN messages
audit: allow user processes to log from another PID namespace
audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace
audit: convert PPIDs to the inital PID namespace.
pid: get pid_t ppid of task in init_pid_ns
audit: rename the misleading audit_get_context() to audit_take_context()
audit: Add generic compat syscall support
audit: Add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
...
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 95a20f3..7c28936 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@
struct audit_reply {
__u32 portid;
- struct net *net;
+ struct net *net;
struct sk_buff *skb;
};
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@
if (printk_ratelimit())
pr_notice("type=%d %s\n", nlh->nlmsg_type, data);
else
- audit_log_lost("printk limit exceeded\n");
+ audit_log_lost("printk limit exceeded");
}
audit_hold_skb(skb);
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@
BUG_ON(err != -ECONNREFUSED); /* Shouldn't happen */
if (audit_pid) {
pr_err("*NO* daemon at audit_pid=%d\n", audit_pid);
- audit_log_lost("auditd disappeared\n");
+ audit_log_lost("auditd disappeared");
audit_pid = 0;
audit_sock = NULL;
}
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@
{
int err = 0;
- /* Only support the initial namespaces for now. */
+ /* Only support initial user namespace for now. */
/*
* We return ECONNREFUSED because it tricks userspace into thinking
* that audit was not configured into the kernel. Lots of users
@@ -618,8 +618,7 @@
* userspace will reject all logins. This should be removed when we
* support non init namespaces!!
*/
- if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) ||
- (task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns))
+ if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns)
return -ECONNREFUSED;
switch (msg_type) {
@@ -639,6 +638,11 @@
case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
case AUDIT_TRIM:
case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
+ /* Only support auditd and auditctl in initial pid namespace
+ * for now. */
+ if ((task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
err = -EPERM;
break;
@@ -659,6 +663,7 @@
{
int rc = 0;
uid_t uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid());
+ pid_t pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
if (!audit_enabled && msg_type != AUDIT_USER_AVC) {
*ab = NULL;
@@ -668,7 +673,7 @@
*ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
if (unlikely(!*ab))
return rc;
- audit_log_format(*ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_vnr(current), uid);
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", pid, uid);
audit_log_session_info(*ab);
audit_log_task_context(*ab);
@@ -1097,7 +1102,7 @@
audit_sock = NULL;
}
- rcu_assign_pointer(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(aunet->nlsk, NULL);
synchronize_net();
netlink_kernel_release(sock);
}
@@ -1829,11 +1834,11 @@
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
audit_log_format(ab,
- " ppid=%ld pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
+ " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
" egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
- sys_getppid(),
- tsk->pid,
+ task_ppid_nr(tsk),
+ task_pid_nr(tsk),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(tsk)),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 8df13221..7bb6573 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -106,6 +106,11 @@
bool should_free;
};
+struct audit_proctitle {
+ int len; /* length of the cmdline field. */
+ char *value; /* the cmdline field */
+};
+
/* The per-task audit context. */
struct audit_context {
int dummy; /* must be the first element */
@@ -202,6 +207,7 @@
} execve;
};
int fds[2];
+ struct audit_proctitle proctitle;
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
int put_count;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 92062fd..8e9bc9c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
@@ -226,7 +228,7 @@
#endif
/* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
-static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
+static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *rule)
{
unsigned listnr;
struct audit_entry *entry;
@@ -249,7 +251,7 @@
;
}
if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n");
+ pr_err("AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n");
goto exit_err;
}
if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
@@ -403,7 +405,7 @@
int i;
char *str;
- entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data);
+ entry = audit_to_entry_common(data);
if (IS_ERR(entry))
goto exit_nofree;
@@ -431,6 +433,19 @@
f->val = 0;
}
+ if ((f->type == AUDIT_PID) || (f->type == AUDIT_PPID)) {
+ struct pid *pid;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ pid = find_vpid(f->val);
+ if (!pid) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ err = -ESRCH;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+ f->val = pid_nr(pid);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ }
+
err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);
if (err)
goto exit_free;
@@ -479,8 +494,8 @@
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
- "\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
+ pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
+ str);
err = 0;
}
if (err) {
@@ -709,8 +724,8 @@
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
- "invalid\n", df->lsm_str);
+ pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
+ df->lsm_str);
ret = 0;
}
@@ -1240,12 +1255,14 @@
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ pid_t pid;
int result = 0;
u32 sid;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
- result = audit_comparator(task_pid_vnr(current), f->op, f->val);
+ pid = task_pid_nr(current);
+ result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_UID:
result = audit_uid_comparator(current_uid(), f->op, f->uid);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7aef2f4..f251a5e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
* and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
@@ -68,6 +70,7 @@
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include "audit.h"
@@ -79,6 +82,9 @@
/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
+/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
+#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
+
/* number of audit rules */
int audit_n_rules;
@@ -451,15 +457,17 @@
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
struct audit_names *n;
int result = 0;
+ pid_t pid;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
+ pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
+ result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_PPID:
if (ctx) {
if (!ctx->ppid)
- ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
+ ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
}
break;
@@ -805,7 +813,8 @@
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
+/* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
int return_valid,
long return_code)
{
@@ -842,6 +851,13 @@
return context;
}
+static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+ kfree(context->proctitle.value);
+ context->proctitle.value = NULL;
+ context->proctitle.len = 0;
+}
+
static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
{
struct audit_names *n, *next;
@@ -850,16 +866,15 @@
if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
int i = 0;
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
- " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
- " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__,
+ pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
+ " name_count=%d put_count=%d ino_count=%d"
+ " [NOT freeing]\n", __FILE__, __LINE__,
context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
context->name_count, context->put_count,
context->ino_count);
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++,
- n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)");
+ pr_err("names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, n->name,
+ n->name->name ?: "(null)");
}
dump_stack();
return;
@@ -955,6 +970,7 @@
audit_free_aux(context);
kfree(context->filterkey);
kfree(context->sockaddr);
+ audit_proctitle_free(context);
kfree(context);
}
@@ -1157,7 +1173,7 @@
*/
buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
- audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
+ audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
return;
}
@@ -1271,6 +1287,59 @@
audit_log_end(ab);
}
+static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
+{
+ char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
+ while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
+ end--;
+
+ /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
+ len = end - proctitle + 1;
+ len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
+ return len;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct audit_context *context)
+{
+ int res;
+ char *buf;
+ char *msg = "(null)";
+ int len = strlen(msg);
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
+ if (!ab)
+ return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
+
+ /* Not cached */
+ if (!context->proctitle.value) {
+ buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ goto out;
+ /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
+ res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
+ if (res == 0) {
+ kfree(buf);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
+ if (res == 0) {
+ kfree(buf);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ context->proctitle.value = buf;
+ context->proctitle.len = res;
+ }
+ msg = context->proctitle.value;
+ len = context->proctitle.len;
+out:
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
int i, call_panic = 0;
@@ -1388,6 +1457,8 @@
audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
}
+ audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
+
/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
if (ab)
@@ -1406,7 +1477,7 @@
{
struct audit_context *context;
- context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
+ context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0);
if (!context)
return;
@@ -1500,7 +1571,7 @@
else
success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
- context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code);
+ context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code);
if (!context)
return;
@@ -1550,7 +1621,7 @@
if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
return;
if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
+ pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
audit_set_auditable(context);
audit_put_chunk(chunk);
unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
@@ -1609,8 +1680,7 @@
goto retry;
}
/* too bad */
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
+ pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
audit_set_auditable(context);
return;
@@ -1682,7 +1752,7 @@
if (!context->in_syscall) {
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
+ pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
__FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
dump_stack();
#endif
@@ -1721,15 +1791,15 @@
BUG_ON(!context);
if (!name->aname || !context->in_syscall) {
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n",
+ pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n",
__FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
if (context->name_count) {
struct audit_names *n;
int i = 0;
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
- printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++,
- n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)");
+ pr_err("name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, n->name,
+ n->name->name ?: "(null)");
}
#endif
final_putname(name);
@@ -1738,9 +1808,8 @@
else {
++context->put_count;
if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
- " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
- " put_count=%d\n",
+ pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d putname(%p)"
+ " name_count=%d put_count=%d\n",
__FILE__, __LINE__,
context->serial, context->major,
context->in_syscall, name->name,
@@ -1981,12 +2050,10 @@
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
if (!ab)
return;
- audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u"
- " old-auid=%u new-auid=%u old-ses=%u new-ses=%u"
- " res=%d",
- current->pid, uid,
- oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid,
- !rc);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid);
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
+ oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
@@ -2208,7 +2275,7 @@
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- context->target_pid = t->pid;
+ context->target_pid = task_pid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
@@ -2233,7 +2300,7 @@
if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
- audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
+ audit_sig_pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
else
@@ -2247,7 +2314,7 @@
/* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
* in audit_context */
if (!ctx->target_pid) {
- ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
+ ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
@@ -2268,7 +2335,7 @@
}
BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
- axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
+ axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
@@ -2368,7 +2435,7 @@
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
sessionid);
audit_log_task_context(ab);
- audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
if (mm) {
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index fd609bd..d8d046c 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(task);
sd->nr = syscall_get_nr(task, regs);
- sd->arch = syscall_get_arch(task, regs);
+ sd->arch = syscall_get_arch();
/* Unroll syscall_get_args to help gcc on arm. */
syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 0, 1, (unsigned long *) &sd->args[0]);
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@
info.si_code = SYS_SECCOMP;
info.si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
info.si_errno = reason;
- info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch(current, task_pt_regs(current));
+ info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch();
info.si_syscall = syscall;
force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
}