Switch a number of files to C++.
http://i1.kym-cdn.com/photos/images/original/000/242/631/382.gif
In the first step, switch C files to C++ individually, keeping
everything in internal.h C-compatible. We'll make minimal changes needed
to get things compiling (notably a lot of goto errs will need to turn to
bssl::UniquePtr right away), but more aggressive changes will happen in
later steps.
(To avoid a rebase, I'm intentionally avoiding files that would conflict
with CLs in flight right now.)
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Id4cfd722e7b57d1df11f27236b4658b5d39b5fd2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17667
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_x509.cc b/ssl/ssl_x509.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77fc0e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/ssl_x509.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,1338 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+/* check_ssl_x509_method asserts that |ssl| has the X509-based method
+ * installed. Calling an X509-based method on an |ssl| with a different method
+ * will likely misbehave and possibly crash or leak memory. */
+static void check_ssl_x509_method(const SSL *ssl) {
+ assert(ssl == NULL || ssl->ctx->x509_method == &ssl_crypto_x509_method);
+}
+
+/* check_ssl_ctx_x509_method acts like |check_ssl_x509_method|, but for an
+ * |SSL_CTX|. */
+static void check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->x509_method == &ssl_crypto_x509_method);
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (session == NULL || session->x509_peer == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ X509_up_ref(session->x509_peer);
+ return session->x509_peer;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (session == NULL ||
+ session->x509_chain == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl->server) {
+ return session->x509_chain;
+ }
+
+ /* OpenSSL historically didn't include the leaf certificate in the returned
+ * certificate chain, but only for servers. */
+ if (session->x509_chain_without_leaf == NULL) {
+ session->x509_chain_without_leaf = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (session->x509_chain_without_leaf == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(session->x509_chain); i++) {
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(session->x509_chain, i);
+ if (!sk_X509_push(session->x509_chain_without_leaf, cert)) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(session->x509_chain_without_leaf, X509_free);
+ session->x509_chain_without_leaf = NULL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ X509_up_ref(cert);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return session->x509_chain_without_leaf;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_full_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return session->x509_chain;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *ctx, int purpose) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *ssl, int purpose) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ssl->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *ctx, int trust) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *ssl, int trust) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ssl->param, trust);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, param);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return ctx->param;
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return ssl->param;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *ssl) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ssl->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *ssl))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return ssl->verify_callback;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return ctx->verify_mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(
+ int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return ctx->default_verify_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode,
+ int (*callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx)) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ ssl->verify_mode = mode;
+ if (callback != NULL) {
+ ssl->verify_callback = callback;
+ }
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ssl->param, depth);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx,
+ void *arg),
+ void *arg) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
+ ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
+ int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ ctx->verify_mode = mode;
+ ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *ca_file,
+ const char *ca_dir) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, ca_file, ca_dir);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long result) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ if (result != X509_V_OK) {
+ abort();
+ }
+}
+
+long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+ }
+ return session->verify_result;
+}
+
+X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return ctx->cert_store;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+ ctx->cert_store = store;
+}
+
+/* x509_to_buffer returns a |CRYPTO_BUFFER| that contains the serialised
+ * contents of |x509|. */
+static CRYPTO_BUFFER *x509_to_buffer(X509 *x509) {
+ uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+ int cert_len = i2d_X509(x509, &buf);
+ if (cert_len <= 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(buf, cert_len, NULL);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+ return buffer;
+}
+
+/* new_leafless_chain returns a fresh stack of buffers set to {NULL}. */
+static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *new_leafless_chain(void) {
+ STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+ if (chain == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(chain, NULL)) {
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(chain);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return chain;
+}
+
+/* ssl_cert_set_chain sets elements 1.. of |cert->chain| to the serialised
+ * forms of elements of |chain|. It returns one on success or zero on error, in
+ * which case no change to |cert->chain| is made. It preverses the existing
+ * leaf from |cert->chain|, if any. */
+static int ssl_cert_set_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+ STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *new_chain = NULL;
+
+ if (cert->chain != NULL) {
+ new_chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+ if (new_chain == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0);
+ if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(new_chain, leaf)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* |leaf| might be NULL if it's a “leafless” chain. */
+ if (leaf != NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(leaf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ if (new_chain == NULL) {
+ new_chain = new_leafless_chain();
+ if (new_chain == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = x509_to_buffer(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
+ if (buffer == NULL ||
+ !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(new_chain, buffer)) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(cert->chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ cert->chain = new_chain;
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(new_chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_leaf(CERT *cert) {
+ X509_free(cert->x509_leaf);
+ cert->x509_leaf = NULL;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(CERT *cert) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cert->x509_chain, X509_free);
+ cert->x509_chain = NULL;
+}
+
+static int ssl_crypto_x509_check_client_CA_list(
+ STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(names); i++) {
+ const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(names, i);
+ const uint8_t *inp = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer);
+ X509_NAME *name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &inp, CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer));
+ const int ok = name != NULL && inp == CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer) +
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer);
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ if (!ok) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_cert_clear(CERT *cert) {
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_leaf(cert);
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(cert);
+
+ X509_free(cert->x509_stash);
+ cert->x509_stash = NULL;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_cert_free(CERT *cert) {
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_clear(cert);
+ X509_STORE_free(cert->verify_store);
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_cert_dup(CERT *new_cert, const CERT *cert) {
+ if (cert->verify_store != NULL) {
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store);
+ new_cert->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssl_crypto_x509_session_cache_objects(SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+ bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> chain;
+ const size_t num_certs = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(sess->certs);
+ if (num_certs > 0) {
+ chain.reset(sk_X509_new_null());
+ if (!chain) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ X509 *leaf = NULL;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_certs; i++) {
+ X509 *x509 = X509_parse_from_buffer(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(sess->certs, i));
+ if (x509 == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(chain.get(), x509)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ leaf = x509;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sess->x509_chain, X509_free);
+ sess->x509_chain = chain.release();
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sess->x509_chain_without_leaf, X509_free);
+ sess->x509_chain_without_leaf = NULL;
+
+ X509_free(sess->x509_peer);
+ if (leaf != NULL) {
+ X509_up_ref(leaf);
+ }
+ sess->x509_peer = leaf;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_crypto_x509_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *new_session,
+ const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (session->x509_peer != NULL) {
+ X509_up_ref(session->x509_peer);
+ new_session->x509_peer = session->x509_peer;
+ }
+ if (session->x509_chain != NULL) {
+ new_session->x509_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(session->x509_chain);
+ if (new_session->x509_chain == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_session_clear(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ X509_free(session->x509_peer);
+ session->x509_peer = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(session->x509_chain, X509_free);
+ session->x509_chain = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(session->x509_chain_without_leaf, X509_free);
+ session->x509_chain_without_leaf = NULL;
+}
+
+static int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+ return SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
+ case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
+ case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
+ return SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ return SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ return SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+ return SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
+ case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
+ return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+ case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+ return SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+ return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+ return SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+
+ default:
+ return SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssl_crypto_x509_session_verify_cert_chain(SSL_SESSION *session,
+ SSL *ssl) {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *const cert_chain = session->x509_chain;
+ if (cert_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(cert_chain) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ X509_STORE *verify_store = ssl->ctx->cert_store;
+ if (ssl->cert->verify_store != NULL) {
+ verify_store = ssl->cert->verify_store;
+ }
+
+ X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(cert_chain, 0);
+ int ret = 0;
+ X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, leaf, cert_chain)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),
+ ssl)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by the
+ * context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or vice
+ * versa. */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, ssl->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+
+ /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), ssl->param);
+
+ if (ssl->verify_callback) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, ssl->verify_callback);
+ }
+
+ int verify_ret;
+ if (ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) {
+ verify_ret = ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, ssl->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+ } else {
+ verify_ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+ }
+
+ session->verify_result = ctx.error;
+
+ /* If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result. */
+ if (verify_ret <= 0 && ssl->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, ssl_verify_alarm_type(ctx.error));
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_hs_flush_cached_ca_names(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(hs->cached_x509_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ hs->cached_x509_ca_names = NULL;
+}
+
+static int ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_new(SSL *ssl) {
+ ssl->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (ssl->param == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ssl->param, ssl->ctx->param);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(SSL *ssl) {
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ssl->cached_x509_client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+ ssl->cached_x509_client_CA = NULL;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_free(SSL *ssl) {
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(ssl);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ssl->param);
+}
+
+static int ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(SSL *ssl) {
+ /* Only build a chain if there are no intermediates configured and the feature
+ * isn't disabled. */
+ if ((ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) ||
+ !ssl_has_certificate(ssl) ||
+ ssl->cert->chain == NULL ||
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(ssl->cert->chain) > 1) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ X509 *leaf =
+ X509_parse_from_buffer(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->cert->chain, 0));
+ if (!leaf) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, ssl->ctx->cert_store, leaf, NULL)) {
+ X509_free(leaf);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Attempt to build a chain, ignoring the result. */
+ X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+ X509_free(leaf);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /* Remove the leaf from the generated chain. */
+ X509_free(sk_X509_shift(ctx.chain));
+
+ const int ok = ssl_cert_set_chain(ssl->cert, ctx.chain);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ if (!ok) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(ssl->cert);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ctx->cached_x509_client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+ ctx->cached_x509_client_CA = NULL;
+}
+
+static int ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ ctx->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
+ ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ return (ctx->cert_store != NULL && ctx->param != NULL);
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(ctx);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+}
+
+const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_crypto_x509_method = {
+ ssl_crypto_x509_check_client_CA_list,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_clear,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_free,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_dup,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_leaf,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_session_cache_objects,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_session_dup,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_session_clear,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_session_verify_cert_chain,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_hs_flush_cached_ca_names,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_new,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_free,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_auto_chain_if_needed,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_new,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_free,
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA,
+};
+
+static int ssl_use_certificate(CERT *cert, X509 *x) {
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = x509_to_buffer(x);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ const int ok = ssl_set_cert(cert, buffer);
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return ssl_use_certificate(ssl->cert, x);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return ssl_use_certificate(ctx->cert, x);
+}
+
+/* ssl_cert_cache_leaf_cert sets |cert->x509_leaf|, if currently NULL, from the
+ * first element of |cert->chain|. */
+static int ssl_cert_cache_leaf_cert(CERT *cert) {
+ assert(cert->x509_method);
+
+ if (cert->x509_leaf != NULL ||
+ cert->chain == NULL) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0);
+ if (!leaf) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ cert->x509_leaf = X509_parse_from_buffer(leaf);
+ return cert->x509_leaf != NULL;
+}
+
+static X509 *ssl_cert_get0_leaf(CERT *cert) {
+ if (cert->x509_leaf == NULL &&
+ !ssl_cert_cache_leaf_cert(cert)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return cert->x509_leaf;
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return ssl_cert_get0_leaf(ssl->cert);
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write((CRYPTO_MUTEX *) &ctx->lock);
+ X509 *ret = ssl_cert_get0_leaf(ctx->cert);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write((CRYPTO_MUTEX *) &ctx->lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+ if (!ssl_cert_set_chain(cert, chain)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(cert);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+ if (!ssl_cert_set_chain(cert, chain)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(cert);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cert_append_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) {
+ assert(cert->x509_method);
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = x509_to_buffer(x509);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (cert->chain != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(cert->chain, buffer)) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ cert->chain = new_leafless_chain();
+ if (cert->chain == NULL ||
+ !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(cert->chain, buffer)) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->chain);
+ cert->chain = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) {
+ if (!ssl_cert_append_cert(cert, x509)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ X509_free(cert->x509_stash);
+ cert->x509_stash = x509;
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(cert);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) {
+ if (!ssl_cert_append_cert(cert, x509)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(cert);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set0_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ctx->cert, chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ctx->cert, chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_set0_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ssl->cert, chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ssl->cert, chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_add0_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_add1_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx, NULL);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx);
+}
+
+int SSL_clear_chain_certs(SSL *ssl) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return SSL_set0_chain(ssl, NULL);
+}
+
+/* ssl_cert_cache_chain_certs fills in |cert->x509_chain| from elements 1.. of
+ * |cert->chain|. */
+static int ssl_cert_cache_chain_certs(CERT *cert) {
+ assert(cert->x509_method);
+
+ if (cert->x509_chain != NULL ||
+ cert->chain == NULL ||
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(cert->chain) < 2) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (chain == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(cert->chain); i++) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, i);
+ X509 *x509 = X509_parse_from_buffer(buffer);
+ if (x509 == NULL ||
+ !sk_X509_push(chain, x509)) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cert->x509_chain = chain;
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write((CRYPTO_MUTEX *) &ctx->lock);
+ const int ret = ssl_cert_cache_chain_certs(ctx->cert);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write((CRYPTO_MUTEX *) &ctx->lock);
+
+ if (!ret) {
+ *out_chain = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *out_chain = ctx->cert->x509_chain;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
+ return SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ctx, out_chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_get0_chain_certs(const SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ if (!ssl_cert_cache_chain_certs(ssl->cert)) {
+ *out_chain = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *out_chain = ssl->cert->x509_chain;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_new_with_crypto_x509(void) {
+ return ssl_session_new(&ssl_crypto_x509_method);
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(BIO *bio, SSL_SESSION **out) {
+ return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION, ssl_session_new_with_crypto_x509,
+ d2i_SSL_SESSION, bio, out);
+}
+
+int i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(BIO *bio, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION, i2d_SSL_SESSION, bio, session);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
+
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
+ if (length < 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ CBS cbs;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, *pp, length);
+
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_SESSION_parse(&cbs, &ssl_crypto_x509_method,
+ NULL /* no buffer pool */);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (a) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(*a);
+ *a = ret;
+ }
+ *pp = CBS_data(&cbs);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) {
+ return sk_X509_NAME_deep_copy(list, X509_NAME_dup, X509_NAME_free);
+}
+
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) **ca_list,
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list,
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+ STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *buffers = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+ if (buffers == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(name_list); i++) {
+ X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(name_list, i);
+ uint8_t *outp = NULL;
+ int len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, &outp);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(outp, len, pool);
+ OPENSSL_free(outp);
+ if (buffer == NULL ||
+ !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(buffers, buffer)) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(*ca_list, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ *ca_list = buffers;
+ return;
+
+err:
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(buffers, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(ssl);
+ set_client_CA_list(&ssl->client_CA, name_list, ssl->ctx->pool);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(name_list, X509_NAME_free);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ ctx->x509_method->ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(ctx);
+ set_client_CA_list(&ctx->client_CA, name_list, ctx->pool);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(name_list, X509_NAME_free);
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *
+ buffer_names_to_x509(const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names,
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **cached) {
+ if (names == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (*cached != NULL) {
+ return *cached;
+ }
+
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *new_cache = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ if (new_cache == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(names); i++) {
+ const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(names, i);
+ const uint8_t *inp = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer);
+ X509_NAME *name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &inp, CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer));
+ if (name == NULL ||
+ inp != CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer) + CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer) ||
+ !sk_X509_NAME_push(new_cache, name)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *cached = new_cache;
+ return new_cache;
+
+err:
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(new_cache, X509_NAME_free);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *ssl) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ /* For historical reasons, this function is used both to query configuration
+ * state on a server as well as handshake state on a client. However, whether
+ * |ssl| is a client or server is not known until explicitly configured with
+ * |SSL_set_connect_state|. If |handshake_func| is NULL, |ssl| is in an
+ * indeterminate mode and |ssl->server| is unset. */
+ if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL && !ssl->server) {
+ if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) {
+ return buffer_names_to_x509(ssl->s3->hs->ca_names,
+ &ssl->s3->hs->cached_x509_ca_names);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->client_CA != NULL) {
+ return buffer_names_to_x509(
+ ssl->client_CA, (STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **)&ssl->cached_x509_client_CA);
+ }
+ return buffer_names_to_x509(ssl->ctx->client_CA,
+ &ssl->ctx->cached_x509_client_CA);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write((CRYPTO_MUTEX *) &ctx->lock);
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = buffer_names_to_x509(
+ ctx->client_CA, (STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **)&ctx->cached_x509_client_CA);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write((CRYPTO_MUTEX *) &ctx->lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) **names, X509 *x509,
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+ if (x509 == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *outp = NULL;
+ int len = i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_subject_name(x509), &outp);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(outp, len, pool);
+ OPENSSL_free(outp);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int alloced = 0;
+ if (*names == NULL) {
+ *names = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+ alloced = 1;
+
+ if (*names == NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(*names, buffer)) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
+ if (alloced) {
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(*names, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ *names = NULL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ if (!add_client_CA(&ssl->client_CA, x509, ssl->ctx->pool)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(ssl);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ if (!add_client_CA(&ctx->client_CA, x509, ctx->pool)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(ctx);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg) {
+ if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl) || ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) ||
+ !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ X509_free(x509);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+ X509 **out_x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **out_pkey)) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ /* Emulate the old client certificate callback with the new one. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, do_client_cert_cb, NULL);
+ ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
+}
+
+static int set_cert_store(X509_STORE **store_ptr, X509_STORE *new_store,
+ int take_ref) {
+ X509_STORE_free(*store_ptr);
+ *store_ptr = new_store;
+
+ if (new_store != NULL && take_ref) {
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(new_store);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) {
+ /* The ex_data index to go from |X509_STORE_CTX| to |SSL| always uses the
+ * reserved app_data slot. Before ex_data was introduced, app_data was used.
+ * Avoid breaking any software which assumes |X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data|
+ * works. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
+ check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+ return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) {
+ check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+ return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 1);
+}
