Switch a number of files to C++.
http://i1.kym-cdn.com/photos/images/original/000/242/631/382.gif
In the first step, switch C files to C++ individually, keeping
everything in internal.h C-compatible. We'll make minimal changes needed
to get things compiling (notably a lot of goto errs will need to turn to
bssl::UniquePtr right away), but more aggressive changes will happen in
later steps.
(To avoid a rebase, I'm intentionally avoiding files that would conflict
with CLs in flight right now.)
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Id4cfd722e7b57d1df11f27236b4658b5d39b5fd2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17667
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_asn1.cc b/ssl/ssl_asn1.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d6140e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/ssl_asn1.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,822 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+/* Per C99, various stdint.h macros are unavailable in C++ unless some macros
+ * are defined. C++11 overruled this decision, but older Android NDKs still
+ * require it. */
+#if !defined(__STDC_LIMIT_MACROS)
+#define __STDC_LIMIT_MACROS
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+/* An SSL_SESSION is serialized as the following ASN.1 structure:
+ *
+ * SSLSession ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version INTEGER (1), -- session structure version
+ * sslVersion INTEGER, -- protocol version number
+ * cipher OCTET STRING, -- two bytes long
+ * sessionID OCTET STRING,
+ * masterKey OCTET STRING,
+ * time [1] INTEGER, -- seconds since UNIX epoch
+ * timeout [2] INTEGER, -- in seconds
+ * peer [3] Certificate OPTIONAL,
+ * sessionIDContext [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * verifyResult [5] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- one of X509_V_* codes
+ * hostName [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * -- from server_name extension
+ * pskIdentity [8] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * ticketLifetimeHint [9] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- client-only
+ * ticket [10] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- client-only
+ * peerSHA256 [13] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * originalHandshakeHash [14] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * signedCertTimestampList [15] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * -- contents of SCT extension
+ * ocspResponse [16] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * -- stapled OCSP response from the server
+ * extendedMasterSecret [17] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
+ * groupID [18] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * certChain [19] SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL,
+ * ticketAgeAdd [21] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * isServer [22] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
+ * peerSignatureAlgorithm [23] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * ticketMaxEarlyData [24] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * authTimeout [25] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- defaults to timeout
+ * earlyALPN [26] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * }
+ *
+ * Note: historically this serialization has included other optional
+ * fields. Their presence is currently treated as a parse error:
+ *
+ * keyArg [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * pskIdentityHint [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * compressionMethod [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * srpUsername [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * ticketFlags [20] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ */
+
+static const unsigned kVersion = 1;
+
+static const int kTimeTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1;
+static const int kTimeoutTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2;
+static const int kPeerTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 3;
+static const int kSessionIDContextTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 4;
+static const int kVerifyResultTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 5;
+static const int kHostNameTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 6;
+static const int kPSKIdentityTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 8;
+static const int kTicketLifetimeHintTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 9;
+static const int kTicketTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 10;
+static const int kPeerSHA256Tag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 13;
+static const int kOriginalHandshakeHashTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 14;
+static const int kSignedCertTimestampListTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 15;
+static const int kOCSPResponseTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 16;
+static const int kExtendedMasterSecretTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 17;
+static const int kGroupIDTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 18;
+static const int kCertChainTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 19;
+static const int kTicketAgeAddTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 21;
+static const int kIsServerTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 22;
+static const int kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 23;
+static const int kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 24;
+static const int kAuthTimeoutTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 25;
+static const int kEarlyALPNTag =
+ CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 26;
+
+static int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
+ size_t *out_len, int for_ticket) {
+ CBB cbb, session, child, child2;
+
+ if (in == NULL || in->cipher == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CBB_zero(&cbb);
+ if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &session, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&session, kVersion) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&session, in->ssl_version) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&child, (uint16_t)(in->cipher->id & 0xffff)) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ /* The session ID is irrelevant for a session ticket. */
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, in->session_id,
+ for_ticket ? 0 : in->session_id_length) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, in->master_key, in->master_key_length) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->time) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeoutTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->timeout)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The peer certificate is only serialized if the SHA-256 isn't
+ * serialized instead. */
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs) > 0 && !in->peer_sha256_valid) {
+ const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(in->certs, 0);
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Although it is OPTIONAL and usually empty, OpenSSL has
+ * historically always encoded the sid_ctx. */
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kSessionIDContextTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->sid_ctx, in->sid_ctx_length)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kVerifyResultTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->verify_result)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->tlsext_hostname) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kHostNameTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->tlsext_hostname,
+ strlen(in->tlsext_hostname))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->psk_identity) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPSKIdentityTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->psk_identity,
+ strlen(in->psk_identity))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketLifetimeHintTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->tlsext_tick && !for_ticket) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->tlsext_tick, in->tlsext_ticklen)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->peer_sha256_valid) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSHA256Tag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->peer_sha256, sizeof(in->peer_sha256))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kOriginalHandshakeHashTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->original_handshake_hash,
+ in->original_handshake_hash_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length > 0) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kSignedCertTimestampListTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
+ in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->ocsp_response_length > 0) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kOCSPResponseTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->ocsp_response, in->ocsp_response_length)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->extended_master_secret) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kExtendedMasterSecretTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&child2, 0xff)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->group_id > 0 &&
+ (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kGroupIDTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->group_id))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The certificate chain is only serialized if the leaf's SHA-256 isn't
+ * serialized instead. */
+ if (in->certs != NULL &&
+ !in->peer_sha256_valid &&
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs) >= 2) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kCertChainTag)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs); i++) {
+ const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(in->certs, i);
+ if (!CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->ticket_age_add_valid) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketAgeAddTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_u32(&child2, in->ticket_age_add)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!in->is_server) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kIsServerTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&child2, 0x00)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (in->peer_signature_algorithm != 0 &&
+ (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->peer_signature_algorithm))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (in->ticket_max_early_data != 0 &&
+ (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->ticket_max_early_data))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (in->timeout != in->auth_timeout &&
+ (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kAuthTimeoutTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->auth_timeout))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (in->early_alpn) {
+ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kEarlyALPNTag) ||
+ !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->early_alpn,
+ in->early_alpn_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, out_data, out_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
+ size_t *out_len) {
+ if (in->not_resumable) {
+ /* If the caller has an unresumable session, e.g. if |SSL_get_session| were
+ * called on a TLS 1.3 or False Started connection, serialize with a
+ * placeholder value so it is not accidentally deserialized into a resumable
+ * one. */
+ static const char kNotResumableSession[] = "NOT RESUMABLE";
+
+ *out_len = strlen(kNotResumableSession);
+ *out_data = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(kNotResumableSession, *out_len);
+ if (*out_data == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(in, out_data, out_len, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
+ size_t *out_len) {
+ return SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(in, out_data, out_len, 1);
+}
+
+int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **pp) {
+ uint8_t *out;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(in, &out, &len)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (len > INT_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_free(out);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (pp) {
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(*pp, out, len);
+ *pp += len;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(out);
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/* SSL_SESSION_parse_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
+ * explicitly tagged with |tag| from |cbs| and saves it in |*out|. On
+ * entry, if |*out| is not NULL, it frees the existing contents. If
+ * the element was not found, it sets |*out| to NULL. It returns one
+ * on success, whether or not the element was found, and zero on
+ * decode error. */
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_string(CBS *cbs, char **out, unsigned tag) {
+ CBS value;
+ int present;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, &present, tag)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (present) {
+ if (CBS_contains_zero_byte(&value)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!CBS_strdup(&value, out)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(*out);
+ *out = NULL;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* SSL_SESSION_parse_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
+ * explicitly tagged with |tag| from |cbs| and stows it in |*out_ptr|
+ * and |*out_len|. If |*out_ptr| is not NULL, it frees the existing
+ * contents. On entry, if the element was not found, it sets
+ * |*out_ptr| to NULL. It returns one on success, whether or not the
+ * element was found, and zero on decode error. */
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(CBS *cbs, uint8_t **out_ptr,
+ size_t *out_len, unsigned tag) {
+ CBS value;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, NULL, tag)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!CBS_stow(&value, out_ptr, out_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string parses an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
+ * explicitly tagged with |tag| of size at most |max_out|. */
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string(
+ CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_len, uint8_t max_out, unsigned tag) {
+ CBS value;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, NULL, tag) ||
+ CBS_len(&value) > max_out) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out, CBS_data(&value), CBS_len(&value));
+ *out_len = (uint8_t)CBS_len(&value);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_long(CBS *cbs, long *out, unsigned tag,
+ long default_value) {
+ uint64_t value;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag,
+ (uint64_t)default_value) ||
+ value > LONG_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *out = (long)value;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out, unsigned tag,
+ uint32_t default_value) {
+ uint64_t value;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag,
+ (uint64_t)default_value) ||
+ value > 0xffffffff) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *out = (uint32_t)value;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_u16(CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out, unsigned tag,
+ uint16_t default_value) {
+ uint64_t value;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag,
+ (uint64_t)default_value) ||
+ value > 0xffff) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *out = (uint16_t)value;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_parse(CBS *cbs, const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method,
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = ssl_session_new(x509_method);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CBS session;
+ uint64_t version, ssl_version;
+ uint16_t unused;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &session, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&session, &version) ||
+ version != kVersion ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&session, &ssl_version) ||
+ /* Require sessions have versions valid in either TLS or DTLS. The session
+ * will not be used by the handshake if not applicable, but, for
+ * simplicity, never parse a session that does not pass
+ * |ssl_protocol_version_from_wire|. */
+ ssl_version > UINT16_MAX ||
+ !ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&unused, ssl_version)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->ssl_version = ssl_version;
+
+ CBS cipher;
+ uint16_t cipher_value;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &cipher, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&cipher, &cipher_value) ||
+ CBS_len(&cipher) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_value);
+ if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CBS session_id, master_key;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &session_id, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&session, &master_key, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ CBS_len(&master_key) > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id));
+ ret->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->master_key, CBS_data(&master_key), CBS_len(&master_key));
+ ret->master_key_length = CBS_len(&master_key);
+
+ CBS child;
+ uint64_t timeout;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeTag) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&child, &ret->time) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeoutTag) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&child, &timeout) ||
+ timeout > UINT32_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret->timeout = (uint32_t)timeout;
+
+ CBS peer;
+ int has_peer;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&session, &peer, &has_peer, kPeerTag) ||
+ (has_peer && CBS_len(&peer) == 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* |peer| is processed with the certificate chain. */
+
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string(
+ &session, ret->sid_ctx, &ret->sid_ctx_length, sizeof(ret->sid_ctx),
+ kSessionIDContextTag) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_long(&session, &ret->verify_result, kVerifyResultTag,
+ X509_V_OK) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_hostname,
+ kHostNameTag) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_string(&session, &ret->psk_identity,
+ kPSKIdentityTag) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint,
+ kTicketLifetimeHintTag, 0) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_tick,
+ &ret->tlsext_ticklen, kTicketTag)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&session, kPeerSHA256Tag)) {
+ CBS peer_sha256;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSHA256Tag) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&child, &peer_sha256, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ CBS_len(&peer_sha256) != sizeof(ret->peer_sha256) ||
+ CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->peer_sha256, CBS_data(&peer_sha256),
+ sizeof(ret->peer_sha256));
+ ret->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
+ } else {
+ ret->peer_sha256_valid = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string(
+ &session, ret->original_handshake_hash,
+ &ret->original_handshake_hash_len,
+ sizeof(ret->original_handshake_hash), kOriginalHandshakeHashTag) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(
+ &session, &ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
+ &ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length,
+ kSignedCertTimestampListTag) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(
+ &session, &ret->ocsp_response, &ret->ocsp_response_length,
+ kOCSPResponseTag)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ int extended_master_secret;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_bool(&session, &extended_master_secret,
+ kExtendedMasterSecretTag,
+ 0 /* default to false */)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->extended_master_secret = !!extended_master_secret;
+
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_u16(&session, &ret->group_id, kGroupIDTag, 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CBS cert_chain;
+ CBS_init(&cert_chain, NULL, 0);
+ int has_cert_chain;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&session, &cert_chain, &has_cert_chain,
+ kCertChainTag) ||
+ (has_cert_chain && CBS_len(&cert_chain) == 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (has_cert_chain && !has_peer) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (has_peer || has_cert_chain) {
+ ret->certs = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+ if (ret->certs == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (has_peer) {
+ /* TODO(agl): this should use the |SSL_CTX|'s pool. */
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&peer, pool);
+ if (buffer == NULL ||
+ !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret->certs, buffer)) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (CBS_len(&cert_chain) > 0) {
+ CBS cert;
+ if (!CBS_get_any_asn1_element(&cert_chain, &cert, NULL, NULL) ||
+ CBS_len(&cert) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO(agl): this should use the |SSL_CTX|'s pool. */
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&cert, pool);
+ if (buffer == NULL ||
+ !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret->certs, buffer)) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!x509_method->session_cache_objects(ret)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CBS age_add;
+ int age_add_present;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(&session, &age_add, &age_add_present,
+ kTicketAgeAddTag) ||
+ (age_add_present &&
+ !CBS_get_u32(&age_add, &ret->ticket_age_add)) ||
+ CBS_len(&age_add) != 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->ticket_age_add_valid = age_add_present;
+
+ int is_server;
+ if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_bool(&session, &is_server, kIsServerTag,
+ 1 /* default to true */)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* TODO: in time we can include |is_server| for servers too, then we can
+ enforce that client and server sessions are never mixed up. */
+
+ ret->is_server = is_server;
+
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_u16(&session, &ret->peer_signature_algorithm,
+ kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag, 0) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->ticket_max_early_data,
+ kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag, 0) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->auth_timeout, kAuthTimeoutTag,
+ ret->timeout) ||
+ !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(&session, &ret->early_alpn,
+ &ret->early_alpn_len, kEarlyALPNTag) ||
+ CBS_len(&session) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+
+err:
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+ const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ CBS cbs;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_SESSION_parse(&cbs, ctx->x509_method, ctx->pool);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
