Switch a number of files to C++.
http://i1.kym-cdn.com/photos/images/original/000/242/631/382.gif
In the first step, switch C files to C++ individually, keeping
everything in internal.h C-compatible. We'll make minimal changes needed
to get things compiling (notably a lot of goto errs will need to turn to
bssl::UniquePtr right away), but more aggressive changes will happen in
later steps.
(To avoid a rebase, I'm intentionally avoiding files that would conflict
with CLs in flight right now.)
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Id4cfd722e7b57d1df11f27236b4658b5d39b5fd2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17667
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.cc b/ssl/d1_both.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f25c2be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,815 @@
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+/* TODO(davidben): 28 comes from the size of IP + UDP header. Is this reasonable
+ * for these values? Notably, why is kMinMTU a function of the transport
+ * protocol's overhead rather than, say, what's needed to hold a minimally-sized
+ * handshake fragment plus protocol overhead. */
+
+/* kMinMTU is the minimum acceptable MTU value. */
+static const unsigned int kMinMTU = 256 - 28;
+
+/* kDefaultMTU is the default MTU value to use if neither the user nor
+ * the underlying BIO supplies one. */
+static const unsigned int kDefaultMTU = 1500 - 28;
+
+
+/* Receiving handshake messages. */
+
+static void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) {
+ if (frag == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->data);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+}
+
+static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) {
+ hm_fragment *frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
+ if (frag == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(frag, 0, sizeof(hm_fragment));
+ frag->type = msg_hdr->type;
+ frag->seq = msg_hdr->seq;
+ frag->msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+
+ /* Allocate space for the reassembled message and fill in the header. */
+ frag->data =
+ (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + msg_hdr->msg_len);
+ if (frag->data == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CBB cbb;
+ if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, frag->data, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, msg_hdr->type) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, msg_hdr->msg_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, msg_hdr->seq) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, 0 /* frag_off */) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, msg_hdr->msg_len) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, NULL)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If the handshake message is empty, |frag->reassembly| is NULL. */
+ if (msg_hdr->msg_len > 0) {
+ /* Initialize reassembly bitmask. */
+ if (msg_hdr->msg_len + 7 < msg_hdr->msg_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ size_t bitmask_len = (msg_hdr->msg_len + 7) / 8;
+ frag->reassembly = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(bitmask_len);
+ if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(frag->reassembly, 0, bitmask_len);
+ }
+
+ return frag;
+
+err:
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* bit_range returns a |uint8_t| with bits |start|, inclusive, to |end|,
+ * exclusive, set. */
+static uint8_t bit_range(size_t start, size_t end) {
+ return (uint8_t)(~((1u << start) - 1) & ((1u << end) - 1));
+}
+
+/* dtls1_hm_fragment_mark marks bytes |start|, inclusive, to |end|, exclusive,
+ * as received in |frag|. If |frag| becomes complete, it clears
+ * |frag->reassembly|. The range must be within the bounds of |frag|'s message
+ * and |frag->reassembly| must not be NULL. */
+static void dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(hm_fragment *frag, size_t start,
+ size_t end) {
+ size_t msg_len = frag->msg_len;
+
+ if (frag->reassembly == NULL || start > end || end > msg_len) {
+ assert(0);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* A zero-length message will never have a pending reassembly. */
+ assert(msg_len > 0);
+
+ if ((start >> 3) == (end >> 3)) {
+ frag->reassembly[start >> 3] |= bit_range(start & 7, end & 7);
+ } else {
+ frag->reassembly[start >> 3] |= bit_range(start & 7, 8);
+ for (size_t i = (start >> 3) + 1; i < (end >> 3); i++) {
+ frag->reassembly[i] = 0xff;
+ }
+ if ((end & 7) != 0) {
+ frag->reassembly[end >> 3] |= bit_range(0, end & 7);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the fragment is complete. */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < (msg_len >> 3); i++) {
+ if (frag->reassembly[i] != 0xff) {
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((msg_len & 7) != 0 &&
+ frag->reassembly[msg_len >> 3] != bit_range(0, msg_len & 7)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+ frag->reassembly = NULL;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_is_current_message_complete returns one if the current handshake
+ * message is complete and zero otherwise. */
+static int dtls1_is_current_message_complete(const SSL *ssl) {
+ hm_fragment *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq %
+ SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT];
+ return frag != NULL && frag->reassembly == NULL;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_get_incoming_message returns the incoming message corresponding to
+ * |msg_hdr|. If none exists, it creates a new one and inserts it in the
+ * queue. Otherwise, it checks |msg_hdr| is consistent with the existing one. It
+ * returns NULL on failure. The caller does not take ownership of the result. */
+static hm_fragment *dtls1_get_incoming_message(
+ SSL *ssl, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) {
+ if (msg_hdr->seq < ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
+ msg_hdr->seq - ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq >= SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ size_t idx = msg_hdr->seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
+ hm_fragment *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx];
+ if (frag != NULL) {
+ assert(frag->seq == msg_hdr->seq);
+ /* The new fragment must be compatible with the previous fragments from this
+ * message. */
+ if (frag->type != msg_hdr->type ||
+ frag->msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_FRAGMENT_MISMATCH);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return frag;
+ }
+
+ /* This is the first fragment from this message. */
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr);
+ if (frag == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx] = frag;
+ return frag;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_process_handshake_record reads a handshake record and processes it. It
+ * returns one if the record was successfully processed and 0 or -1 on error. */
+static int dtls1_process_handshake_record(SSL *ssl) {
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
+
+start:
+ if (rr->length == 0) {
+ int ret = dtls1_get_record(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Cross-epoch records are discarded, but we may receive out-of-order
+ * application data between ChangeCipherSpec and Finished or a
+ * ChangeCipherSpec before the appropriate point in the handshake. Those must
+ * be silently discarded.
+ *
+ * However, only allow the out-of-order records in the correct epoch.
+ * Application data must come in the encrypted epoch, and ChangeCipherSpec in
+ * the unencrypted epoch (we never renegotiate). Other cases fall through and
+ * fail with a fatal error. */
+ if ((rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx != NULL) ||
+ (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
+ ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx == NULL)) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS cbs;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, rr->data, rr->length);
+
+ while (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
+ /* Read a handshake fragment. */
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+ CBS body;
+ if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &msg_hdr, &body)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ const size_t frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+ const size_t frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
+ const size_t msg_len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ if (frag_off > msg_len || frag_off + frag_len < frag_off ||
+ frag_off + frag_len > msg_len ||
+ msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* The encrypted epoch in DTLS has only one handshake message. */
+ if (ssl->d1->r_epoch == 1 && msg_hdr.seq != ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (msg_hdr.seq < ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
+ msg_hdr.seq >
+ (unsigned)ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq + SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) {
+ /* Ignore fragments from the past, or ones too far in the future. */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ hm_fragment *frag = dtls1_get_incoming_message(ssl, &msg_hdr);
+ if (frag == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ assert(frag->msg_len == msg_len);
+
+ if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
+ /* The message is already assembled. */
+ continue;
+ }
+ assert(msg_len > 0);
+
+ /* Copy the body into the fragment. */
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(frag->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + frag_off,
+ CBS_data(&body), CBS_len(&body));
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(frag, frag_off, frag_off + frag_len);
+ }
+
+ rr->length = 0;
+ ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_get_message(SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
+ /* There must be a current message. */
+ assert(ssl->init_msg != NULL);
+ ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+ } else {
+ dtls1_release_current_message(ssl, 0 /* don't free buffer */);
+ }
+
+ /* Process handshake records until the current message is ready. */
+ while (!dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl)) {
+ int ret = dtls1_process_handshake_record(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ hm_fragment *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq %
+ SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT];
+ assert(frag != NULL);
+ assert(frag->reassembly == NULL);
+ assert(ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->seq);
+
+ /* TODO(davidben): This function has a lot of implicit outputs. Simplify the
+ * |ssl_get_message| API. */
+ ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = frag->type;
+ ssl->init_msg = frag->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ ssl->init_num = frag->msg_len;
+
+ ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->data,
+ ssl->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void dtls1_get_current_message(const SSL *ssl, CBS *out) {
+ assert(dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl));
+
+ hm_fragment *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq %
+ SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT];
+ CBS_init(out, frag->data, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + frag->msg_len);
+}
+
+void dtls1_release_current_message(SSL *ssl, int free_buffer) {
+ if (ssl->init_msg == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ assert(dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl));
+ size_t index = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(ssl->d1->incoming_messages[index]);
+ ssl->d1->incoming_messages[index] = NULL;
+ ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+ ssl->init_msg = NULL;
+ ssl->init_num = 0;
+}
+
+void dtls_clear_incoming_messages(SSL *ssl) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT; i++) {
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(ssl->d1->incoming_messages[i]);
+ ssl->d1->incoming_messages[i] = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+int dtls_has_incoming_messages(const SSL *ssl) {
+ size_t current = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT; i++) {
+ /* Skip the current message. */
+ if (ssl->init_msg != NULL && i == current) {
+ assert(dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ssl->d1->incoming_messages[i] != NULL) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int dtls1_parse_fragment(CBS *cbs, struct hm_header_st *out_hdr,
+ CBS *out_body) {
+ OPENSSL_memset(out_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &out_hdr->type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->msg_len) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &out_hdr->seq) ||
+ !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->frag_off) ||
+ !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->frag_len) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(cbs, out_body, out_hdr->frag_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Sending handshake messages. */
+
+void dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(SSL *ssl) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len; i++) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[i].data);
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[i].data = NULL;
+ }
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len = 0;
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_written = 0;
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
+}
+
+int dtls1_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
+ /* Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. */
+ if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0 /* length (filled in later) */) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(cbb, ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0 /* offset */) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, uint8_t **out_msg,
+ size_t *out_len) {
+ *out_msg = NULL;
+ if (!CBB_finish(cbb, out_msg, out_len) ||
+ *out_len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(*out_msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Fix up the header. Copy the fragment length into the total message
+ * length. */
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(*out_msg + 1, *out_msg + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 3, 3);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* add_outgoing adds a new handshake message or ChangeCipherSpec to the current
+ * outgoing flight. It returns one on success and zero on error. In both cases,
+ * it takes ownership of |data| and releases it with |OPENSSL_free| when
+ * done. */
+static int add_outgoing(SSL *ssl, int is_ccs, uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
+ OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT <
+ (1 << 8 * sizeof(ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len)),
+ outgoing_messages_len_is_too_small);
+ if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len >= SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) {
+ assert(0);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(data);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!is_ccs) {
+ /* TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSL_TRANSCRIPT
+ * on hs. */
+ if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&
+ !SSL_TRANSCRIPT_update(&ssl->s3->hs->transcript, data, len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(data);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+ }
+
+ DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE *msg =
+ &ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len];
+ msg->data = data;
+ msg->len = len;
+ msg->epoch = ssl->d1->w_epoch;
+ msg->is_ccs = is_ccs;
+
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len++;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_add_message(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
+ return add_outgoing(ssl, 0 /* handshake */, data, len);
+}
+
+int dtls1_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
+ return add_outgoing(ssl, 1 /* ChangeCipherSpec */, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+int dtls1_add_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t level, uint8_t desc) {
+ /* The |add_alert| path is only used for warning alerts for now, which DTLS
+ * never sends. This will be implemented later once closure alerts are
+ * converted. */
+ assert(0);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_update_mtu updates the current MTU from the BIO, ensuring it is above
+ * the minimum. */
+static void dtls1_update_mtu(SSL *ssl) {
+ /* TODO(davidben): No consumer implements |BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU| and the
+ * only |BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU| implementation could use
+ * |SSL_set_mtu|. Does this need to be so complex? */
+ if (ssl->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() &&
+ !(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+ long mtu = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+ if (mtu >= 0 && mtu <= (1 << 30) && (unsigned)mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()) {
+ ssl->d1->mtu = (unsigned)mtu;
+ } else {
+ ssl->d1->mtu = kDefaultMTU;
+ BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, ssl->d1->mtu, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* The MTU should be above the minimum now. */
+ assert(ssl->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());
+}
+
+enum seal_result_t {
+ seal_error,
+ seal_no_progress,
+ seal_partial,
+ seal_success,
+};
+
+/* seal_next_message seals |msg|, which must be the next message, to |out|. If
+ * progress was made, it returns |seal_partial| or |seal_success| and sets
+ * |*out_len| to the number of bytes written. */
+static enum seal_result_t seal_next_message(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out,
+ size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
+ const DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE *msg) {
+ assert(ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len);
+ assert(msg == &ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_written]);
+
+ /* DTLS renegotiation is unsupported, so only epochs 0 (NULL cipher) and 1
+ * (negotiated cipher) exist. */
+ assert(ssl->d1->w_epoch == 0 || ssl->d1->w_epoch == 1);
+ assert(msg->epoch <= ssl->d1->w_epoch);
+ enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch = dtls1_use_current_epoch;
+ if (ssl->d1->w_epoch == 1 && msg->epoch == 0) {
+ use_epoch = dtls1_use_previous_epoch;
+ }
+ size_t overhead = dtls_max_seal_overhead(ssl, use_epoch);
+ size_t prefix = dtls_seal_prefix_len(ssl, use_epoch);
+
+ if (msg->is_ccs) {
+ /* Check there is room for the ChangeCipherSpec. */
+ static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
+ if (max_out < sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec) + overhead) {
+ return seal_no_progress;
+ }
+
+ if (!dtls_seal_record(ssl, out, out_len, max_out,
+ SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec,
+ sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec), use_epoch)) {
+ return seal_error;
+ }
+
+ ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ kChangeCipherSpec, sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec));
+ return seal_success;
+ }
+
+ /* DTLS messages are serialized as a single fragment in |msg|. */
+ CBS cbs, body;
+ struct hm_header_st hdr;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, msg->data, msg->len);
+ if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &hdr, &body) ||
+ hdr.frag_off != 0 ||
+ hdr.frag_len != CBS_len(&body) ||
+ hdr.msg_len != CBS_len(&body) ||
+ !CBS_skip(&body, ssl->d1->outgoing_offset) ||
+ CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return seal_error;
+ }
+
+ /* Determine how much progress can be made. */
+ if (max_out < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1 + overhead || max_out < prefix) {
+ return seal_no_progress;
+ }
+ size_t todo = CBS_len(&body);
+ if (todo > max_out - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - overhead) {
+ todo = max_out - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - overhead;
+ }
+
+ /* Assemble a fragment, to be sealed in-place. */
+ CBB cbb;
+ uint8_t *frag = out + prefix;
+ size_t max_frag = max_out - prefix, frag_len;
+ if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, frag, max_frag) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, hdr.type) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, hdr.msg_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, hdr.seq) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, ssl->d1->outgoing_offset) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, todo) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, CBS_data(&body), todo) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &frag_len)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return seal_error;
+ }
+
+ ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag, frag_len);
+
+ if (!dtls_seal_record(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ out + prefix, frag_len, use_epoch)) {
+ return seal_error;
+ }
+
+ if (todo == CBS_len(&body)) {
+ /* The next message is complete. */
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
+ return seal_success;
+ }
+
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_offset += todo;
+ return seal_partial;
+}
+
+/* seal_next_packet writes as much of the next flight as possible to |out| and
+ * advances |ssl->d1->outgoing_written| and |ssl->d1->outgoing_offset| as
+ * appropriate. */
+static int seal_next_packet(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+ size_t max_out) {
+ int made_progress = 0;
+ size_t total = 0;
+ assert(ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len);
+ for (; ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len;
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_written++) {
+ const DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE *msg =
+ &ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_written];
+ size_t len;
+ enum seal_result_t ret = seal_next_message(ssl, out, &len, max_out, msg);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case seal_error:
+ return 0;
+
+ case seal_no_progress:
+ goto packet_full;
+
+ case seal_partial:
+ case seal_success:
+ out += len;
+ max_out -= len;
+ total += len;
+ made_progress = 1;
+
+ if (ret == seal_partial) {
+ goto packet_full;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+packet_full:
+ /* The MTU was too small to make any progress. */
+ if (!made_progress) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MTU_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *out_len = total;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
+ dtls1_update_mtu(ssl);
+
+ int ret = -1;
+ uint8_t *packet = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(ssl->d1->mtu);
+ if (packet == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ while (ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len) {
+ uint8_t old_written = ssl->d1->outgoing_written;
+ uint32_t old_offset = ssl->d1->outgoing_offset;
+
+ size_t packet_len;
+ if (!seal_next_packet(ssl, packet, &packet_len, ssl->d1->mtu)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ int bio_ret = BIO_write(ssl->wbio, packet, packet_len);
+ if (bio_ret <= 0) {
+ /* Retry this packet the next time around. */
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_written = old_written;
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = old_offset;
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ ret = bio_ret;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) {
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(packet);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int dtls1_retransmit_outgoing_messages(SSL *ssl) {
+ /* Rewind to the start of the flight and write it again.
+ *
+ * TODO(davidben): This does not allow retransmits to be resumed on
+ * non-blocking write. */
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_written = 0;
+ ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
+
+ return dtls1_flush_flight(ssl);
+}
+
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void) {
+ return kMinMTU;
+}
