Switch handshake_client and handshake_server to C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: Ic68252de7b3a8f90d60f052a3cb707730d5a2b16
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17744
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
diff --git a/ssl/handshake_client.cc b/ssl/handshake_client.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c37ec0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/handshake_client.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,1876 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int dtls1_get_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+int ssl3_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_connect);
+ assert(!ssl->server);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ int state = hs->state;
+
+ switch (hs->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_INIT:
+ ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || ssl->d1->send_cookie) {
+ if (hs->early_data_offered) {
+ if (!tls13_init_early_key_schedule(hs) ||
+ !tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, ssl->session->master_key,
+ ssl->session->master_key_length) ||
+ !tls13_derive_early_secrets(hs) ||
+ !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal,
+ hs->early_traffic_secret,
+ hs->hash_len)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_WRITE_EARLY_DATA;
+ } else {
+ hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ }
+ } else {
+ hs->next_state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
+ assert(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+ ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify_request(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ssl->d1->send_cookie) {
+ ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ } else {
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_WRITE_EARLY_DATA:
+ /* Stash the early data session, so connection properties may be queried
+ * out of it. */
+ hs->in_early_data = 1;
+ hs->early_session = ssl->session;
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
+
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ hs->can_early_write = 1;
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(hs);
+ if (hs->state == SSL_ST_TLS13) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ } else {
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
+ if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ if (hs->certificate_status_expected) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT:
+ if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ ret = ssl3_verify_server_cert(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
+ if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_hello_done(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
+ if (hs->cert_request) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ if (hs->cert_request && ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+ if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
+ !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+ if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A:
+ if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+ ret = ssl3_send_finished(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE;
+ } else {
+ /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then
+ * record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that
+ * any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those
+ * hashes. */
+ ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) &&
+ ssl3_can_false_start(ssl) &&
+ /* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state
+ * machine). */
+ !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+ hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START;
+ } else {
+ hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START:
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ hs->in_false_start = 1;
+ hs->can_early_write = 1;
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ if (hs->ticket_expected) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+ ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ ret = ssl3_get_finished(hs);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ } else {
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+ ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hs->state = hs->next_state;
+ if (hs->state != SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_TLS13: {
+ int early_return = 0;
+ ret = tls13_handshake(hs, &early_return);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (early_return) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE:
+ ssl->method->release_current_message(ssl, 1 /* free_buffer */);
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session);
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
+ ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session;
+ } else {
+ /* We make a copy of the session in order to maintain the immutability
+ * of the new established_session due to False Start. The caller may
+ * have taken a reference to the temporary session. */
+ ssl->s3->established_session =
+ SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session, SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
+ if (ssl->s3->established_session == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0;
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(hs->new_session);
+ hs->new_session = NULL;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK: {
+ const int is_initial_handshake = !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete;
+ ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
+ if (is_initial_handshake) {
+ /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */
+ ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (hs->state != state) {
+ ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+end:
+ ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL *ssl, enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
+ /* Use the client_random for entropy. This both avoids calling |RAND_bytes| on
+ * a single byte repeatedly and ensures the values are deterministic. This
+ * allows the same ClientHello be sent twice for a HelloRetryRequest or the
+ * same group be advertised in both supported_groups and key_shares. */
+ uint16_t ret = ssl->s3->client_random[index];
+ /* This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16. */
+ ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a;
+ ret |= ret << 8;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ssl_get_client_disabled sets |*out_mask_a| and |*out_mask_k| to masks of
+ * disabled algorithms. */
+static void ssl_get_client_disabled(SSL *ssl, uint32_t *out_mask_a,
+ uint32_t *out_mask_k) {
+ *out_mask_a = 0;
+ *out_mask_k = 0;
+
+ /* PSK requires a client callback. */
+ if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+ *out_mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ *out_mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
+ ssl_get_client_disabled(ssl, &mask_a, &mask_k);
+
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Add a fake cipher suite. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */
+ if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
+ !CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_cipher))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Add TLS 1.3 ciphers. Order ChaCha20-Poly1305 relative to AES-GCM based on
+ * hardware support. */
+ if (hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ if (!EVP_has_aes_hardware() &&
+ !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (EVP_has_aes_hardware() &&
+ !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hs->min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
+ int any_enabled = 0;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+ /* Skip disabled ciphers */
+ if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) ||
+ (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > hs->max_version ||
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < hs->min_version) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ any_enabled = 1;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_cipher_get_value(cipher))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */
+ if (!any_enabled && hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is
+ * added. */
+ if (hs->max_version == SSL3_VERSION &&
+ !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+int ssl_write_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */
+ int has_session_id = ssl->session != NULL &&
+ !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
+ ssl->session->session_id_length > 0;
+
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, hs->client_version) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (has_session_id) {
+ if (!CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->session->session_id,
+ ssl->session->session_id_length)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* In TLS 1.3 experimental encodings, send a fake placeholder session ID
+ * when we do not otherwise have one to send. */
+ if (hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+ ssl->tls13_variant != tls13_default &&
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ size_t header_len =
+ SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ if (!ssl_write_client_cipher_list(hs, &body) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, 1 /* one compression method */) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* null compression */) ||
+ !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, header_len + CBB_len(&body))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *msg = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &msg, &len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Now that the length prefixes have been computed, fill in the placeholder
+ * PSK binder. */
+ if (hs->needs_psk_binder &&
+ !tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, msg, len)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ssl->method->add_message(ssl, msg, len);
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ /* The handshake buffer is reset on every ClientHello. Notably, in DTLS, we
+ * may send multiple ClientHellos if we receive HelloVerifyRequest. */
+ if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init(&hs->transcript)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Freeze the version range. */
+ if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &hs->min_version, &hs->max_version)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Always advertise the ClientHello version from the original maximum version,
+ * even on renegotiation. The static RSA key exchange uses this field, and
+ * some servers fail when it changes across handshakes. */
+ if (SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl)) {
+ hs->client_version =
+ hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : DTLS1_VERSION;
+ } else {
+ hs->client_version =
+ hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? TLS1_2_VERSION : hs->max_version;
+ }
+
+ /* If the configured session has expired or was created at a disabled
+ * version, drop it. */
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ if (ssl->session->is_server ||
+ !ssl_supports_version(hs, ssl->session->ssl_version) ||
+ (ssl->session->session_id_length == 0 &&
+ ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen == 0) ||
+ ssl->session->not_resumable ||
+ !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, ssl->session)) {
+ ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't
+ * renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */
+ if ((!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || !ssl->d1->send_cookie) &&
+ !RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->client_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize a random session ID for the experimental TLS 1.3 variant. */
+ if (ssl->tls13_variant != tls13_default) {
+ hs->session_id_len = sizeof(hs->session_id);
+ if (!RAND_bytes(hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_write_client_hello(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int dtls1_get_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ CBS hello_verify_request, cookie;
+ uint16_t server_version;
+
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ ssl->d1->send_cookie = 0;
+ ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&hello_verify_request, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &server_version) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie) ||
+ CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(ssl->d1->cookie) ||
+ CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->d1->cookie, CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie));
+ ssl->d1->cookie_len = CBS_len(&cookie);
+
+ ssl->d1->send_cookie = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id;
+ uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite;
+ uint8_t compression_method;
+
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
+ ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) {
+ /* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert
+ * in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and
+ * gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial
+ * parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one.
+ *
+ * See https://crbug.com/446505. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO &&
+ ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&server_hello, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse out server version from supported_versions if available. */
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO &&
+ server_version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ CBS copy = server_hello;
+ CBS extensions;
+ uint8_t sid_length;
+ if (!CBS_skip(©, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8(©, &sid_length) ||
+ !CBS_skip(©, sid_length + 2 /* cipher_suite */ +
+ 1 /* compression_method */) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &extensions) ||
+ CBS_len(©) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ int have_supported_versions;
+ CBS supported_versions;
+ const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = {
+ {TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions, &have_supported_versions,
+ &supported_versions},
+ };
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types,
+ OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types),
+ 1 /* ignore unknown */)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (have_supported_versions) {
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_versions, &server_version) ||
+ CBS_len(&supported_versions) != 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_supports_version(hs, server_version)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+ if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
+ ssl->version = server_version;
+ /* At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is
+ * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
+ ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
+ } else if (server_version != ssl->version) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ hs->state = SSL_ST_TLS13;
+ hs->do_tls13_handshake = tls13_client_handshake;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (hs->early_data_offered) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_clear_tls13_state(hs);
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) ||
+ CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy over the server random. */
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+ /* TODO(davidben): Implement the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 downgrade sentinels once TLS
+ * 1.3 is finalized and we are not implementing a draft version. */
+
+ if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && ssl->session != NULL &&
+ ssl->session->session_id_length != 0 &&
+ CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
+ ssl->session->session_id_length)) {
+ ssl->s3->session_reused = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to
+ * fill out. */
+ ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 0 /* client */)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Note: session_id could be empty. */
+ hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id),
+ CBS_len(&session_id));
+ }
+
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ /* unknown cipher */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* The cipher must be allowed in the selected version and enabled. */
+ uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
+ ssl_get_client_disabled(ssl, &mask_a, &mask_k);
+ if ((c->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) || (c->algorithm_auth & mask_a) ||
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) > ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) ||
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) < ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) ||
+ !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), NULL, c)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ssl->session->cipher != c) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, ssl->session)) {
+ /* This is actually a client application bug. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
+ SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ hs->new_session->cipher = c;
+ }
+ hs->new_cipher = c;
+
+ /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash and hash the
+ * ServerHello. */
+ if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init_hash(&hs->transcript, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl),
+ c->algorithm_prf) ||
+ !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If doing a full handshake, the server may request a client certificate
+ * which requires hashing the handshake transcript. Otherwise, the handshake
+ * buffer may be released. */
+ if (ssl->session != NULL ||
+ !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
+ }
+
+ /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */
+ if (compression_method != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
+ if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL &&
+ hs->extended_master_secret != ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
+ if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION);
+ }
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+ !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS cbs;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(hs->peer_pubkey);
+ hs->peer_pubkey = NULL;
+ hs->new_session->certs = ssl_parse_cert_chain(&alert, &hs->peer_pubkey, NULL,
+ &cbs, ssl->ctx->pool);
+ if (hs->new_session->certs == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0 ||
+ CBS_len(&cbs) != 0 ||
+ !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_leaf_certificate(
+ hs, hs->peer_pubkey,
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, 0))) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Disallow the server certificate from changing during a renegotiation. See
+ * https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation,
+ * so this check is sufficient. */
+ if (ssl->s3->established_session != NULL) {
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(ssl->s3->established_session->certs) !=
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs); i++) {
+ const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert =
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->s3->established_session->certs, i);
+ const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert =
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, i);
+ if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) ||
+ OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+ /* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change
+ * its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */
+ ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response;
+ uint8_t status_type;
+ CBS_init(&certificate_status, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) ||
+ status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
+ !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) ||
+ CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
+ CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &hs->new_session->ocsp_response,
+ &hs->new_session->ocsp_response_length)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(hs->new_session, ssl)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ /* Some ciphers (pure PSK) have an optional ServerKeyExchange message. */
+ if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */
+ CBS server_key_exchange;
+ CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+ CBS server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange;
+
+ uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ CBS psk_identity_hint;
+
+ /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange,
+ &psk_identity_hint)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
+ * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK
+ * identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity.
+ * Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings.
+ *
+ * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than
+ * a specific identity. */
+ if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
+ CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Save non-empty identity hints as a C string. Empty identity hints we
+ * treat as missing. Plain PSK makes it possible to send either no hint
+ * (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while ECDHE_PSK can only spell
+ * empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd, so we interpret empty
+ * and missing as identical. */
+ if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) != 0 &&
+ !CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &hs->peer_psk_identity_hint)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ /* Parse the server parameters. */
+ uint8_t group_type;
+ uint16_t group_id;
+ CBS point;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) ||
+ group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
+
+ /* Ensure the group is consistent with preferences. */
+ if (!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later. */
+ if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&hs->ecdh_ctx, group_id) ||
+ !CBS_stow(&point, &hs->peer_key, &hs->peer_key_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while
+ * |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive
+ * a CBS containing just the parameter. */
+ CBS parameter;
+ CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig),
+ CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange));
+
+ /* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */
+ if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
+ } else if (!tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(&signature_algorithm,
+ hs->peer_pubkey)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */
+ CBS signature;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) ||
+ CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CBB transcript;
+ uint8_t *transcript_data;
+ size_t transcript_len;
+ if (!CBB_init(&transcript, 2*SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + CBS_len(¶meter)) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, CBS_data(¶meter), CBS_len(¶meter)) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&transcript, &transcript_data, &transcript_len)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&transcript);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ int sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(
+ ssl, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), signature_algorithm,
+ hs->peer_pubkey, transcript_data, transcript_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(transcript_data);
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+ sig_ok = 1;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+#endif
+ if (!sig_ok) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */
+ assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK);
+
+ if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (msg_ret <= 0) {
+ return msg_ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) {
+ ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ /* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing
+ * client auth. */
+ SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
+ !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS cbs;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+
+ /* Get the certificate types. */
+ CBS certificate_types;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &hs->certificate_types,
+ &hs->num_certificate_types)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
+ !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ca_names =
+ ssl_parse_client_CA_list(ssl, &alert, &cbs);
+ if (ca_names == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ca_names, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ hs->cert_request = 1;
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->ca_names, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ hs->ca_names = ca_names;
+ ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(hs);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
+ !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ServerHelloDone is empty. */
+ if (ssl->init_num > 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ /* Call cert_cb to update the certificate. */
+ if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) {
+ int ret = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ /* Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released. */
+ SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
+
+ /* In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is replaced with a warning alert. */
+ if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!ssl->method->add_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
+ SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_on_certificate_selected(hs) ||
+ !ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned),
+ SIZE_T_IS_SMALLER_THAN_UNSIGNED);
+
+static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *pms = NULL;
+ size_t pms_len = 0;
+ uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
+ unsigned psk_len = 0;
+ uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+ OPENSSL_memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+ psk_len =
+ ssl->psk_client_callback(ssl, hs->peer_psk_identity_hint, identity,
+ sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk));
+ if (psk_len == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(hs->new_session->psk_identity);
+ hs->new_session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+ if (hs->new_session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Write out psk_identity. */
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity,
+ OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) ||
+ !CBB_flush(&body)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ pms = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(hs->peer_pubkey);
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pms[0] = hs->client_version >> 8;
+ pms[1] = hs->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CBB child, *enc_pms = &body;
+ size_t enc_pms_len;
+ /* In TLS, there is a length prefix. */
+ if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ enc_pms = &child;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ if (!CBB_reserve(enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) ||
+ !RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
+ !CBB_did_write(enc_pms, enc_pms_len) ||
+ !CBB_flush(&body)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ /* Generate a keypair and serialize the public half. */
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the premaster. */
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &child, &pms, &pms_len, &alert,
+ hs->peer_key, hs->peer_key_len)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!CBB_flush(&body)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */
+ SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&hs->ecdh_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_key);
+ hs->peer_key = NULL;
+ hs->peer_key_len = 0;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as
+ * the pre-shared key. */
+ pms_len = psk_len;
+ pms = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(pms, 0, pms_len);
+ } else {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared
+ * key. */
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ CBB pms_cbb, child;
+ uint8_t *new_pms;
+ size_t new_pms_len;
+
+ CBB_zero(&pms_cbb);
+ if (!CBB_init(&pms_cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&pms_cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&pms_cbb);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(pms);
+ pms = new_pms;
+ pms_len = new_pms_len;
+ }
+
+ /* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the
+ * master secret. */
+ if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ hs->new_session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(
+ hs, hs->new_session->master_key, pms, pms_len);
+ if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(pms);
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ if (pms != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(pms);
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ assert(ssl_has_private_key(ssl));
+
+ bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body, child;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+ if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ /* Write out the digest type in TLS 1.2. */
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Set aside space for the signature. */
+ const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey);
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ size_t sig_len = max_sig_len;
+ /* The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a
+ * single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased. */
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t digest_len;
+ if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_ssl3_cert_verify_hash(&hs->transcript, digest,
+ &digest_len, hs->new_session,
+ signature_algorithm)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ssl->cert->privatekey, NULL);
+ int ok = pctx != NULL &&
+ EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) &&
+ EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, ptr, &sig_len, digest, digest_len);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ if (!ok) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (ssl_private_key_sign(hs, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len,
+ signature_algorithm,
+ (const uint8_t *)hs->transcript.buffer->data,
+ hs->transcript.buffer->length)) {
+ case ssl_private_key_success:
+ break;
+ case ssl_private_key_failure:
+ return -1;
+ case ssl_private_key_retry:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */
+ SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0};
+ size_t padding_len = 32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len + 2) % 32);
+
+ CBB cbb, body, child;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated,
+ ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ if (!ssl_do_channel_id_callback(ssl)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL) {
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBB cbb, body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
+ !tls1_write_channel_id(hs, &body) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ||
+ !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS new_session_ticket, ticket;
+ uint32_t tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
+ CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+ if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) ||
+ CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) {
+ /* RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after
+ * negotiating the extension. The value of |ticket_expected| is checked in
+ * |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary update. */
+ hs->ticket_expected = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ int session_renewed = ssl->session != NULL;
+ SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session;
+ if (session_renewed) {
+ /* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are
+ * immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the
+ * existing session. */
+ session = SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ /* This should never happen. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* |tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint| is measured from when the ticket was issued. */
+ ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
+
+ if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &session->tlsext_tick, &session->tlsext_ticklen)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
+
+ /* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use
+ * the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in
+ * with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/
+ if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket),
+ session->session_id, &session->session_id_length,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (session_renewed) {
+ session->not_resumable = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
+ ssl->session = session;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ if (session_renewed) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+ }
+ return -1;
+}