commit 9a41d1b946c17f353c1f7f1d35713b5623dc399e
author David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Sat May 16 01:30:09 2015 -0400
committer Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Thu May 21 18:29:34 2015 +0000
tree c5c4b6683984866adc9634035994014fc08c1e2a
parent 76e48c51d0744e916613c1e7657995099e8122f9

Deprecate SSL_*_read_ahead and enforce DTLS packet boundaries.

Now that WebRTC honors packet boundaries (https://crbug.com/447431), we
can start enforcing them correctly. Configuring read-ahead now does
nothing. Instead DTLS will always set "read-ahead" and also correctly
enforce packet boundaries when reading records. Add tests to ensure that
badly fragmented packets are ignored. Because such packets don't fail
the handshake, the tests work by injecting an alert in the front of the
handshake stream and ensuring the DTLS implementation ignores them.

ssl3_read_n can be be considerably unraveled now, but leave that for
future cleanup. For now, make it correct.

BUG=468889

Change-Id: I800cfabe06615af31c2ccece436ca52aed9fe899
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4820
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

include/openssl/ssl.h

diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h b/include/openssl/ssl.h
index a7e49c9..8b69613 100644
--- a/include/openssl/ssl.h
+++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h
@@ -942,7 +942,6 @@
   uint32_t max_cert_list;
 
   struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
-  int read_ahead;
 
   /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
   void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
@@ -1334,9 +1333,6 @@
   struct ssl3_state_st *s3;  /* SSLv3 variables */
   struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */
 
-  int read_ahead; /* Read as many input bytes as possible
-                   * (for non-blocking reads) */
-
   /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
   void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
                        const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
@@ -1859,7 +1855,6 @@
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n);
-OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_pending(const SSL *s);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd);
@@ -1868,7 +1863,6 @@
 OPENSSL_EXPORT BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str);
-OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,
@@ -2166,11 +2160,6 @@
  * |ctx| */
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
 
-/* TODO(davidben): Deprecate read_ahead functions after https://crbug.com/447431
- * is resolved. */
-OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes);
-
 /* SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list returns the maximum length, in bytes, of a peer
  * certificate chain accepted by |ctx|. */
 OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
@@ -2403,6 +2392,18 @@
 /* SSL_set_tmp_rsa returns one. */
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, const RSA *rsa);
 
+/* SSL_CTX_get_read_head returns zero. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead does nothing. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(SSL_CTX *ctx, int yes);
+
+/* SSL_get_read_head returns zero. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s);
+
+/* SSL_set_read_ahead does nothing. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes);
+
 
 /* Android compatibility section.
  *