Inital import.
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).
(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
diff --git a/ssl/test/runner/handshake_server.go b/ssl/test/runner/handshake_server.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a44a94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/test/runner/handshake_server.go
@@ -0,0 +1,659 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package main
+
+import (
+ "crypto"
+ "crypto/ecdsa"
+ "crypto/rsa"
+ "crypto/subtle"
+ "crypto/x509"
+ "encoding/asn1"
+ "errors"
+ "fmt"
+ "io"
+)
+
+// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
+// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
+type serverHandshakeState struct {
+ c *Conn
+ clientHello *clientHelloMsg
+ hello *serverHelloMsg
+ suite *cipherSuite
+ ellipticOk bool
+ ecdsaOk bool
+ sessionState *sessionState
+ finishedHash finishedHash
+ masterSecret []byte
+ certsFromClient [][]byte
+ cert *Certificate
+}
+
+// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
+func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() error {
+ config := c.config
+
+ // If this is the first server handshake, we generate a random key to
+ // encrypt the tickets with.
+ config.serverInitOnce.Do(config.serverInit)
+
+ hs := serverHandshakeState{
+ c: c,
+ }
+ isResume, err := hs.readClientHello()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ // For an overview of TLS handshaking, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3
+ if isResume {
+ // The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
+ if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if err := hs.sendFinished(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if err := hs.readFinished(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ c.didResume = true
+ } else {
+ // The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
+ // valid so we do a full handshake.
+ if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if err := hs.readFinished(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if err := hs.sendFinished(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+ c.handshakeComplete = true
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message from the client and decides
+// whether we will perform session resumption.
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readClientHello() (isResume bool, err error) {
+ config := hs.c.config
+ c := hs.c
+
+ msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return false, err
+ }
+ var ok bool
+ hs.clientHello, ok = msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
+ if !ok {
+ c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ return false, unexpectedMessageError(hs.clientHello, msg)
+ }
+ c.vers, ok = config.mutualVersion(hs.clientHello.vers)
+ if !ok {
+ c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+ return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered an unsupported, maximum protocol version of %x", hs.clientHello.vers)
+ }
+ c.haveVers = true
+
+ hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
+
+ supportedCurve := false
+ preferredCurves := config.curvePreferences()
+Curves:
+ for _, curve := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves {
+ for _, supported := range preferredCurves {
+ if supported == curve {
+ supportedCurve = true
+ break Curves
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ supportedPointFormat := false
+ for _, pointFormat := range hs.clientHello.supportedPoints {
+ if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
+ supportedPointFormat = true
+ break
+ }
+ }
+ hs.ellipticOk = supportedCurve && supportedPointFormat
+
+ foundCompression := false
+ // We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
+ for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
+ if compression == compressionNone {
+ foundCompression = true
+ break
+ }
+ }
+
+ if !foundCompression {
+ c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ return false, errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
+ }
+
+ hs.hello.vers = c.vers
+ hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
+ _, err = io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hs.hello.random)
+ if err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+ return false, err
+ }
+ hs.hello.secureRenegotiation = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation
+ hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
+ if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
+ c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
+ }
+ // Although sending an empty NPN extension is reasonable, Firefox has
+ // had a bug around this. Best to send nothing at all if
+ // config.NextProtos is empty. See
+ // https://code.google.com/p/go/issues/detail?id=5445.
+ if hs.clientHello.nextProtoNeg && len(config.NextProtos) > 0 {
+ hs.hello.nextProtoNeg = true
+ hs.hello.nextProtos = config.NextProtos
+ }
+
+ if len(config.Certificates) == 0 {
+ c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+ return false, errors.New("tls: no certificates configured")
+ }
+ hs.cert = &config.Certificates[0]
+ if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
+ hs.cert = config.getCertificateForName(hs.clientHello.serverName)
+ }
+
+ _, hs.ecdsaOk = hs.cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
+
+ if hs.checkForResumption() {
+ return true, nil
+ }
+
+ var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16
+ if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites {
+ preferenceList = c.config.cipherSuites()
+ supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
+ } else {
+ preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
+ supportedList = c.config.cipherSuites()
+ }
+
+ for _, id := range preferenceList {
+ if hs.suite = c.tryCipherSuite(id, supportedList, c.vers, hs.ellipticOk, hs.ecdsaOk); hs.suite != nil {
+ break
+ }
+ }
+
+ if hs.suite == nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ return false, errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
+ }
+
+ return false, nil
+}
+
+// checkForResumption returns true if we should perform resumption on this connection.
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
+ c := hs.c
+
+ var ok bool
+ if hs.sessionState, ok = c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket); !ok {
+ return false
+ }
+
+ if hs.sessionState.vers > hs.clientHello.vers {
+ return false
+ }
+ if vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion(hs.sessionState.vers); !ok || vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
+ return false
+ }
+
+ cipherSuiteOk := false
+ // Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
+ for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
+ if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
+ cipherSuiteOk = true
+ break
+ }
+ }
+ if !cipherSuiteOk {
+ return false
+ }
+
+ // Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
+ hs.suite = c.tryCipherSuite(hs.sessionState.cipherSuite, c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.sessionState.vers, hs.ellipticOk, hs.ecdsaOk)
+ if hs.suite == nil {
+ return false
+ }
+
+ sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
+ needClientCerts := c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAnyClientCert || c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAndVerifyClientCert
+ if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
+ return false
+ }
+ if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
+ return false
+ }
+
+ return true
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
+ c := hs.c
+
+ hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+ // We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
+ // that we're doing a resumption.
+ hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
+
+ hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal())
+
+ if len(hs.sessionState.certificates) > 0 {
+ if _, err := hs.processCertsFromClient(hs.sessionState.certificates); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+
+ hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
+ config := hs.c.config
+ c := hs.c
+
+ if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
+ hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
+ }
+
+ hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !config.SessionTicketsDisabled
+ hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+
+ hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal())
+
+ certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
+ certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
+
+ if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
+ certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
+ certStatus.statusType = statusTypeOCSP
+ certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal())
+ }
+
+ keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
+ skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
+ if err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ return err
+ }
+ if skx != nil {
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal())
+ }
+
+ if config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
+ // Request a client certificate
+ certReq := new(certificateRequestMsg)
+ certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
+ byte(certTypeRSASign),
+ byte(certTypeECDSASign),
+ }
+ if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
+ certReq.hasSignatureAndHash = true
+ certReq.signatureAndHashes = supportedClientCertSignatureAlgorithms
+ }
+
+ // An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
+ // the client that it may send any certificate in response
+ // to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
+ // we can send them down, so that the client can choose
+ // an appropriate certificate to give to us.
+ if config.ClientCAs != nil {
+ certReq.certificateAuthorities = config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
+ }
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal())
+ }
+
+ helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal())
+
+ var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
+
+ msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ var ok bool
+ // If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
+ // certificate message, even if it's empty.
+ if config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
+ if certMsg, ok = msg.(*certificateMsg); !ok {
+ c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
+ }
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+
+ if len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
+ // The client didn't actually send a certificate
+ switch config.ClientAuth {
+ case RequireAnyClientCert, RequireAndVerifyClientCert:
+ c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+ return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub, err = hs.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificates)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Get client key exchange
+ ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
+ if !ok {
+ c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
+ }
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
+
+ // If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
+ // the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
+ // clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
+ // handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
+ // to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
+ // possession of the private key of the certificate.
+ if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
+ msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
+ if !ok {
+ c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
+ }
+
+ switch key := pub.(type) {
+ case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+ ecdsaSig := new(ecdsaSignature)
+ if _, err = asn1.Unmarshal(certVerify.signature, ecdsaSig); err != nil {
+ break
+ }
+ if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
+ err = errors.New("ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values")
+ break
+ }
+ digest, _, _ := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureECDSA)
+ if !ecdsa.Verify(key, digest, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) {
+ err = errors.New("ECDSA verification failure")
+ break
+ }
+ case *rsa.PublicKey:
+ digest, hashFunc, _ := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureRSA)
+ err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(key, hashFunc, digest, certVerify.signature)
+ }
+ if err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+ return errors.New("could not validate signature of connection nonces: " + err.Error())
+ }
+
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+ }
+
+ preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
+ if err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ return err
+ }
+ hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
+ c := hs.c
+
+ clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
+ keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
+
+ var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
+ var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
+
+ if hs.suite.aead == nil {
+ clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
+ clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
+ serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
+ serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
+ } else {
+ clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
+ serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
+ }
+
+ c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
+ c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished() error {
+ c := hs.c
+
+ c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
+ if err := c.in.error(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ if hs.hello.nextProtoNeg {
+ msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg)
+ if !ok {
+ c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ return unexpectedMessageError(nextProto, msg)
+ }
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
+ c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto
+ }
+
+ msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
+ if !ok {
+ c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
+ }
+
+ verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
+ if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
+ subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
+ c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
+ }
+
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
+ if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ c := hs.c
+ m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
+
+ var err error
+ state := sessionState{
+ vers: c.vers,
+ cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
+ masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
+ certificates: hs.certsFromClient,
+ }
+ m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(&state)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ m.ticket = make([]byte, 16105+62)
+ for i := range m.ticket {
+ m.ticket[i] = 'A'
+ }
+
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal())
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished() error {
+ c := hs.c
+
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
+
+ finished := new(finishedMsg)
+ finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())
+
+ c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
+// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
+// the public key of the leaf certificate.
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processCertsFromClient(certificates [][]byte) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+ c := hs.c
+
+ hs.certsFromClient = certificates
+ certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
+ var err error
+ for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
+ if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+ return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
+ }
+ }
+
+ if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
+ opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
+ Roots: c.config.ClientCAs,
+ CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
+ Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
+ KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
+ }
+
+ for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
+ opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
+ }
+
+ chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
+ if err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+ return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to verify client's certificate: " + err.Error())
+ }
+
+ ok := false
+ for _, ku := range certs[0].ExtKeyUsage {
+ if ku == x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth {
+ ok = true
+ break
+ }
+ }
+ if !ok {
+ c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ return nil, errors.New("tls: client's certificate's extended key usage doesn't permit it to be used for client authentication")
+ }
+
+ c.verifiedChains = chains
+ }
+
+ if len(certs) > 0 {
+ var pub crypto.PublicKey
+ switch key := certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
+ case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey:
+ pub = key
+ default:
+ c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client's certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
+ }
+ c.peerCertificates = certs
+ return pub, nil
+ }
+
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
+// tryCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite with the given id if that cipher suite
+// is acceptable to use.
+func (c *Conn) tryCipherSuite(id uint16, supportedCipherSuites []uint16, version uint16, ellipticOk, ecdsaOk bool) *cipherSuite {
+ for _, supported := range supportedCipherSuites {
+ if id == supported {
+ var candidate *cipherSuite
+
+ for _, s := range cipherSuites {
+ if s.id == id {
+ candidate = s
+ break
+ }
+ }
+ if candidate == nil {
+ continue
+ }
+ // Don't select a ciphersuite which we can't
+ // support for this client.
+ if (candidate.flags&suiteECDHE != 0) && !ellipticOk {
+ continue
+ }
+ if (candidate.flags&suiteECDSA != 0) != ecdsaOk {
+ continue
+ }
+ if version < VersionTLS12 && candidate.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
+ continue
+ }
+ return candidate
+ }
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}