Inital import.
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).
(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..061bc49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,488 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+extern const RSA_METHOD RSA_default_method;
+
+RSA *RSA_new(void) { return RSA_new_method(NULL); }
+
+RSA *RSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
+ RSA *rsa = (RSA *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA));
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_new_method, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memset(rsa, 0, sizeof(RSA));
+
+ if (engine) {
+ rsa->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA_method(engine);
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->meth == NULL) {
+ rsa->meth = (RSA_METHOD*) &RSA_default_method;
+ }
+ METHOD_ref(rsa->meth);
+
+ rsa->references = 1;
+ rsa->flags = rsa->meth->flags;
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, rsa, &rsa->ex_data)) {
+ METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->meth->init && !rsa->meth->init(rsa)) {
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
+ METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return rsa;
+}
+
+void RSA_free(RSA *rsa) {
+ unsigned u;
+
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (CRYPTO_add(&rsa->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA) > 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->meth->finish) {
+ rsa->meth->finish(rsa);
+ }
+ METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
+
+ if (rsa->n != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->n);
+ if (rsa->e != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->e);
+ if (rsa->d != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->d);
+ if (rsa->p != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->p);
+ if (rsa->q != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->q);
+ if (rsa->dmp1 != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->dmp1);
+ if (rsa->dmq1 != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->dmq1);
+ if (rsa->iqmp != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->iqmp);
+ for (u = 0; u < rsa->num_blindings; u++) {
+ BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blindings[u]);
+ }
+ if (rsa->blindings != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings);
+ if (rsa->blindings_inuse != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse);
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa);
+}
+
+int RSA_up_ref(RSA *rsa) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&rsa->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+ if (rsa->meth->keygen) {
+ return rsa->meth->keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+ }
+
+ return RSA_default_method.keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+}
+
+int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+ if (rsa->meth->encrypt) {
+ return rsa->meth->encrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+ }
+
+ return RSA_default_method.encrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len,
+ padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding) {
+ size_t out_len;
+
+ if (!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return out_len;
+}
+
+int RSA_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+ if (rsa->meth->sign_raw) {
+ return rsa->meth->sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+ }
+
+ return RSA_default_method.sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len,
+ padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding) {
+ size_t out_len;
+
+ if (!RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return out_len;
+}
+
+int RSA_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+ if (rsa->meth->decrypt) {
+ return rsa->meth->decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+ }
+
+ return RSA_default_method.decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len,
+ padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding) {
+ size_t out_len;
+
+ if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return out_len;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+ if (rsa->meth->verify_raw) {
+ return rsa->meth->verify_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+ }
+
+ return RSA_default_method.verify_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len,
+ padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+ int padding) {
+ size_t out_len;
+
+ if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return out_len;
+}
+
+unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa) {
+ return BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+}
+
+int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, argl, argp, new_func,
+ dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *d, int idx, void *arg) {
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *d, int idx) {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+/* SSL_SIG_LENGTH is the size of an SSL/TLS (prior to TLS 1.2) signature: it's
+ * the length of an MD5 and SHA1 hash. */
+static const unsigned SSL_SIG_LENGTH = 36;
+
+/* pkcs1_sig_prefix contains the ASN.1, DER encoded prefix for a hash that is
+ * to be signed with PKCS#1. */
+struct pkcs1_sig_prefix {
+ /* nid identifies the hash function. */
+ int nid;
+ /* len is the number of bytes of |bytes| which are valid. */
+ uint8_t len;
+ /* bytes contains the DER bytes. */
+ uint8_t bytes[19];
+};
+
+/* kPKCS1SigPrefixes contains the ASN.1 prefixes for PKCS#1 signatures with
+ * different hash functions. */
+static const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix kPKCS1SigPrefixes[] = {
+ {
+ NID_md5,
+ 18,
+ {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
+ 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_sha1,
+ 15,
+ {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05,
+ 0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_sha224,
+ 19,
+ {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_sha256,
+ 19,
+ {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_sha384,
+ 19,
+ {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_sha512,
+ 19,
+ {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_ripemd160,
+ 14,
+ {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x28, 0xcf, 0x06, 0x03, 0x00, 0x31,
+ 0x04, 0x14},
+ },
+ {
+ NID_undef, 0, {0},
+ },
+};
+
+/* TODO(fork): mostly new code, needs careful review. */
+
+/* pkcs1_prefixed_msg builds a PKCS#1, prefixed version of |msg| for the given
+ * hash function and sets |out_msg| to point to it. On successful return,
+ * |*out_msg| may be allocated memory and, if so, |*is_alloced| will be 1. */
+static int pkcs1_prefixed_msg(uint8_t **out_msg, size_t *out_msg_len,
+ int *is_alloced, int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg,
+ size_t msg_len) {
+ unsigned i;
+ const uint8_t* prefix = NULL;
+ unsigned prefix_len;
+ uint8_t *signed_msg;
+ unsigned signed_msg_len;
+
+ if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length. */
+ if (msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_sign, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *out_msg = (uint8_t*) msg;
+ *out_msg_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+ *is_alloced = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix *sig_prefix = &kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i];
+ if (sig_prefix->nid == hash_nid) {
+ prefix = sig_prefix->bytes;
+ prefix_len = sig_prefix->len;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (prefix == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_sign, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ signed_msg_len = prefix_len + msg_len;
+ if (signed_msg_len < prefix_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_sign, RSA_R_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ signed_msg = OPENSSL_malloc(signed_msg_len);
+ if (!signed_msg) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_sign, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(signed_msg, prefix, prefix_len);
+ memcpy(signed_msg + prefix_len, msg, msg_len);
+
+ *out_msg = signed_msg;
+ *out_msg_len = signed_msg_len;
+ *is_alloced = 1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_sign(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, uint8_t *out,
+ unsigned *out_len, RSA *rsa) {
+ const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+ int ret = 0;
+ uint8_t *signed_msg;
+ size_t signed_msg_len;
+ int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
+ size_t size_t_out_len;
+
+ if (rsa->meth->sign) {
+ return rsa->meth->sign(hash_nid, in, in_len, out, out_len, rsa);
+ }
+
+ if (!pkcs1_prefixed_msg(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len, &signed_msg_is_alloced,
+ hash_nid, in, in_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa_size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE ||
+ signed_msg_len > rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_sign, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &size_t_out_len, out, rsa_size, signed_msg,
+ signed_msg_len, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
+ *out_len = size_t_out_len;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+finish:
+ if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
+ OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) {
+ const size_t rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+ uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
+ size_t signed_msg_len, len;
+ int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
+
+ if (rsa->meth->verify) {
+ return rsa->meth->verify(hash_nid, msg, msg_len, sig, sig_len, rsa);
+ }
+
+ if (sig_len != rsa_size) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1 && msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+ if (!buf) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &len, buf, rsa_size, sig, sig_len,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!pkcs1_prefixed_msg(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len, &signed_msg_is_alloced,
+ hash_nid, msg, msg_len)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (len != signed_msg_len || CRYPTO_memcmp(buf, signed_msg, len) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+out:
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
+ OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}