Verify RSA private key operation regardless of whether CRT is used.
Previously, the verification was only done when using the CRT method,
as the CRT method has been shown to be extremely sensitive to fault
attacks. However, there's no reason to avoid doing the verification
when the non-CRT method is used (performance-sensitive applications
should always be using the CRT-capable keys).
Previously, when we detected a fault (attack) through this verification,
libcrypto would fall back to the non-CRT method and assume that the
non-CRT method would give a correct result, despite having just
detecting corruption that is likely from an attack. Instead, just give
up, like NSS does.
Previously, the code tried to handle the case where the input was not
reduced mod rsa->n. This is (was) not possible, so avoid trying to
handle that. This simplifies the equality check and lets us use
|CRYPTO_memcmp|.
Change-Id: I78d1e55520a1c8c280cae2b7256e12ff6290507d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7582
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
diff --git a/include/openssl/bn.h b/include/openssl/bn.h
index 1dea3c5..c66f887 100644
--- a/include/openssl/bn.h
+++ b/include/openssl/bn.h
@@ -441,6 +441,11 @@
* value of |b|, respectively. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+/* BN_equal_consttime returns one if |a| is equal to |b|, and zero otherwise.
+ * It takes an amount of time dependent on the sizes of |a| and |b|, but
+ * independent of the contents (including the signs) of |a| and |b|. */
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int BN_equal_consttime(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+
/* BN_abs_is_word returns one if the absolute value of |bn| equals |w| and zero
* otherwise. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int BN_abs_is_word(const BIGNUM *bn, BN_ULONG w);