commit 6dc8bf62627b81a53f300d968a50cdc90ea722c4
author David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Wed Jul 19 16:38:21 2017 -0400
committer CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Thu Jul 20 21:10:02 2017 +0000
tree f529b635fdfcc8621fdd4130ec1381223b295c62
parent bf1117d1fd755188d2562c7b32bd00ab3a7bd5d1

Convert SSL_TRANSCRIPT to C++.

Bug: 132
Change-Id: I2d7cb45d56e8dcb223fbc5838922fdbe6f28ded7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18264
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

ssl/tls13_enc.cc

diff --git a/ssl/tls13_enc.cc b/ssl/tls13_enc.cc
index 14dbb9d..1ae4849 100644
--- a/ssl/tls13_enc.cc
+++ b/ssl/tls13_enc.cc
@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@
 
 static int init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version,
                               int algorithm_prf) {
-  if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init_hash(&hs->transcript, version, algorithm_prf)) {
+  if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(version, algorithm_prf)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  hs->hash_len = SSL_TRANSCRIPT_digest_len(&hs->transcript);
+  hs->hash_len = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
 
   /* Initialize the secret to the zero key. */
   OPENSSL_memset(hs->secret, 0, hs->hash_len);
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
     return 0;
   }
 
-  SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
+  hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -64,9 +64,8 @@
 
 int tls13_advance_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const uint8_t *in,
                                size_t len) {
-  return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len,
-                      SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), in, len, hs->secret,
-                      hs->hash_len);
+  return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), in,
+                      len, hs->secret, hs->hash_len);
 }
 
 static int hkdf_expand_label(uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest,
@@ -105,12 +104,11 @@
                          const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len) {
   uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   size_t context_hash_len;
-  if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_get_hash(&hs->transcript, context_hash,
-                               &context_hash_len)) {
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  return hkdf_expand_label(out, SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), hs->secret,
+  return hkdf_expand_label(out, hs->transcript.Digest(), hs->secret,
                            hs->hash_len, label, label_len, context_hash,
                            context_hash_len, len);
 }
@@ -313,11 +311,9 @@
 
   uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   size_t context_hash_len;
-  if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_get_hash(&hs->transcript, context_hash,
-                               &context_hash_len) ||
-      !tls13_verify_data(SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), out, out_len,
-                         traffic_secret, hs->hash_len, context_hash,
-                         context_hash_len)) {
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len) ||
+      !tls13_verify_data(hs->transcript.Digest(), out, out_len, traffic_secret,
+                         hs->hash_len, context_hash, context_hash_len)) {
     return 0;
   }
   return 1;
@@ -387,8 +383,8 @@
   uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   unsigned context_len;
   if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), digest, NULL) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), hs->transcript.buffer->data,
-                        hs->transcript.buffer->length) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), hs->transcript.buffer_data(),
+                        hs->transcript.buffer_len()) ||
       !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), msg, len - hash_len - 3) ||
       !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), context, &context_len)) {
     return 0;
@@ -407,7 +403,7 @@
 
 int tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
                             CBS *binders) {
-  size_t hash_len = SSL_TRANSCRIPT_digest_len(&hs->transcript);
+  size_t hash_len = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
 
   /* Get the full ClientHello, including message header. It must be large enough
    * to exclude the binders. */
@@ -423,14 +419,13 @@
   uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   unsigned context_len;
   if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&message), CBS_len(&message) - CBS_len(binders) - 2,
-                  context, &context_len, SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript),
-                  NULL)) {
+                  context, &context_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), NULL)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
   uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
   CBS binder;
-  if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript),
+  if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, hs->transcript.Digest(),
                         session->master_key, session->master_key_length,
                         context, context_len, hash_len) ||
       /* We only consider the first PSK, so compare against the first binder. */