Switch more files to C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I2b0c87262a5a529ea264ea8ce2d11c2dba0ec1c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17766
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.cc b/ssl/t1_enc.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c224240
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,562 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+/* tls1_P_hash computes the TLS P_<hash> function as described in RFC 5246,
+ * section 5. It XORs |out_len| bytes to |out|, using |md| as the hash and
+ * |secret| as the secret. |seed1| through |seed3| are concatenated to form the
+ * seed parameter. It returns one on success and zero on failure. */
+static int tls1_P_hash(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
+ const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
+ const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
+ const uint8_t *seed3, size_t seed3_len) {
+ HMAC_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
+ uint8_t A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned A1_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ size_t chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_init, secret, secret_len, md, NULL) ||
+ !HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init) ||
+ !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len) ||
+ !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len) ||
+ !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len) ||
+ !HMAC_Final(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned len;
+ uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init) ||
+ !HMAC_Update(&ctx, A1, A1_len) ||
+ /* Save a copy of |ctx| to compute the next A1 value below. */
+ (out_len > chunk && !HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx)) ||
+ !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len) ||
+ !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len) ||
+ !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len) ||
+ !HMAC_Final(&ctx, hmac, &len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ assert(len == chunk);
+
+ /* XOR the result into |out|. */
+ if (len > out_len) {
+ len = out_len;
+ }
+ unsigned i;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ out[i] ^= hmac[i];
+ }
+ out += len;
+ out_len -= len;
+
+ if (out_len == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate the next A1 value. */
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tls1_prf(const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
+ const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
+ size_t label_len, const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
+ const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len) {
+ if (out_len == 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, out_len);
+
+ if (digest == EVP_md5_sha1()) {
+ /* If using the MD5/SHA1 PRF, |secret| is partitioned between SHA-1 and
+ * MD5, MD5 first. */
+ size_t secret_half = secret_len - (secret_len / 2);
+ if (!tls1_P_hash(out, out_len, EVP_md5(), secret, secret_half,
+ (const uint8_t *)label, label_len, seed1, seed1_len, seed2,
+ seed2_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Note that, if |secret_len| is odd, the two halves share a byte. */
+ secret = secret + (secret_len - secret_half);
+ secret_len = secret_half;
+
+ digest = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_P_hash(out, out_len, digest, secret, secret_len,
+ (const uint8_t *)label, label_len, seed1, seed1_len, seed2,
+ seed2_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_prf(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *secret,
+ size_t secret_len, const char *label, size_t label_len,
+ const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
+ const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX md5;
+ EVP_MD_CTX sha1;
+ uint8_t buf[16], smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t c = 'A';
+ size_t i, j, k;
+
+ k = 0;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&sha1);
+ for (i = 0; i < out_len; i += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ k++;
+ if (k > sizeof(buf)) {
+ /* bug: 'buf' is too small for this ciphersuite */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < k; j++) {
+ buf[j] = c;
+ }
+ c++;
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&sha1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&sha1, buf, k);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&sha1, secret, secret_len);
+ /* |label| is ignored for SSLv3. */
+ if (seed1_len) {
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&sha1, seed1, seed1_len);
+ }
+ if (seed2_len) {
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&sha1, seed2, seed2_len);
+ }
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&sha1, smd, NULL);
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md5, EVP_md5(), NULL)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md5, secret, secret_len);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md5, smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (i + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH > out_len) {
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md5, smd, NULL);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out, smd, out_len - i);
+ } else {
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md5, out, NULL);
+ }
+
+ out += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&sha1);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ if (hs->key_block_len != 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->session;
+ if (hs->new_session != NULL) {
+ session = hs->new_session;
+ }
+
+ const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
+ size_t mac_secret_len, fixed_iv_len;
+ if (session->cipher == NULL ||
+ !ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &mac_secret_len, &fixed_iv_len,
+ session->cipher, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl),
+ SSL_is_dtls(ssl))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
+ if (mac_secret_len > 0) {
+ /* For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher suites) the
+ * key length reported by |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will include the MAC key
+ * bytes and initial implicit IV. */
+ if (key_len < mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ key_len -= mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len;
+ }
+
+ assert(mac_secret_len < 256);
+ assert(key_len < 256);
+ assert(fixed_iv_len < 256);
+
+ ssl->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len = (uint8_t)mac_secret_len;
+ ssl->s3->tmp.new_key_len = (uint8_t)key_len;
+ ssl->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len = (uint8_t)fixed_iv_len;
+
+ size_t key_block_len = SSL_get_key_block_len(ssl);
+
+ uint8_t *keyblock = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(key_block_len);
+ if (keyblock == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_generate_key_block(ssl, keyblock, key_block_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(keyblock);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ assert(key_block_len < 256);
+ hs->key_block_len = (uint8_t)key_block_len;
+ hs->key_block = keyblock;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int which) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ /* Ensure the key block is set up. */
+ if (!tls1_setup_key_block(hs)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message - i.e. we
+ * need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have just written one. */
+ const char is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0;
+ /* use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client write"
+ * direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a ChangeCipherSpec,
+ * or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. */
+ const char use_client_keys = which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE ||
+ which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+
+ size_t mac_secret_len = ssl->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len;
+ size_t key_len = ssl->s3->tmp.new_key_len;
+ size_t iv_len = ssl->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len;
+ assert((mac_secret_len + key_len + iv_len) * 2 == hs->key_block_len);
+
+ const uint8_t *key_data = hs->key_block;
+ const uint8_t *client_write_mac_secret = key_data;
+ key_data += mac_secret_len;
+ const uint8_t *server_write_mac_secret = key_data;
+ key_data += mac_secret_len;
+ const uint8_t *client_write_key = key_data;
+ key_data += key_len;
+ const uint8_t *server_write_key = key_data;
+ key_data += key_len;
+ const uint8_t *client_write_iv = key_data;
+ key_data += iv_len;
+ const uint8_t *server_write_iv = key_data;
+ key_data += iv_len;
+
+ const uint8_t *mac_secret, *key, *iv;
+ if (use_client_keys) {
+ mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret;
+ key = client_write_key;
+ iv = client_write_iv;
+ } else {
+ mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret;
+ key = server_write_key;
+ iv = server_write_iv;
+ }
+
+ SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx = SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(
+ is_read ? evp_aead_open : evp_aead_seal, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl), SSL_is_dtls(ssl),
+ hs->new_cipher, key, key_len, mac_secret, mac_secret_len, iv, iv_len);
+ if (aead_ctx == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (is_read) {
+ return ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_key_block_len(const SSL *ssl) {
+ return 2 * ((size_t)ssl->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len +
+ (size_t)ssl->s3->tmp.new_key_len +
+ (size_t)ssl->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_generate_key_block(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ return ssl3_prf(out, out_len, SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key,
+ SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key_length,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
+ ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(
+ SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher->algorithm_prf, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl));
+ if (digest == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return tls1_prf(digest, out, out_len, SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key,
+ SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key_length,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
+ ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+}
+
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out,
+ const uint8_t *premaster,
+ size_t premaster_len) {
+ const SSL *ssl = hs->ssl;
+ if (hs->extended_master_secret) {
+ uint8_t digests[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t digests_len;
+ if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_get_hash(&hs->transcript, digests, &digests_len) ||
+ !tls1_prf(SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), out,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster, premaster_len,
+ TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, digests,
+ digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!ssl3_prf(out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster, premaster_len,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!tls1_prf(SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), out,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster, premaster_len,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
+}
+
+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
+ const char *label, size_t label_len,
+ const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+ int use_context) {
+ if (!ssl->s3->have_version || ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Exporters may not be used in the middle of a renegotiation. */
+ if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !SSL_in_false_start(ssl)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ return tls13_export_keying_material(ssl, out, out_len, label, label_len,
+ context, context_len, use_context);
+ }
+
+ size_t seed_len = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ if (use_context) {
+ if (context_len >= 1u << 16) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ seed_len += 2 + context_len;
+ }
+ uint8_t *seed = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len);
+ if (seed == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(seed, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(seed + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, ssl->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ if (use_context) {
+ seed[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = (uint8_t)(context_len >> 8);
+ seed[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(seed + 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 2, context, context_len);
+ }
+
+ const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(
+ SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher->algorithm_prf, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl));
+ if (digest == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ int ret = tls1_prf(digest, out, out_len, SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key,
+ SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key_length, label, label_len,
+ seed, seed_len, NULL, 0);
+ OPENSSL_free(seed);
+ return ret;
+}